Daniel Parent

Bio: Daniel Parent is an academic researcher from HEC Montréal. The author has contributed to research in topics: Wage & Earnings. The author has an hindex of 21, co-authored 69 publications receiving 2545 citations. Previous affiliations of Daniel Parent include Université de Sherbrooke & McGill University.

Performance Pay and Wage Inequality

Abstract: An increasing fraction of jobs in the U.S. labor market explicitly pay workers for their performance using bonus pay, commissions, or piece-rate contracts. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we show that compensation in performance-pay jobs is more closely tied to both observed and unobserved productive characteristics of workers than compensation in non-performance-pay jobs. We also find that the return to these productive characteristics increased faster over time in performance-pay than in non-performance-pay jobs. We show that this finding is consistent with the view that underlying changes in returns to skill due, for instance, to technological change induce more firms to offer performance-pay contracts and result in more wage inequality among workers who are paid for performance. Thus, performance pay provides a channel through which underlying changes in returns to skill get translated into higher wage inequality. We conclude that this channel accounts for 21% of the growth in the variance of male wages between the late 1970s and the early 1990s and for most of the increase in wage inequality above the eightieth percentile over the same period.

Industry‐Specific Capital and the Wage Profile: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics

Abstract: Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979–96) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1981–91), I seek to determine whether there is any net positive return to tenure with the current employer once we control for industry‐specific capital. Including total experience in the industry as an additional explanatory variable, I show that the return to seniority is markedly reduced using GLS while it virtually disappears using IV-GLS, at both the one‐digit and three‐digit levels. Therefore, it seems that what matters most for the wage profile in terms of human capital is industry‐specificity, not firm‐specificity.

Wages and Mobility: The Impact of Employer-Provided Training

Abstract: Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the period spanning the years 1979-1991, this essay examines the impact of employer-provided formal training on the wage profile and on the mobility of young Americans making their transition to the labor market. By exploiting the longitudinal aspect of the data set, we are able to provide some control for unobserved individual and job-match heterogeneity by making use of the methodology proposed by Altonji and Shakotko (ReStud '87). The results show that (i) training with the current employer has a statistically and economically significant positive effect on the wage; (ii) employers seem to reward skills acquired through training with previous employers as much as skills they provide themselves; (iii) workers undergoing training have 18 percent lower starting salaries than other workers; this result is obtained by setting up a starting wage equation and by making use of a variable called on-the-job training still in progress at the time of the interview; (iv) with a hazard model which makes use of multiple employment spells by the same worker (thereby allowing the implementation of fixed-effects methods akin to the conditional logit method), skills acquired through formal training programs provided by the current employer seem to be fairly specific. The upshot from these results is that formal on-the-job-training in the current job contains both a general component which the employer rewards up to its market value and a specific component which reduces mobility while not being rewarded. En utilisant des donnees americaines du National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), cette etude s'attarde a examiner l'impact de la formation dispensee par l'employeur sur le profil salarial ainsi que sur la mobilite des jeunes travailleurs faisant leur entree sur le marche du travail. En exploitant l'aspect longitudinal de l'echantillon de facon a tenir compte de l'heterogeneite non observee, les resultats montrent (i) un impact economiquement et statistiquement significatif de la formation sur le salaire dans l'emploi courant, (ii) un impact substantiel sur le salaire de la formation acquise avec les employeurs precedents, (iii) une reduction d'environ 18% du salaire de depart pour les travailleurs en formation, et (iv) par un modele de duree qui tient compte des episodes multiples d'emploi (permettant alors l'utilisation de methodes de type effets fixes ), un degre substantiel de specificite du capital humain acquis par le biais de programmes de formation dispenses par l'employeur. La conclusion a tirer de ces resultats est que le capital humain acquis contient a la fois une composante generale remuneree egalement par tous les employeurs ainsi qu'une composante specifique qui reduit la mobilite tout en n'etant pas remuneree.

Comparative Advantage, Learning, and Sectoral Wage Determination

Abstract: We develop a model in which a worker’s skills determine the worker’s current wage and sector. The market and the worker are initially uncertain about some of the worker’s skills. Endogenous wage changes and sector mobility occur as labor market participants learn about these unobserved skills. We show how the model can be estimated using nonlinear instrumental variables techniques. We apply our methodology to study wages and allocation of workers across occupations and industries using individual‐level panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. We find that high‐wage sectors employ high‐skill workers and offer high returns to workers’ skills.

