Daniel D. Hutto

Bio: Daniel D. Hutto is an academic researcher from University of Wollongong. The author has contributed to research in topics: Enactivism & Folk psychology. The author has an hindex of 28, co-authored 141 publications receiving 4073 citations. Previous affiliations of Daniel D. Hutto include University of Hertfordshire.

Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content

Abstract: Most of what humans do and experience is best understood in terms of dynamically unfolding interactions with the environment. Many philosophers and cognitive scientists now acknowledge the critical importance of situated, environment-involving embodied engagements as a means of understanding basic minds -- including basic forms of human mentality. Yet many of these same theorists hold fast to the view that basic minds are necessarily or essentially contentful -- that they represent conditions the world might be in. In this book, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition that holds that some kinds of minds -- basic minds -- are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. Hutto and Myin oppose the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. They defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness

Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons

Abstract: Original book is available at : http://books.google.com/ [Full text of this book is not available in the UHRA]

Representation reconsidered: Book review

Abstract: Some books are just begging to be written. This is one such. It gives a long overdue critical look at the nearly universal tendency to invoke the notion of ‘‘representation’’ as a theoretical posit in certain branches of the cognitive sciences, e.g., psychology and neuroscience. As the preface and opening chapter make clear, Ramsey’s project is to ask, from the vantage point of philosophy of science, whether positing representations has the sort of explanatory value it is generally imagined to have. His principal focus is to determine if the explanatory posits that are in fact employed by these sciences meet the minimal criteria for doing bona fide representational work. As he puts it, the question is whether or not such proposals meet the ‘‘job description challenge.’’ Adequately meeting that challenge requires saying not only what determines the content of a state or structure but also, critically, saying how that state or structure serves or functions as a representation in a larger system. Ramsey’s assessment is that when the notion of representation is invoked in an important class of cases this challenge cannot be met. However, he claims (chapter 3) that there are, at least, two prominent uses of the notion in the classical framework of cognitive science that are exceptions to this rule. Nevertheless, even these uses—so he argues— are at odds in important ways with the standard (folk psychological) interpretation of what being a representation amounts to (chapter 2). Against this backdrop, in making his core argument he is critical of the popular tendency to regard representations as states (or ensembles of states) that only are reliably caused by (or nomically depend upon) the occurrence of certain external features (chapter 4) or those that dispositionally produce certain effects under specific conditions (chapter 5). He classifies these sorts of theory as subscribing to what he designates, respectively, ‘‘receptor’’ and ‘‘tacit’’ notions of representation. These ideas come into play, on the one hand, when scientists speak of states or processes that serve as ‘‘detectors’’ or ‘‘indicators’’ of some external feature or other, or on the other hand, when they talk of a system or organism’s implicit or embodied ‘‘know how’’ as being responsible for generating reliable effects. Subjecting these accounts to a detailed analysis, Ramsey demonstrates that both the receptor and tacit notions of representation—those favored by today’s

The concept of mind

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A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting out our sensory experience

Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.