scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Author

Christopher Harding

Bio: Christopher Harding is an academic researcher from Aberystwyth University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cartel & Criminal law. The author has an hindex of 8, co-authored 35 publications receiving 276 citations.

Papers
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The European cartel offence as discussed by the authors is defined as an agreement or concertation for anti-competitive purposes, which is defined by the European Commission and the Community Court of the European Union.
Abstract: The discussion in this paper examines the emergence of what may now be fairly described as the ‘European cartel offence’: that species of infringement of Article 81 of the EC Treaty, increasingly referred to as ‘hard core cartel’ activity, connoting real delinquency which justifies the imposition of severe penal sanctions. This development is significant not just as a matter of more explicit regulation within the field of competition law, but also as part of a wider context of vilification and criminalisation of certain well-established forms of cartel behaviour. As national systems (such as that in Britain) have introduced new criminal offences in relation to cartels, it is illuminating to consider and compare the evolution of the supranational ‘European cartel offence’. Having its basis in the infringement of Article 81 of the EC Treaty, the offence is necessarily one of collusion, being an agreement or concertation for anti-competitive purposes. As such, the more specific nature of the ‘offence’ has been established incrementally, very much as the product of argument presented in appeals relating to issues of evidence and penalties. It has been necessary to consider whether the offence resides in the planning or the implementation of anti-competitive activity, or both, and whether it comprises specific acts or a continuing pattern of behaviour. The mature version of the ‘offence’, worked out in the jurisprudence of the European Commission and the Community Courts, is based on the organising concept of ‘the cartel as a whole’. This process of forging a ‘European cartel offence’ provides an instructive lesson in the legal construction of criminality and the resort to a form of organisational responsibility. It also points to the emergence of a bifurcated system of both individual and corporate liability in this context.

2 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors compared the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the male synthetic sling with those of the artificial urinary sphincter surgery in men with persistent stress urinary incontinence after prostate surgery.
Abstract: Background Stress urinary incontinence is common in men after prostate surgery and can be difficult to improve. Implantation of an artificial urinary sphincter is the most common surgical procedure for persistent stress urinary incontinence, but it requires specialist surgical skills, and revisions may be necessary. In addition, the sphincter is relatively expensive and its operation requires adequate patient dexterity. New surgical approaches include the male synthetic sling, which is emerging as a possible alternative. However, robust comparable data, derived from randomised controlled trials, on the relative safety and efficacy of the male synthetic sling and the artificial urinary sphincter are lacking. Objective We aimed to compare the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the male synthetic sling with those of the artificial urinary sphincter surgery in men with persistent stress urinary incontinence after prostate surgery. Design This was a multicentre, non-inferiority randomised controlled trial, with a parallel non-randomised cohort and embedded qualitative component. Randomised controlled trial allocation was carried out by remote web-based randomisation (1 : 1), minimised on previous prostate surgery (radical prostatectomy or transurethral resection of the prostate), radiotherapy (or not, in relation to prostate surgery) and centre. Surgeons and participants were not blind to the treatment received. Non-randomised cohort allocation was participant and/or surgeon preference. Setting The trial was set in 28 UK urological centres in the NHS. Participants Participants were men with urodynamic stress incontinence after prostate surgery for whom surgery was deemed appropriate. Exclusion criteria included previous sling or artificial urinary sphincter surgery, unresolved bladder neck contracture or urethral stricture after prostate surgery, and an inability to give informed consent or complete trial documentation. Interventions We compared male synthetic sling with artificial urinary sphincter. Main outcome measures The clinical primary outcome measure was men’s reports of continence (assessed from questions 3 and 4 of the International Consultation on Incontinence Questionnaire-Urinary Incontinence Short Form) at 12 months post randomisation (with a non-inferiority margin of 15%). The primary economic outcome was cost-effectiveness (assessed as the incremental cost per quality-adjusted life-year at 24 months post randomisation). Results In total, 380 men were included in the randomised controlled trial ( n = 190 in each group), and 99 out of 100 men were included in the non-randomised cohort. In terms of continence, the male sling was non-inferior to the artificial urinary sphincter (intention-to-treat estimated absolute risk difference –0.034, 95% confidence interval –0.117 to 0.048; non-inferiority p = 0.003), indicating a lower success rate in those randomised to receive a sling, but with a confidence interval excluding the non-inferiority margin of –15%. In both groups, treatment resulted in a reduction in incontinence symptoms (as measured by the International Consultation on Incontinence Questionnaire-Urinary Incontinence Short Form). Between baseline and 12 months’ follow-up, the International Consultation on Incontinence Questionnaire-Urinary Incontinence Short Form score fell from 16.1 to 8.7 in the male sling group and from 16.4 to 7.5 in the artificial urinary sphincter group (mean difference for the time point at 12 months 1.30, 95% confidence interval 0.11 to 2.49; p = 0.032). The number of serious adverse events was small (male sling group, n = 8; artificial urinary sphincter group, n = 15; one man in the artificial urinary sphincter group experienced three serious adverse events). Quality-of-life scores improved and satisfaction was high in both groups. Secondary outcomes that showed statistically significant differences favoured the artificial urinary sphincter over the male sling. Outcomes of the non-randomised cohort were similar. The male sling cost less than the artificial sphincter but was associated with a smaller quality-adjusted life-year gain. The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio for male slings compared with an artificial urinary sphincter suggests that there is a cost saving of £425,870 for each quality-adjusted life-year lost. The probability that slings would be cost-effective at a £30,000 willingness-to-pay threshold for a quality-adjusted life-year was 99%. Limitations Follow-up beyond 24 months is not available. More specific surgical/device-related pain outcomes were not included. Conclusions Continence rates improved from baseline, with the male sling non-inferior to the artificial urinary sphincter. Symptoms and quality of life significantly improved in both groups. Men were generally satisfied with both procedures. Overall, secondary and post hoc analyses favoured the artificial urinary sphincter over the male sling. Future work Participant reports of any further surgery, satisfaction and quality of life at 5-year follow-up will inform longer-term outcomes. Administration of an additional pain questionnaire would provide further information on pain levels after both surgeries. Trial registration This trial is registered as ISRCTN49212975. Funding This project was funded by the National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR) Health Technology Assessment programme and will be published in full in Health Technology Assessment ; Vol. 26, No. 36. See the NIHR Journals Library website for further project information.