Report by the commission on the measurement of economic performance and social progress

Abstract: As GDP is a measure of market capacity and not economic well-being, this report has been commissioned to more accurately understand the social progress indicators of any given state. Gross domestic product (GDP) is the most widely used measure of economic activity. There are international standards for its calculation, and much thought has gone into its statistical and conceptual bases. But GDP mainly measures market production, though it has often been treated as if it were a measure of economic well-being. Conflating the two can lead to misleading indications about how well-off people are and entail the wrong policy decisions. One reason why money measures of economic performance and living standards have come to play such an important role in our societies is that the monetary valuation of goods and services makes it easy to add up quantities of a very different nature. When we know the prices of apple juice and DVD players, we can add up their values and make statements about production and consumption in a single figure. But market prices are more than an accounting device. Economic theory tells us that when markets are functioning properly, the ratio of one market price to another is reflective of the relative appreciation of the two products by those who purchase them. Moreover, GDP captures all final goods in the economy, whether they are consumed by households, firms or government. Valuing them with their prices would thus seem to be a good way of capturing, in a single number, how well-off society is at a particular moment. Furthermore, keeping prices unchanged while observing how quantities of goods and services that enter GDP move over time would seem like a reasonable way of making a statement about how society’s living standards are evolving in real terms. As it turns out, things are more complicated. First, prices may not exist for some goods and services (if for instance government provides free health insurance or if households are engaged in child care), raising the question of how these services should be valued. Second, even where there are market prices, they may deviate from society’s underlying valuation. In particular, when the consumption or production of particular products affects society as a whole, the price that individuals pay for those products will differ from their value to society at large. Environmental damage caused by production or consumption activities that is not reflected in market prices is a well-known example.

The Provision of Incentives in Firms

Abstract: I NCENTIVES ARE the essence of economics. Despite many wide-ranging claims about their supposed importance, there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers. The purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives. Since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned, a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm's interest. This literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers. These include piece rates, options, discretionary bonuses, promotions, profit sharing, efficiency wages, deferred compensation, and so on. My objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation. Where possible, I will address the literature from two perspectives. First, an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance. Accordingly, I consider whether agents behave in this way, and whether these responses are always in the firm's interest. Second, I address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind. In other words, do contracts look like the predictions of the theory? Incentives are provided to workers

The Economic Institutions of Capitalism

Abstract: The 2008 crash has left all the established economic doctrines - equilibrium models, real business cycles, disequilibria models - in disarray. Part of the problem is due to Smith’s "veil of ignorance": individuals unknowingly pursue society’s interest and, as a result, have no clue as to the macroeconomic effects of their actions: witness the Keynes and Leontief multipliers, the concept of value added, fiat money, Engel’s law and technical progress, to name but a few of the macrofoundations of microeconomics. A good viewpoint to take bearings anew lies in comparing the post-Great Depression institutions with those emerging from Thatcher and Reagan’s economic policies: deregulation, exogenous vs. endoge- nous money, shadow banking vs. Volcker’s Rule. Very simply, the banks, whose lending determined deposits after Roosevelt, and were a public service became private enterprises whose deposits determine lending. These underlay the great moderation preceding 2006, and the subsequent crash.

Evolution and Rationality Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results. Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects

Abstract: We investigate conditions sufficient for identification of average treatment effects using instrumental variables. First we show that the existence of valid instruments is not sufficient to identify any meaningful average treatment effect. We then establish that the combination of an instrument and a condition on the relation between the instrument and the participation status is sufficient for identification of a local average treatment effect for those who can be induced to change their participation status by changing the value of the instrument. Finally we derive the probability limit of the standard IV estimator under these conditions. It is seen to be a weighted average of local average treatment effects.

Performance Pay and Productivity

Abstract: Much of the theory in personnel economics relates to effects of monetary incentives on output, but the theory was untested because appropriate data were unavailable. A new data set for the Safelite Glass Corporation tests the predictions that average productivity will rise, the firm will attract a more able workforce, and variance in output across individuals at the firm will rise when it shifts to piece rates. In Safelite, productivity effects amount to a 44-percent increase in output per worker. This firm apparently had selected a suboptimal compensation system, as profits also increased with the change.