Debora C.M. Glandorf

Bio: Debora C.M. Glandorf is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Gene drive & Risk assessment. The author has an hindex of 2, co-authored 3 publications receiving 12 citations.

Potential use of gene drive modified insects against disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species poses new challenges for risk assessment.

Abstract: Potential future application of engineered gene drives (GDs), which bias their own inheritance and can spread genetic modifications in wild target populations, has sparked both enthusiasm and concern. Engineered GDs in insects could potentially be used to address long-standing challenges in control of disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, or help to rescue endangered species, and thus provide important public benefits. However, there are concerns that the deliberate environmental release of GD modified insects may pose different or new harms to animal and human health and the wider environment, and raise novel challenges for risk assessment. Risk assessors, risk managers, developers, potential applicants and other stakeholders at many levels are currently discussing whether there is a need to develop new or additional risk assessment guidance for the environmental release of GD modified organisms, including insects. Developing new or additional guidance that is useful and practical is a challenge, especially at an international level, as risk assessors, risk managers and many other stakeholders have different, often contrasting, opinions and perspectives toward the environmental release of GD modified organisms, and on the adequacy of current risk assessment frameworks for such organisms. Here, we offer recommendations to overcome some of the challenges associated with the potential future development of new or additional risk assessment guidance for GD modified insects and provide considerations on areas where further risk assessment guidance may be required.

Interspecific hybridization in the genus Drosophila

Abstract: The first review of the phenomenon of interspecific hybridization in animals appears to be that of Haldane (1922), who catalogued all cases known to that time in which crosses performed artificially had yielded ten or more offspring with a distortion of the F1 sex ratio or fertility. Haldane’s examples encompassed Insecta (Lepidoptera, plus single instances in Diptera and Anoplura), Crustacea (a single instance in Cladocera), Aves, and Mammalia. On the basis of his compilation Haldane enunciated the empirical “law” that the absent or sterile sex is always the heterogamic one (“heterozygous” in the original terminology), although exceptions have subsequently been found in some groups (White, 1973).

The wMel Wolbachia strain blocks dengue and invades caged Aedes aegypti populations

Abstract: Dengue fever is the most important mosquito-borne viral disease of humans with more than 50 million cases estimated annually in more than 100 countries. Disturbingly, the geographic range of dengue is currently expanding and the severity of outbreaks is increasing. Control options for dengue are very limited and currently focus on reducing population abundance of the major mosquito vector, Aedes aegypti. These strategies are failing to reduce dengue incidence in tropical communities and there is an urgent need for effective alternatives. It has been proposed that endosymbiotic bacterial Wolbachia infections of insects might be used in novel strategies for dengue control. For example, the wMelPop-CLA Wolbachia strain reduces the lifespan of adult A. aegypti mosquitoes in stably transinfected lines. This life-shortening phenotype was predicted to reduce the potential for dengue transmission. The recent discovery that several Wolbachia infections, including wMelPop-CLA, can also directly influence the susceptibility of insects to infection with a range of insect and human pathogens has markedly changed the potential for Wolbachia infections to control human diseases. Here we describe the successful transinfection of A. aegypti with the avirulent wMel strain of Wolbachia, which induces the reproductive phenotype cytoplasmic incompatibility with minimal apparent fitness costs and high maternal transmission, providing optimal phenotypic effects for invasion. Under semi-field conditions, the wMel strain increased from an initial starting frequency of 0.65 to near fixation within a few generations, invading A. aegypti populations at an accelerated rate relative to trials with the wMelPop-CLA strain. We also show that wMel and wMelPop-CLA strains block transmission of dengue serotype 2 (DENV-2) in A. aegypti, forming the basis of a practical approach to dengue suppression.

Adequacy and sufficiency evaluation of existing EFSA guidelines for the molecular characterisation, environmental risk assessment and post-market environmental monitoring of genetically modified insects containing engineered gene drives.

