Darrell A. H. Miller

Bio: Darrell A. H. Miller is an academic researcher from Duke University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Supreme court & Right to keep and bear arms. The author has an hindex of 4, co-authored 25 publications receiving 71 citations. Previous affiliations of Darrell A. H. Miller include University of Cincinnati & Indiana University.

Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights

Abstract: The Supreme Court began its 2009 Term by addressing the constitutional rights of corporations. It ended the Term by addressing the incorporated rights of the Constitution. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a five-member majority of the Court held that corporations have a First Amendment right to spend their own money on political advocacy. A corporation generally is no different than a natural person when it comes to the First Amendment - at least as it relates to political speech. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, a plurality of the Court held that the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution is incorporated through the Due Process Clause and applies to states and municipalities. Neither the federal government nor states may prevent persons from keeping and bearing arms in their homes for self-defense. Given this new world in both senses of incorporation, the time has come to explore the issue of Second Amendment rights and the corporate form. This Article will offer an analysis of the potential Second Amendment rights of the corporation. And it will, in the process, offer a more systematic critique of corporate constitutional rights in general.

Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights

Abstract: The Supreme Court began its 2009 Term by addressing the constitutional rights of corporations. It ended the Term by addressing the incorporated rights of the Constitution. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a five-member majority of the Court held that corporations have a First Amendment right to spend their own money on political advocacy. A corporation generally is no different than a natural person when it comes to the First Amendment—at least as it relates to political speech. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, a plurality of the Court held that the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution is incorporated through the Due Process Clause and applies to states and municipalities. Neither the federal government nor states may prevent persons from keeping and bearing arms in their homes for self-defense.

What is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment

Abstract: Particularly in places with few recognizable gun control laws, “gun neutral” civil and criminal rules are an important but often-unnoticed basis for the legal regulation of guns. The burdens that these rules impose on the keeping and bearing of arms are at times significant, but they are also incidental, which raises hard questions about the boundaries between constitutional law, regulation, and legally enforceable private ordering. Does the Second Amendment apply to civil suits for trespass, negligence, and nuisance? Does the Amendment cover gun-neutral laws of general applicability like assault and disturbing the peace? In the course of addressing these practical questions and the broader conceptual challenges that they represent, this Article fashions analytic tools that may be useful to a wide range of constitutional problems.

Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment

Abstract: In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment guarantees a personal, individual right to keep and bear arms. But the Court left lower courts and legislatures adrift on the fundamental question of scope. While the Court stated in dicta that some regulation may survive constitutional scrutiny, it left the precise contours of the right, and even the method by which to determine those contours, for “future evaluation.” This Article offers a provocative proposal for tackling the issue of Second Amendment scope, one tucked in many dresser drawers across the nation: Treat the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense the same as the right to own and view adult obscenity under the First Amendment — a robust right in the home, subject to near-plenary restriction by elected government everywhere else. This Article’s proposal to treat guns like smut is sure to stir controversy. But it is grounded in solid methods of constitutional analysis. The Court in Heller sent unmistakable signals that the First and Second Amendments are cousins and may be subject to similar limitations. As Justice Scalia noted, the First Amendment excludes from its protection certain categories of speech: “obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets.” The Second Amendment may be “no different,” and almost certainly excludes from its protection certain categories of “bearing” and certain categories of “arms.” Moreover, the “home-bound” approach to the Second Amendment rationalizes the disparate norms that animate the Court’s privacy jurisprudence. It situates the Second Amendment within tradition and doctrine that accord constitutional weight to a spatial and conceptual distinction between the home and the public sphere. Finally, this proposal has the benefit of simplicity: The Court has already marked boundaries for an individual right to adult obscenity in the home. Those boundaries are surprisingly applicable to the individual right to bear arms, and far easier to administer. While this proposal will not resolve all issues of Second Amendment scope, its prudential and practical merits deserve serious consideration as part of post-Heller discourse on the Second Amendment.

What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment

Abstract: Particularly in places with few recognizable gun control laws, 'gun neutral" civil and criminal rules are an important but often-unnoticed basis for the legal regulation of guns. The burdens that these rules impose on the keeping and bearing of arms are at times significant, but they are also incidental, which raises hard questions about the boundaries between constitutional law, regulation, and legally enforceable private ordering. Does the Second Amendment apply to civil suits for trespass, negligence, and nuisance? Does the Amendment cover gun-neutral laws of general applicability like assault and disturbing the peace? In the course of addressing these practical questions and the broader conceptual challenges that they represent, this Article fashions analytic tools that may be useful to a wide range of constitutional problems. Language: en

Current index to legal periodicals

Abstract: American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

Constitutional Dimensions of the Corporate Person: Corporate Free Speech

Abstract: The term “corporation” does not appear anywhere in the United States Constitution, yet the United States Supreme Court has held that corporations are entitled to claim an extensive array of constitutional rights. The justifications for these rights have developed from the many different conceptions of the corporation as a legal, moral, economic, social, and political actor. In particular, the constitutional dimension of the corporation’s personhood is an extension of its legal personhood. Therefore, the fundamental legal theories of the corporate person, i.e., the artificial person, aggregate, and real entity theories, have had a role in supporting the extension of constitutional rights to corporations. The moral and sociological dimensions of the corporate person have also been important. In determining the scope of corporate constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has considered the actual and normative roles and purposes of corporations in our pluralistic and democratic society. Considerations of corporate power, both economic and political, have contributed as well to the debate over which constitutional rights appropriately apply to corporations.

Constitutional Dimensions of the Corporate Person: Corporate Religion and Race

Abstract: The idea that the corporation is a person entitled to certain constitutional rights has become the subject of intense debate in the context of religion and race. To what extent can and should corporations be regarded as persons with the status to claim fundamental religious liberty rights and racial equality rights? Can a corporation be associated with a certain religion or race if most or all of its human members identify with one religion or race? Does it make sense to say that the corporation itself can possess and exercise religious beliefs, thereby entitling it to religious liberty rights? Is it possible for a corporation to have a racial identity, thereby affording it standing to claim it has been discriminated against on the basis of its race? Cases involving such questions have generated significant controversy in recent years. The Supreme Court has affirmed the statutory right of corporations to freely exercise religion, and federal courts have developed a body of law to allow corporations to assert racial discrimination claims.

Constitutionalizing World Politics: The Logic of Democratic Power and the Unintended Consequences of International Treaty Making

Abstract: The elusive ideal of a world constitution is unlikely to be realized any time soon – yet important steps in that direction are happening in world politics. Milewicz argues that international constitutionalization has gathered steam as an unintended by-product of international treaty making in the post-war period. This process is driven by the logic of democratic power, whereby states that are both democratic and powerful – democratic powers – are the strongest promoters of rule-based cooperation. Not realizing the inadvertent and long-term effects of the specialized rules they design, states fall into a constitutionalization trap that is hard to escape as it conforms with their interests and values. Milewicz's analysis will appeal to students and scholars of International Relations and International Law, interested in international cooperation, as well as institutional and constitutional theory and practice.