David Ribó-Pérez

Bio: David Ribó-Pérez is an academic researcher from Polytechnic University of Valencia. The author has contributed to research in topics: Renewable energy & Environmental economics. The author has an hindex of 6, co-authored 18 publications receiving 140 citations.

Assessing the obstacles to the participation of renewable energy sources in the electricity market of Colombia

Abstract: This paper presents an assessment of the obstacles to the development of non-conventional renewable energy sources in Colombia. In the study, eleven barriers were included in three clusters: technical, social and economic. These barriers obstruct renewable energy sources from contributing to the electricity market in Colombia, mainly in its non-interconnected areas. The energy sources analysed are solar photovoltaic power, wind power, biomass, geothermal and small hydroelectric power (less than 20 MW electricity). Obstacles and energy alternatives are included in an assessment model by means of Analytical Network Process. The method permits ranking the barriers and energy sources according to their influence in the network. That means, the more conflictive the obstacles and the more obstructed the energy sources, the higher their values. Four experts participated in the procedure representing different stakeholders in the electricity market of Colombia. The research showed the most important barriers are costs of investment and operating, lack of public and private coordination and lack of development planning for renewable energy sources. The most influenced (hindered by barriers) sources are wind power and geothermal power. However, the experts did not fully agree on those results and differences are discussed. The paper ends with some recommendations for overcoming the main obstacles against the participation of renewable energy sources in the Colombian electricity market.

Novel Conceptual Architecture for the Next-Generation Electricity Markets to Enhance a Large Penetration of Renewable Energy

Abstract: This work was supported by the Ministerio de Economia, Industria, y Competitividad (Spanish Government) under research project ENE-2016-78509-C3-1-P, and EU FEDER funds. The authors received funds from these grants for covering the costs to publish in open access. This work was also supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education under the scholarship FPU16/00962.

A Critical Review of Demand Response Products as Resource for Ancillary Services: International Experience and Policy Recommendations

Abstract: Demand response is a key element of future power systems due to its capacity to defer grid investments, improve demand participation in the market, and absorb renewable energy source variations In this regard, demand response can play an important role in delivering ancillary services to power systems The lack of standardization and ancillary services programs prepared for traditional generators have blocked the participation of demand in these services Nowadays, increasing needs to ensure the security of supply, renewable fluctuations, and information and communication technology advances are boosting the interest in demand response products to deliver ancillary services While countries have had lengthy experience with these programs, others are starting from almost zero to develop these programs To our knowledge, no analysis or standardized comparison exists of the different parameters and prices of demand response in ancillary services among different countries Our study reviews more than 20 power systems around the world and their programs to classify them according to standard demand response parameters At the end of the paper we discuss the main characteristics and prices that face demand response in ancillary services markets and a series of policy recommendations to policymakers to improve the deployment on demand participation in ancillary services

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

Optimal demand bidding for time-shiftable loads

Abstract: Time-shiftable loads have recently received an increasing attention due to their role in creating load flexibility and enhancing demand response and peak-load shaving programs. In this paper, we seek to answer the following question: How can a time-shiftable load, that itself may comprise of several smaller time-shiftable subloads, submit its demand bids to the day-ahead and real-time markets so as to minimize its energy procurement cost? Answering this question is challenging because of the inter-temporal dependencies in choosing the demand bids for time-shiftable loads, and also due to the coupling between demand bid selection and time-shiftable load scheduling problems. Nevertheless, we answer the above question for different practical bidding scenarios and based on different statistical characteristics of practical market prices. In all cases, closed form solutions are obtained for the optimal choices of the price and energy bids. The bidding performance is then evaluated in details by examining several case studies and analyzing actual market price data.

Virtual power plant models and electricity markets - A review

Abstract: In recent years, the integration of distributed generation in power systems has been accompanied by new facility operations strategies. Thus, it has become increasingly important to enhance management capabilities regarding the aggregation of distributed electricity production and demand through different types of virtual power plants (VPPs). It is also important to exploit their ability to participate in electricity markets to maximize operating profits. This review article focuses on the classification and in-depth analysis of recent studies that propose VPP models including interactions with different types of energy markets. This classification is formulated according to the most important aspects to be considered for these VPPs. These include the formulation of the model, techniques for solving mathematical problems, participation in different types of markets, and the applicability of the proposed models to real case studies. From the analysis of the studies, it is concluded that the most recent models tend to be more complete and realistic in addition to featuring greater diversity in the types of electricity markets in which VPPs participate. The aim of this review is to identify the most profitable VPP scheme to be applied in each regulatory environment. It also highlights the challenges remaining in this field of study.