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Darrell A. H. Miller

Bio: Darrell A. H. Miller is an academic researcher from Duke University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Supreme court & Right to keep and bear arms. The author has an hindex of 4, co-authored 25 publications receiving 71 citations. Previous affiliations of Darrell A. H. Miller include University of Cincinnati & Indiana University.

Papers
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that empathy is essential for making correct, principled, and unbiased judgments, because empathy is one of the few means we have to understand human motivation.
Abstract: This Essay argues that empathy does and should play an important, albeit limited role, in a judge’s decision making process. Specifically, empathy is essential for making correct, principled, and unbiased judgments, because empathy is one of the few means we have to understand human motivation. Empathy is a crucial cognitive mechanism that can help compensate for common cognitive bias. As such, empathy, appropriately restricted, should be an accepted and meaningful tool for judges to use in evaluating the sufficiency of complaints, especially as they relate to Iqbal’s plausibility pleading standard.

1 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the relationship between lethality and the right to bear arms, and consider how that relationship might be shaped by the availability of non-lethal alternative weapons.
Abstract: This Article explores the relationship between lethality and the right to bear arms, and considers how that relationship might be shaped by the availability of non-lethal alternative weapons. Prior scholarship has asked whether the Second Amendment includes a right to carry non-lethal “Arms.” An important set of related questions remains: does the Second Amendment necessarily include a right to arm oneself publicly with lethal force, if non-lethal alternatives are available? And how should one evaluate the adequacy of those alternatives?

1 citations

01 Jan 2010
TL;DR: In fact, the questioning had just turned to the looming HINI virus threat when President Barack Obama unexpectedly stepped into the James S. Brady Press Briefing Room as discussed by the authors and said, "I just got off the telephone with Justice Souter," and "I would like to say a few words about his decision to retire from the Supreme Court."
Abstract: Robert Gibbs, the White House Press Secretary, spent the first half-hour of his May 1, 2009 press corps briefing doggedly deflecting speculation about Justice David Souter's retirement.' In fact, the questioning had just turned to the looming HINI virus threat when President Barack Obama unexpectedly stepped into the James S. Brady Press Briefing Room. 2 "I just got off the telephone with Justice Souter," 3 he said, "[a]nd so I would like to say a few words about his decision to retire from the Supreme Court."4 After some gracious remarks concerning Justice Souter's twenty year tenure as an Associate Justice, the President turned to the topic of his replacement:

1 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: Waldman and DeBrabander as mentioned in this paper argue that the principal actor in America’s gun policy drama is not the Second Amendment or even guns, but what people fear.
Abstract: The principal actor in America’s gun policy drama isn’t the Second Amendment or even guns—it’s fear. In Michael Waldman’s brisk The Second Amendment: A Biography, the main character doesn’t appear until the end of the third act. “What matters,” Waldman tells us, “is what people fear.”1 In Firmin DeBrabander’s more academic, Do Guns Make Us Free? Democracy and the Armed Society, the star takes center stage from the outset. Chapter one is titled “The Culture of Fear.”2 But in both books, it was fear—what we fear, who we fear, and what we do with fear—that I lingered over, long after I read the last line. Waldman is president of the Brennan Center for Justice and a recurrent guest on cable news shows. His book is a breakneck tour of over two hundred years of constitutional law and politics, written in a beach-reading patter, and sprinkled with winking asides to his lay audience. (Popular politicians in the 1700s are ones you’d want to “‘drink a cider’ with.”3) His goal is to explain how a coalition of conservative think tanks, gun rights groups, Justice Department ideologues, and small government populists turned a poorly worded, historically and politically contested constitutional provision into an individual right. The champion in this narrative is the late Justice Antonin Scalia, the weapon is a method called “originalism,” and the prize is the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.4 The politico-legal alchemy that transformed an individual right to keep and bear arms from a “fraud,” in the words of the late Chief Justice Warren Burger,5 into the

