Daniel N. Stern

Bio: Daniel N. Stern is an academic researcher from University of Geneva. The author has contributed to research in topics: Motherhood constellation & Brief psychotherapy. The author has an hindex of 29, co-authored 55 publications receiving 12322 citations.

The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology

Abstract: The Questions And Their Background Exploring the Infants Subjective Experience: A Central Role for the Sense of Self Perspectives and Approaches to Infancy The Four Senses Of Self The Sense of an Emergent Self The Sense of a Core Self: I, Self versus Other The Sense of a Core Self II, Self with Other The Sense of a Subjective Self: I, Overview The Sense of a Subjective Self: II, Affect Attunement The Sense of a Verbal Self Some Clinical Implications The Observed Infant as Seen with a Clinical Eye Some Implications for the Theories Behind Therapeutic Reconstructions Implications for the Therapeutic Process of Reconstructing a Developmental Past Epilogue.

The present moment in psychotherapy and everyday life

Abstract: PART I. Exploring the Present Moment PART II. Contextualizing the Present Moment PART III. Views from a Clinical Perspective APPENDIX. The Micro-Analytic Interview

The Motherhood Constellation: A Unified View of Parent-Infant Psychotherapy

Abstract: The Clinical System In Parent-Infant Psychotherapy * An Overview of the Clinical Situation * The Parents Representational World * The Parents Representations Enacted * The Parent-Infant Interaction * The Nature and Formation of the Infants Representations * The Infants Representations Viewed Clinically * The Therapist Therapeutic Approaches In Parent-Infant Psychotherapy And Their Common * Approaches That Aim to Change the Parents Representation * Approaches That Aim to Change the Interactive Behaviors * Commonalities Among the Different Approaches Synthesis * The Motherhood Constellation * Some Wider Implications for Other Clinical Situations

The First Relationship: Infant and Mother

Abstract: Introduction 1 Learning about Things Human 2 The Caregiver's Repertoire 3 The Infant's Repertoire 4 From Laboratory to Real Life 5 Where Do the Steps Lead? 6 Structure and Timing 7 From Interaction to Relationship 8 Missteps in the Dance 9 Finding Your Own Path Notes Index

The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative review.

Abstract: The emerging field of emotion regulation studies how individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express them. This review takes an evolutionary perspective and characterizes emotion in terms of response tendencies. Emotion regulation is denned and distinguished from coping, mood regulation, defense, and affect regulation. In the increasingly specialized discipline of psychology, the field of emotion regulation cuts across traditional boundaries and provides common ground. According to a process model of emotion regulation, emotion may be regulated at five points in the emotion generative process: (a) selection of the situation, (b) modification of the situation, (c) deployment of attention, (d) change of cognitions, and (e) modulation of responses. The field of emotion regulation promises new insights into age-old questions about how people manage their emotions.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Abstract: Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

A Secure Base. Parent-Child Attachment and Healthy Human Development. New York (Basic Books) 1988.

Abstract: * Caring for children * The origins of attachment theory * Psychoanalysis as art and science * Psychoanalysis as a natural science * Violence in the family * On knowing what you are not supposed to know and feeling what you are not supposed to feel * The role of attachment in personality development * Attachment, communication, and the therapeutic process * Developmental psychiatry comes of age

Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition

Abstract: We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with oth- ers and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The develop- mental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.