2 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a broad distinction is drawn between two major categories of economic right, namely, integration rights and vulnerability rights, which serve to enhance the opportunities of the economically disadvantaged, those sections of the population at risk of social exclusion and poverty.
Abstract: The discussion here takes stock of and analyses the way in which ideas of economic freedom and basic economic rights have evolved during the last half century to generate legal discourse and legal action, and with what effect, with particular reference to Europe as a site for such developments. It is necessary to probe the understanding and purpose of such ‘rights talk’ and also to set the discourse in relevant ideological contexts. For the purpose of this exercise, a broad distinction is drawn between two major categories of economic right. The first category may be broadly described as ‘integration rights’—entrepreneurial in character, forward‐looking and opportunistic in a historical context of supranational integration and trade liberalisation. The second category, in contrast, may be termed ‘vulnerability rights’; these are more protective in character, and serve to enhance the opportunities of the economically disadvantaged, those sections of the population at risk of social exclusion and poverty. An assessment is made, on the one hand, of the achievement of the movement to exploit integration rights, and on the other hand, the prospect for the mobilisation and assertion of vulnerability rights in the wake of governmental policies of austerity

1 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore further the rationale for criminalisation of involvement in the activity of business cartels and address both the reasons which may be put forward to justify use of criminal l...
Abstract: This paper explores further the rationale for criminalisation of involvement in the activity of business cartels and addresses both the reasons which may be put forward to justify use of criminal l...

1 citations


Cited by
More filters
MonographDOI
07 Jun 2018
TL;DR: In this article, the authors track the historical development of European criminal law, offering a detailed critical analysis of the criminal justice systems responsible for its implementation, and provide a thorough understanding of European Criminal Law and the institutions involved.
Abstract: Since their creation, the European Union and the Council of Europe have worked to harmonise the justice systems of their member states. This project has been met with a series of challenges. European Criminal Law offers a compelling insight into the development and functions of European criminal law. It tracks the historical development of European criminal law, offering a detailed critical analysis of the criminal justice systems responsible for its implementation. While the rapid expansion and transnationalisation of criminal law is a necessary response to the growing numbers of free movement of persons and goods, it has serious implications for the rights of European citizens and needs to be balanced with rights protections. With its close analysis of secondary legislation and reliance on a wide variety of original sources, this book provides a thorough understanding of European Criminal Law and the institutions involved.

236 citations

Book
01 Aug 2006
TL;DR: This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 1999-2004 and describes the properties of a collusive outcome, monitoring and punishment methods for enforcing it, the frequency of meetings, the organizational structure of cartels, and what preceded cartel formation.
Abstract: This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 2000-2004. It describes the properties of a collusive outcome in terms of the setting of price and a market allocation, monitoring of agreements with respect to price but more importantly sales, punishment methods for enforcing an agreement and also the use of buy-backs to compensate cartel members, methods for responding to external disruptions from non-cartel suppliers and handling over-zealous sales representatives, and operational procedures in terms of the frequency of meetings and the cartel’s organizational structure.

221 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards and argue that rewarding individuals, including firm employees, can deter collusion in a more effective way, and explore explanations for the puzzling fact that managers keep incriminating evidence and argue reward programs actually provide additional incentives for keeping such evidence.

216 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper presented a unique regression analysis of social-science estimates of the size of cartel overcharges and found that overcharges are significantly higher for durable international cartels and are declining as antitrust enforcement regimes have stiffened.
Abstract: The article presents a unique regression analysis of social-science estimates of the size of cartel overcharges. More than 800 overcharge rates were collected from a variety of published sources that have appeared in the literature during the last 125 years. A meta-analysis of overcharges from 395 cartel episodes finds that duration, legal environment, and organizational characteristics of cartels explain the variation on overcharge rates to a greater extent than the type of publication or the method of overcharge analysis. In particular, overcharges are significantly higher for durable international cartels and are declining as antitrust enforcement regimes have stiffened. Historical case studies and government reports calculate lower overcharges, whereas antitrust authorities arrive at relatively high rates.

155 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the impact of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's cartel enforcement activity on business regulation has been investigated and empirically evidence on the effect of the enforcement action on the compliance of business regulation is presented.
Abstract: Deterrence will often fail because it falls into the 'deterrence trap' - penalties are either not large enough or so large they exceed the capacity to pay. Responsive regulation, by contrast, builds commitment to compliance through moral suasion backed up by tough enforcement action. Empirical evidence on the impact of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's cartel enforcement activity shows that in overcoming the deterrence trap, responsive regulators can fall into 'compliance trap.' The 'compliance trap' occurs where there is a lack of political and cultural support for the moral seriousness of the law it must enforce, such as is the case with much of the law relating to business regulation. The regulator can choose to nevertheless take enforcement action in a way that garners compliance by communicating the moral seriousness of breaches of the law. If they do so, however, their enforcement action will ultimately lack legitimacy in the eyes of business regulatees. Most regulators most of the time will end up taking the easy option of enforcing the law 'softly' or formalistically, and therefore ineffectively.

145 citations