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Claus Dieter Ehlermann

Bio: Claus Dieter Ehlermann is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: European integration & Modernization theory. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 57 citations.

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors summarized and interpreted the "modernization" reforms of European antitrust and used principal-agent analysis enhanced by socio-institutional insights to evaluate the effect of these reforms.
Abstract: The “modernization” reforms of European antitrust are summarized and interpreted. The article uses principal–agent analysis enhanced by socio-institutional insights. The reforms in policy implementation are of historic importance. While they appear to promise decentralization to national competition authorities, more sophisticated analysis points to an increase in the centralized power of the Commission. The novel instrument of a supranational European Competition Network creates a redesigned relationship between the Commission and the member states that carries high risks of incoherence. Modernization driven by a legal epistemic community carries a less obvious risk that increased power of competition policy will unduly reinforce liberal market disciplines through a juridification of the European competition regime.

126 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the tendency for governments to create independent competition agencies is analysed in the cases of Directorate General IV of the Commission, the German Cartel Office, the Office of Fair Trading, and the Competition Commission.
Abstract: The tendency for governments to create independent competition agencies is analysed in the cases of Directorate General IV of the Commission, the German Cartel Office, the Office of Fair Trading, and the Competition Commission. Analysis of the historical process of agency design, and the re-definition of agency missions, indicates a progression from a symbolic and constitutional rationale to a more material impact on contemporary market economies. Drawing loosely on principal-agent theory, changing agency roles are ascribed partly to the activism of independent agents, partly to the changing priorities of majoritarian principals. The unanticipated consequences of delegation include an escape from business capture but a shift to legalism or economic purism.

98 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a case study of the implementation of privacy norms in electronic health systems in the Netherlands is presented, and it is argued that next to the expertise generated by the relevant ERN, it was the institutional compliance of the Dutch government to the Privacy Directive that has substantially contributed to the bureaucratic autonomy of Dutch Data Protection Authority.
Abstract: One important function of European regulatory networks (ERNs) is to provide national regulatory authorities (NRAs) with an institutional platform for coordinating the implementation and harmonization of Community law within the member states by issuing non-binding norms such as guidelines and standards. However, to what extent are NRAs successful in implementing these non-binding rules within their member states and what is the role of European networks of regulation? This article argues, and illustrates with a case study of the implementation of privacy norms in electronic health systems in the Netherlands, that next to the expertise generated by the relevant ERN, it was the institutional compliance of the Dutch government to the Privacy Directive that has substantially contributed to the bureaucratic autonomy of the Dutch Data Protection Authority.

70 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The 2004 antitrust reform is the most important change in the history of EU competition policy as discussed by the authors, which amounts to a major shift in both the mode of regulation and the substance (towards the Anglo-Saxon model) eroding crucial elements of the Rhenish variety of economic organization.
Abstract: The 2004 antitrust reform is the most important change in the history of EU competition policy. It amounts to a major shift in both the mode of regulation (towards private enforcement) and the substance (towards the Anglo-Saxon model). These changes erode crucial elements of the Rhenish variety of economic organization.

68 citations