1 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: The human story behind Jones, tracking the narrative of the Joneses, their counsel, the judges, and their lives after the decision, is described in this paper, where Jones' recognition of the interrelationship between public and private coercion can help scholars, lawmakers, and jurists define the contours of Thirteenth Amendment power.
Abstract: To commemorate the fortieth anniversary of Jones, this piece does three things First, it explains how Congress' exercise of Thirteenth Amendment power to govern private economic relationships during Reconstruction gave important, but unacknowledged, intellectual credence to the antitrust movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Second, it explores the human story behind Jones, tracking the narrative of the Joneses, their counsel, the judges, and their lives after the decision Finally, it explains how Jones' recognition of the interrelationship between public and private coercion can help scholars, lawmakers, and jurists define the contours of Thirteenth Amendment power

1 citations


Cited by
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01 Jan 2014
TL;DR: In this paper, Cardozo et al. proposed a model for conflict resolution in the context of bankruptcy resolution, which is based on the work of the Cardozo Institute of Conflict Resolution.
Abstract: American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

1,336 citations

Book ChapterDOI
01 Aug 2019
TL;DR: For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that corporations are entitled to claim an extensive array of constitutional rights as discussed by the authors, and the justifications for these rights have developed from the many different conceptions of the corporation as a legal, moral, economic, social, and political actor.
Abstract: The term “corporation” does not appear anywhere in the United States Constitution, yet the United States Supreme Court has held that corporations are entitled to claim an extensive array of constitutional rights. The justifications for these rights have developed from the many different conceptions of the corporation as a legal, moral, economic, social, and political actor. In particular, the constitutional dimension of the corporation’s personhood is an extension of its legal personhood. Therefore, the fundamental legal theories of the corporate person, i.e., the artificial person, aggregate, and real entity theories, have had a role in supporting the extension of constitutional rights to corporations. The moral and sociological dimensions of the corporate person have also been important. In determining the scope of corporate constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has considered the actual and normative roles and purposes of corporations in our pluralistic and democratic society. Considerations of corporate power, both economic and political, have contributed as well to the debate over which constitutional rights appropriately apply to corporations.

34 citations

Book ChapterDOI
01 Aug 2019
TL;DR: The idea that a corporation is a person entitled to certain constitutional rights has become the subject of intense debate in the context of religion and race as mentioned in this paper, which has generated significant controversy in recent years.
Abstract: The idea that the corporation is a person entitled to certain constitutional rights has become the subject of intense debate in the context of religion and race. To what extent can and should corporations be regarded as persons with the status to claim fundamental religious liberty rights and racial equality rights? Can a corporation be associated with a certain religion or race if most or all of its human members identify with one religion or race? Does it make sense to say that the corporation itself can possess and exercise religious beliefs, thereby entitling it to religious liberty rights? Is it possible for a corporation to have a racial identity, thereby affording it standing to claim it has been discriminated against on the basis of its race? Cases involving such questions have generated significant controversy in recent years. The Supreme Court has affirmed the statutory right of corporations to freely exercise religion, and federal courts have developed a body of law to allow corporations to assert racial discrimination claims.

33 citations

Book
23 Jul 2020
TL;DR: Milewicz as mentioned in this paper argues that international constitutionalization has gathered steam as an unintended by-product of international treaty making in the post-war period, whereby states that are both democratic and powerful are the strongest promoters of rule-based cooperation.
Abstract: The elusive ideal of a world constitution is unlikely to be realized any time soon – yet important steps in that direction are happening in world politics. Milewicz argues that international constitutionalization has gathered steam as an unintended by-product of international treaty making in the post-war period. This process is driven by the logic of democratic power, whereby states that are both democratic and powerful – democratic powers – are the strongest promoters of rule-based cooperation. Not realizing the inadvertent and long-term effects of the specialized rules they design, states fall into a constitutionalization trap that is hard to escape as it conforms with their interests and values. Milewicz's analysis will appeal to students and scholars of International Relations and International Law, interested in international cooperation, as well as institutional and constitutional theory and practice.

28 citations

OtherDOI
01 Jul 2020

27 citations