D
David Pointcheval
Researcher at École Normale Supérieure
Publications - 317
Citations - 21225
David Pointcheval is an academic researcher from École Normale Supérieure. The author has contributed to research in topics: Encryption & Cryptography. The author has an hindex of 64, co-authored 298 publications receiving 19538 citations. Previous affiliations of David Pointcheval include Lockheed Martin Corporation & Centre national de la recherche scientifique.
Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
Security Arguments for Digital Signatures and Blind Signatures
David Pointcheval,Jacques Stern +1 more
TL;DR: It is proved that a very slight variation of the well-known El Gamal signature scheme resists existential forgeries even against an adaptively chosen-message attack and an appropriate notion of security related to the setting of electronic cash is defined.
Book ChapterDOI
Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks
TL;DR: Correctness for the idea at the center of the Encrypted Key-Exchange protocol of Bellovin and Merritt is proved: it is proved security, in an ideal-cipher model, of the two-flow protocol at the core of EKE.
Book ChapterDOI
Security proofs for signature schemes
David Pointcheval,Jacques Stern +1 more
TL;DR: This paper establishes the generality of this technique against adaptively chosen message attacks and achieves such a security proof for a slight variant of the El Garrial signature schemc where committed values are hashed together with the message.
Journal Article
Relations among notions of security for public-key encryption schemes
TL;DR: In this article, the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes are compared under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack, and the goals of privacy and non-malleability are considered.
Book ChapterDOI
Password-Based authenticated key exchange in the three-party setting
TL;DR: This paper presents a natural generic construction of a three-party protocol, based on any two-party authenticated key exchange protocol, and proves its security without making use of the Random Oracle model, which is the first provably-secure password-based protocol in the three- party setting.