Abstract: Advances in molecular and synthetic biology are enabling the engineering of gene drives in insects for disease vector/pest control. Engineered gene drives (that bias their own inheritance) can be designed either to suppress interbreeding target populations or modify them with a new genotype. Depending on the engineered gene drive system, theoretically, a genetic modification of interest could spread through target populations and persist indefinitely, or be restricted in its spread or persistence. While research on engineered gene drives and their applications in insects is advancing at a fast pace, it will take several years for technological developments to move to practical applications for deliberate release into the environment. Some gene drive modified insects (GDMIs) have been tested experimentally in the laboratory, but none has been assessed in small-scale confined field trials or in open release trials as yet. There is concern that the deliberate release of GDMIs in the environment may have possible irreversible and unintended consequences. As a proactive measure, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has been requested by the European Commission to review whether its previously published guidelines for the risk assessment of genetically modified animals (EFSA, 2012 and 2013), including insects (GMIs), are adequate and sufficient for GDMIs, primarily disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, for deliberate release into the environment. Under this mandate, EFSA was not requested to develop risk assessment guidelines for GDMIs. In this Scientific Opinion, the Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) concludes that EFSA's guidelines are adequate, but insufficient for the molecular characterisation (MC), environmental risk assessment (ERA) and post-market environmental monitoring (PMEM) of GDMIs. While the MC,ERA and PMEM of GDMIs can build on the existing risk assessment framework for GMIs that do not contain engineered gene drives, there are specific areas where further guidance is needed for GDMIs.

Systematic identification of plausible pathways to potential harm via problem formulation for investigational releases of a population suppression gene drive to control the human malaria vector Anopheles gambiae in West Africa

Abstract: Population suppression gene drive has been proposed as a strategy for malaria vector control. A CRISPR-Cas9-based transgene homing at the doublesex locus (dsxFCRISPRh) has recently been shown to increase rapidly in frequency in, and suppress, caged laboratory populations of the malaria mosquito vector Anopheles gambiae. Here, problem formulation, an initial step in environmental risk assessment (ERA), was performed for simulated field releases of the dsxFCRISPRh transgene in West Africa. Building on consultative workshops in Africa that previously identified relevant environmental and health protection goals for ERA of gene drive in malaria vector control, 8 potentially harmful effects from these simulated releases were identified. These were stratified into 46 plausible pathways describing the causal chain of events that would be required for potential harms to occur. Risk hypotheses to interrogate critical steps in each pathway, and an analysis plan involving experiments, modelling and literature review to test each of those risk hypotheses, were developed. Most potential harms involved increased human (n = 13) or animal (n = 13) disease transmission, emphasizing the importance to subsequent stages of ERA of data on vectorial capacity comparing transgenics to non-transgenics. Although some of the pathways (n = 14) were based on known anatomical alterations in dsxFCRISPRh homozygotes, many could also be applicable to field releases of a range of other transgenic strains of mosquito (n = 18). In addition to population suppression of target organisms being an accepted outcome for existing vector control programmes, these investigations also revealed that the efficacy of population suppression caused by the dsxFCRISPRh transgene should itself directly affect most pathways (n = 35). Modelling will play an essential role in subsequent stages of ERA by clarifying the dynamics of this relationship between population suppression and reduction in exposure to specific potential harms. This analysis represents a comprehensive identification of plausible pathways to potential harm using problem formulation for a specific gene drive transgene and organism, and a transparent communication tool that could inform future regulatory studies, guide subsequent stages of ERA, and stimulate further, broader engagement on the use of population suppression gene drive to control malaria vectors in West Africa.

Potential use of gene drive modified insects against disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species poses new challenges for risk assessment.

Abstract: Potential future application of engineered gene drives (GDs), which bias their own inheritance and can spread genetic modifications in wild target populations, has sparked both enthusiasm and concern. Engineered GDs in insects could potentially be used to address long-standing challenges in control of disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, or help to rescue endangered species, and thus provide important public benefits. However, there are concerns that the deliberate environmental release of GD modified insects may pose different or new harms to animal and human health and the wider environment, and raise novel challenges for risk assessment. Risk assessors, risk managers, developers, potential applicants and other stakeholders at many levels are currently discussing whether there is a need to develop new or additional risk assessment guidance for the environmental release of GD modified organisms, including insects. Developing new or additional guidance that is useful and practical is a challenge, especially at an international level, as risk assessors, risk managers and many other stakeholders have different, often contrasting, opinions and perspectives toward the environmental release of GD modified organisms, and on the adequacy of current risk assessment frameworks for such organisms. Here, we offer recommendations to overcome some of the challenges associated with the potential future development of new or additional risk assessment guidance for GD modified insects and provide considerations on areas where further risk assessment guidance may be required.