scispace - formally typeset
C

Christopher S. Armstrong

Researcher at University of Pennsylvania

Publications -  84
Citations -  8432

Christopher S. Armstrong is an academic researcher from University of Pennsylvania. The author has contributed to research in topics: Executive compensation & Corporate governance. The author has an hindex of 31, co-authored 82 publications receiving 7106 citations. Previous affiliations of Christopher S. Armstrong include Stanford University.

Papers
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI

The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting

TL;DR: In this article, the role of financial reporting transparency in reducing governance-related agency conflicts among managers, directors, and shareholders, as well as in reducing agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, is reviewed.
Journal ArticleDOI

The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting

TL;DR: In this article, the role of financial reporting transparency in reducing governance-related agency conflicts among managers, directors, and shareholders, as well as in reducing agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, is reviewed.
Posted Content

Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities

TL;DR: This article examined whether chief executive officer (CEO) equity-based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports and found no evidence of a positive association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments.
Journal ArticleDOI

Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities

TL;DR: This article examined whether chief executive officer (CEO) equity-based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports and found no evidence of a positive association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Incentives for Tax Planning

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and GAAP and cash effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness.