The purpose of this paper is to defend the systematic introduction of formal ontological principles in the current practice of knowledge engineering, to explore the various relationships between ontology and knowledge representation, and to present the recent trends in this promising research area. According to the "modelling view" of knowledge acquisition proposed by Clancey, the modelling activity must establish a correspondence between a knowledge base and two separate subsystems: the agent's behaviour (i.e. the problem-solving expertise ) and its own environment (the problem domain ). Current knowledge modelling methodologies tend to focus on the former sub-system only, viewing domain knowledge as strongly dependent on the particular task at hand: in fact, AI researchers seem to have been much more interested in the nature of reasoning rather than in the nature of the real world. Recently, however, the potential value of task-independent knowledge bases (or "ontologies") suitable to large scale integration has been underlined in many ways. In this paper, we compare the dichotomy between reasoning and representation to the philosophical distinction between epistemology and ontology. We introduce the notion of the ontological level, intermediate between the epistemological and the conceptual levels discussed by Brachman, as a way to characterize a knowledge representation formalism taking into account the intended meaning of its primitives. We then discuss some formal ontologic distinctions which may play an important role for such purpose.

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Formal ontology, conceptual analysis and knowledge representation

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/s15516709cog1401_3

Principles of Object Perception

Objects and attention: the state of the art

One characterization of functionalism that is probably vague enough to be acceptable to most functionalists is: each type of mental state is a state consisting of a disposition to act in certain ways and to have certain mental states, given certain sensory inputs and certain mental states. So put, functionalism can be seen as a new incarnation of behaviorism. Behaviorism identifies mental states with dispositions to act in certain ways in certain input situations. But as critics have pointed out (Chisholm, 1957; Geach, 1957; Putnam, 1963), desire for goal G cannot be identified with, say, the disposition to do A in input circumstances in which A leads to G, since, after all, the agent might not know that A leads to G and thus might not be disposed to do A. Functionalism replaces behaviorism's "sensory inputs ' with "sensory inputs and mental states '; and functionalism replaces behaviorism's "dispositions to act" with "dispositions to act and have certain mental states." Functionalists want to individuate mental states causally, and since mental states have mental causes and effects as well as sensory causes and behavioral effects, Functionalists individuate mental states partly in terms of causal relations to other mental states. One consequence of this difference between functionalism and behaviorism is that there are possible organisms that according to behaviorism, have mental states but, according to functionalism, do not have mental states.

http://www.pstruc.org/english/files/Block,%20Ned%20-%20Troubles%20With%20Functionalism.pdf

Troubles with functionalism

Diverse theories suggest that people are motivated to maintain or enhance feelings of self-esteem, continuity, distinctiveness, belonging, efficacy, and meaning in their identities. Four studies tested the influence of these motives on identity construction, by using a multilevel regression design. Participants perceived as more central those identity elements that provided a greater sense of self-esteem, continuity, distinctiveness, and meaning; this was found for individual, relational, and group levels of identity, among various populations, and by using a prospective design. Motives for belonging and efficacy influenced identity definition indirectly through their direct influences on identity enactment and through their contributions to self-esteem. Participants were happiest about those identity elements that best satisfied motives for self-esteem and efficacy. These findings point to the need for an integrated theory of identity motivation.

Beyond self-esteem: influence of multiple motives on identity construction.

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Sameness and substance

1. The absoluteness of sameness 2. Outline of a theory of individuation 3. Sortal concepts: their characteristic activity or function or purpose 4. Essentialism and conceptualism 5. Conceptualism and realism 6. Vagueness, determinacy and identity: a conceptualist proposal 7. Personal identity.

/pdf/sameness-and-substance-renewed-1vmra7517b.pdf

Sameness and Substance Renewed

On being in the same place at the same time

I: Claims of Need II: Universalizability, Impartiality, Truth III: Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life IV: Truth as Predicated of Moral Judgments V: A Sensible Subjectivism VI: Deliberation and Practical Reason VII: Weakness of Will, Commensurability and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire VIII: Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism IX: The Concern to Survive Postscript to Essays I-IX X: Incommensurability: Four Proposals Index

Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value

Les questions de la verite et du sens de la vie sont-elles les questions centrales de la philosophie morale?.

David Wiggins

Papers

Sameness and substance

Sameness and Substance Renewed

On being in the same place at the same time

Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value

Truth, invention, and the meaning of life