Enclosed is a copy of the Board of Governors’ Semiannual Agenda of Regulations for the period August 1, 1980 through February 1, 1981. The Semiannual Agenda provides you with information on those regulatory matters that the Board now has under consideration or anticipates considering over the next six months, and is divided into three parts: (1) regulatory matters that the Board had considered during the previous six months on which final action has been taken; (2) regulatory matters that have been proposed for public comment and that require further Board consideration; and (3) regulatory matters that the Board may consider over the next six months.

Federal Reserve Bank of New Yorkの制定せる財務諸表様式について

Prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availability depends solely on firm characteristics. However, market frictions that make capital structure relevant may also be associated with a firm's source of capital. Examining this intuition, we find firms that have access to the public bond markets, as measured by having a debt rating, have significantly more leverage. Although firms with a rating are fundamentally different, these differences do not explain our findings. Even after controlling for firm characteristics that determine observed capital structure, and instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of having a rating, firms with access have 35% more debt. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

/pdf/does-the-source-of-capital-affect-capital-structure-oxexa094wg.pdf

Does the Source of Capital Affect Capital Structure

https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/45984177/CEO_gender_02222016.pdf

CEO gender, corporate risk-taking, and the efficiency of capital allocation

Different continuous-time models for interest rates coexist in the literature. We test parametric models by comparing their implied parametric density to the same density estimated nonparametrically. We do not replace the continuous-time model by discrete approximations, even though the data are recorded at discrete intervals. The principal source of rejection of existing models is the strong nonlinearity of the drift. Around its mean, where the drift is essentially zero, the spot rate behaves like a random walk. The drift then mean-reverts strongly when far away from the mean. The volatility is higher when away from the mean.

Testing Continuous-Time Models of the Spot Interest Rate

The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008 has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interest in the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit Ratings Agencies (CRAs) in which there are three possible sources of conflicts: 1) the CRA conflict of interest of understating credit risk to attract more business; 2) the ability of issuers to purchase only the most favorable ratings; and 3) the trusting nature of some investor clienteles who may take ratings at face value. We show that when combined, these give rise to three fundamental equilibrium distortions. First, competition among CRAs can reduce market efficiency, as competition facilitates ratings shopping by issuers. Second, CRAs are more prone to inflate ratings in boom times, when there are more trusting investors, and when the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, the industry practice of tranching of structured products distorts market efficiency as its role is to deceive trusting investors. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring: i) upfront payments for rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer), ii) mandatory disclosure of any rating produced by CRAs, and iii) oversight of ratings methodology can substantially mitigate ratings inflation and promote efficiency.

The Credit Ratings Game

We examine corporate financial and investment decisions made by female executives compared to male executives Male executives undertake more acquisitions and issue debt more often than female executives Further, acquisitions made by firms with male executives have announcement returns approximately 2% lower than those made by female executive firms, and debt issues also have lower announcement returns for firms with male executives Female executives place wider bounds on earnings estimates and are more likely to exercise stock options early This evidence suggests men exhibit relative overconfidence in significant corporate decision-making compared to women

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2088860_code341401.pdf?abstractid=1263990&rulid=181537&mirid=5

Gender and Corporate Finance: Are Male Executives Overconfident Relative to Female Executives?

Gender and corporate finance: Are male executives overconfident relative to female executives?

This paper examines to what extent credit ratings directly affect capital structure decisions. The paper outlines discrete costs (benefits) associated with firm credit rating level differences and tests whether concerns for these costs (benefits) directly affect debt and equity financing decisions. Firms near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade issue less debt relative to equity than firms not near a change in rating. This behavior is consistent with discrete costs (benefits) of rating changes but is not explained by traditional capital structure theories. The results persist within previous empirical tests of the pecking order and tradeoff capital structure theories.

Credit Ratings and Capital Structure

Firms reduce leverage following credit rating downgrades. In the year following a downgrade, downgraded firms issue approximately 1.5-2.0% less net debt relative to net equity as a percentage of assets compared to other firms. This relationship persists within an empirical model of target leverage behavior. The effect of a downgrade is larger at downgrades to a speculative grade rating and if commercial paper access is affected. In particular, firms downgraded to speculative are about twice as likely to reduce debt as other firms. Rating upgrades do not affect subsequent capital structure activity, suggesting that firms target minimum rating levels.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1311518_code97752.pdf?abstractid=686227&mirid=1

Do Firms Target Credit Ratings or Leverage Levels

Firms reduce leverage following credit rating downgrades. In the year following a downgrade, downgraded firms issue approximately 1.5%–2.0% less net debt relative to net equity as a percentage of assets compared to other firms. This relationship persists within an empirical model of target leverage behavior. The effect of a downgrade is larger at downgrades to a speculative grade rating and if commercial paper access is affected. In particular, firms downgraded to speculative are about twice as likely to reduce debt as other firms. Rating upgrades do not affect subsequent capital structure activity, suggesting that firms target minimum rating levels.

http://media.terry.uga.edu/documents/finance/kisgen.pdf

Darren J. Kisgen

Papers

Gender and Corporate Finance: Are Male Executives Overconfident Relative to Female Executives?

Gender and corporate finance: Are male executives overconfident relative to female executives?

Credit Ratings and Capital Structure

Do Firms Target Credit Ratings or Leverage Levels

Do Firms Target Credit Ratings or Leverage Levels