Dan Zahavi

Bio: Dan Zahavi is an academic researcher from University of Copenhagen. The author has contributed to research in topics: Phenomenology (philosophy) & Consciousness. The author has an hindex of 44, co-authored 197 publications receiving 8765 citations. Previous affiliations of Dan Zahavi include University of Education, Winneba & University of Oxford.

Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective

Abstract: What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social construct -- or is it perhaps a neurologically induced illusion? The legitimacy of the concept of the self has been questioned by both neuroscientists and philosophers in recent years Countering this, in Subjectivity and Selfhood, Dan Zahavi argues that the notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness He investigates the interrelationships of experience, self-awareness, and selfhood, proposing that none of these three notions can be understood in isolation Any investigation of the self, Zahavi argues, must take the first-person perspective seriously and focus on the experiential givenness of the self Subjectivity and Selfhood explores a number of phenomenological analyses pertaining to the nature of consciousness, self, and self-experience in light of contemporary discussions in consciousness research Philosophical phenomenology -- as developed by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others -- not only addresses crucial issues often absent from current debates over consciousness but also provides a conceptual framework for understanding subjectivity Zahavi fills the need -- given the recent upsurge in theoretical and empirical interest in subjectivity -- for an account of the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness that is accessible to researchers and students from a variety of disciplines His aim is to use phenomenological analyses to clarify issues of central importance to philosophy of mind, cognitive science, developmental psychology, and psychiatry By engaging in a dialogue with other philosophical and empirical positions, says Zahavi, phenomenology can demonstrate its vitality and contemporary relevance

The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science

Abstract: The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: What is phenomenology? naturalizing phenomenology and the empirical cognitive sciences phenomenology and consciousness consciousness and self-consciousness, including perception and action time and consciousness, including William James intentionality the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds phenomenology and personal identity Interesting and important examples are used throughout, including phantom limb syndrome, blindsight and self-disorders in schizophrenia, making The Phenomenological Mind an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy of mind.

The Phenomenological Mind

Abstract: Preface to the Second Edition 1. Introduction: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science, and Phenomenology 2. Methodology 3. Consciousness/Self-consciousness 4. Time 5. Intentionality 6. The Embodied Mind 7. Action 8. How we Know Others 9. Situated and Extended Minds 10. Self and Person. Bibliography. Index

EASE: Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience.

Abstract: for a detailed account of phenomena that have in common a somehow deformed sense of fi rst-person perspective – in brief, a disorder or defi ciency in the sense of being a subject, a self-coinciding center of action, thought, and experience 1 . The scale is mainly designed for conditions in the schizophrenia spectrum, but it cannot be used alone as a diagnostic instrument (self-disorders are not listed by the DSM-IV or ICD-10 as diagnostically crucial or even important features of schizophrenia; derealization and depersonalization are mentioned as nonessential features of schizotypy). The EASE does not cover all potential anomalies of experience, but focuses only on the disorders of the self [in contrast to the BSABS (‘Bonner Skala fur die Beurteilung von Basissymptomen’) [Gross et al., 1987], e.g. perceptual disorders are not explored].

Husserl's phenomenology

Abstract: It is commonly believed that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), well known as the founder of phenomenology and as the teacher of Heidegger, was unable to free himself from the framework of a classical metaphysics of subjectivity. Supposedly, he never abandoned the view that the world and the Other are constituted by a pure transcendental subject, and his thinking in consequence remains Cartesian, idealistic, and solipsistic. The continuing publication of Husserl's manuscripts has made it necessary to revise such an interpretation. Drawing upon both Husserl's published works and posthumous material, Husserl's Phenomenology incorporates the results of the most recent Husserl research. It is divided into three parts, roughly following the chronological development of Husserl's thought, from his early analyses of logic and intentionality, through his mature transcendental-philosophical analyses of reduction and constitution, to his late analyses of intersubjectivity and lifeworld. It can consequently serve as a concise and updated introduction to his thinking.

Remembering. A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology, Cambridge (University Press) 1964.

Abstract: Part I. Experimental Studies: 2. Experiment in psychology 3. Experiments on perceiving III Experiments on imaging 4-8. Experiments on remembering: (a) The method of description (b) The method of repeated reproduction (c) The method of picture writing (d) The method of serial reproduction (e) The method of serial reproduction picture material 9. Perceiving, recognizing, remembering 10. A theory of remembering 11. Images and their functions 12. Meaning Part II. Remembering as a Study in Social Psychology: 13. Social psychology 14. Social psychology and the matter of recall 15. Social psychology and the manner of recall 16. Conventionalism 17. The notion of a collective unconscious 18. The basis of social recall 19. A summary and some conclusions.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Abstract: Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.