Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

This book concerns the use of concepts from statistical physics in the description of financial systems. The authors illustrate the scaling concepts used in probability theory, critical phenomena, and fully developed turbulent fluids. These concepts are then applied to financial time series. The authors also present a stochastic model that displays several of the statistical properties observed in empirical data. Statistical physics concepts such as stochastic dynamics, short- and long-range correlations, self-similarity and scaling permit an understanding of the global behaviour of economic systems without first having to work out a detailed microscopic description of the system. Physicists will find the application of statistical physics concepts to economic systems interesting. Economists and workers in the financial world will find useful the presentation of empirical analysis methods and well-formulated theoretical tools that might help describe systems composed of a huge number of interacting subsystems.

/pdf/introduction-to-econophysics-correlations-and-complexity-in-4a1wviggsu.pdf

Introduction to Econophysics: Correlations and Complexity in Finance

Evolutionary games on graphs

Animals with widely varying body weight, such as flies, spiders, and geckos, can adhere to and move along vertical walls and even ceilings. This ability is caused by very efficient attachment mechanisms in which patterned surface structures interact with the profile of the substrate. An extensive microscopic study has shown a strong inverse scaling effect in these attachment devices. Whereas μm dimensions of the terminal elements of the setae are sufficient for flies and beetles, geckos must resort to sub-μm devices to ensure adhesion. This general trend is quantitatively explained by applying the principles of contact mechanics, according to which splitting up the contact into finer subcontacts increases adhesion. This principle is widely spread in design of natural adhesive systems and may also be transferred into practical applications.

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From micro to nano contacts in biological attachment devices.

This chapter surveys research on agent-based models used in finance. It will concentrate on models where the use of computational tools is critical for the process of crafting models which give insights into the importance and dynamics of investor heterogeneity in many financial settings.

/pdf/agent-based-computational-finance-2ofm9w8yv3.pdf

Agent-based Computational Finance

A binary game is introduced and analysed. N players have to choose one of the two sides independently and those on the minority side win. Players use a finite set of ad hoc strategies to make their decision, based on the past record. The analysing power is limited and can adapt when necessary. Interesting cooperation and competition patterns of the society seem to arise and to be responsive to the payoff function.

Emergence of cooperation and organization in an evolutionary game

We investigate further several properties of the minority game we have recently introduced. We explain the origin of the phase transition and give an analytical expression of σ2/N in the N ⪡ 2 M region. The ability of the players to learn a given payoff is also analyzed, and we show that the Darwinian evolution process tends to a self-organized state, in particular, the lifetime distribution is a power-law with exponent −2. Furthermore, we study the influence of identical players on their gain and on the systems performance. Finally, we show that large brains always take advantage of small brains.

On the Minority Game : Analytical and Numerical Studies

We study analytically a simple game theoretical model of heterogeneous interacting agents. We show that the stationary state of the system is described by the ground state of a disordered spin model which is exactly solvable within the simple replica symmetric ansatz. Such a stationary state differs from the Nash equilibrium where each agent maximizes her own utility. The latter turns out to be characterized by a replica symmetry broken structure. Numerical results fully agree with our analytical findings.

Statistical mechanics of systems with heterogeneous agents: minority games

The Minority Game is a physicist's attempt to explain market behaviour by the interaction between traders. With a minimal set of ingredients and drastic assumptions, this model reproduces market ecology among different types of traders. Its emphasis is on speculative trading and information flow. The book first describes the philosophy lying behind the conception of the Minority Game in 1997, and includes in particular a discussion about the El Farol bar problem. It then reviews the main steps in later developments, including both the theory and its applications to market phenomena. 'Minority Games' gives a colourful and stylized, but also realistic picture of how financial markets operate.

Minority Games: Interacting agents in financial markets

Using the minority game model we study a broad spectrum of problems of market mechanism. We study the role of different types of agents: producers, speculators as well as noise traders. The central issue here is the information flow: producers feed in the information whereas speculators make it away. How well each agent fares in the common game depends on the market conditions, as well as their sophistication. Sometimes there is much to gain with little effort, sometimes great effort virtually brings no more incremental gain. Market impact is also shown to play an important role, a strategy should be judged when it is actually used in play for its quality. Though the minority game is an extremely simplified market model, it allows to ask, analyze and answer many questions which arise in real markets.

Damien Challet

Papers

Emergence of cooperation and organization in an evolutionary game

On the Minority Game : Analytical and Numerical Studies

Statistical mechanics of systems with heterogeneous agents: minority games

Minority Games: Interacting agents in financial markets

Modeling market mechanism with minority game