TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that Indonesia's long-running ideological constraints set its priorities to its interest to the dispute, while its foreign policy doctrine serves as a pragmatic means to achieve its goals of interests.
Abstract: Before it developed into a dispute among China and Southeast Asian nations, the South China Sea has been disputed long before it became what it is today. The post-World War II era brought a fresh start to a new chapter of dispute, as China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam laid their claims one by one. This study contends that under Suharto’s iron fist rule, Indonesia’s interest to the South China Sea dispute grew from maintaining Indonesia’s territorial integrity to maintaining domestic stability. The former took shape after being threatened by China’s map which claimed a part of the former’s territorial waters, while the later grew in through establishing deeper trade cooperation with China. Despite the half-hearted normalization with China, Indonesia managed to establish a track-two forum for parties involved in the South China Sea dispute, which is later proven to be instrumental. Under President Yudhoyono, Indonesia gradually played its initial role from a passive into an active honest broker, which brought improvements to the process. This research attempts to show that constraint to Indonesia’s role in the South China Sea dispute originates from both the ideological and historical factors. Indonesia’s long-running ideological constraints set its priorities to its interest to the dispute, while its foreign policy doctrine serves as a pragmatic means to achieve its goals of interests. Indonesia’s past relationship with China also played a part in influencing Indonesia’s response which later evolved as the relations went through ups and downs. Moreover, the unclear integration process of ASEAN sets the task of the honest broker became a one-country-show for Indonesia.
TL;DR: After being a neutral actor for decades in the complex South China Sea (SCS) territorial disputes, Indonesia has seen itself compelled by China's assertiveness to become firmer about protecting its...
Abstract: After being a neutral actor for decades in the complex South China Sea (SCS) territorial disputes, Indonesia has seen itself compelled by China’s assertiveness to become firmer about protecting its...
TL;DR: Indonesia's foreign policy has remained largely autonomous of the political struggles associated with democratisation and a subsequent illiberal turn, even as they have changed over the last few decades as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Key areas of Indonesian foreign policy have remained largely autonomous of the political struggles associated with democratisation and a subsequent illiberal turn, even as they have changed...
TL;DR: For example, this paper pointed out that Japan has looked on as a passive observer of the events happening in the Korean peninsular despite the peninsula's geographical proximity and undeniable importance for her security.
Abstract: Throughout the post-World War 2 history, Japan has looked on as a passive observer of the events happening in the Korean peninsular despite the peninsula’s geographical proximity and undeniable importance for her security. Neither the outbreak nor results of the Korean War, for example, were influenced by Japan’s action. She was not able to change the continuos division and conflicting relations between North (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and South (the Republic of Korea) Koreas either. Other major neighbors, namely the US, the former Soviet Union, and China, played more active roles and had certain responsibilities in the establishment of the peninsula’s present situation. Even after the size of Japan’s economy, an important potential political power source, became undeniably huge and the basic character of international system, namely the Cold War situation, was changed, this impression of Japan’s passive, if not nonexistent, Korea policy has not changed much. To be exact, Japan played no minor role in South Korea’s achievement in becoming one of Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) through her provision of official developmental assistance (ODA) and private investment. But Japan’s ODA to South Korea was often either a response to American requests for strategic aid or, by building infrastructure, a foundation by which Japanese industry advanced on the South Korean market. Therefore, if Japan contributed to the economic growth of South Korea, it was a byproduct rather than the result of a grand strategy for the peninsular. When we turn attention to North Korea, Japan’s appearance has been even less visible. She did not earnestly attempt to draw North Korean society out of its isolation. Through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the Japanese
TL;DR: The role of Indonesia in the South China Sea (SCS) disputes has been limited to being part of the ASEAN team since the country is not one of the active claimants.
Abstract: The role of Indonesia in the South China Sea (SCS) disputes has been limited to being part of the ASEAN team since the country is not one of the active claimants. Jakarta has tried to sidestep its ...
01 Jan 2020
TL;DR: In this paper, a broadened definition of securitization, which looks beyond the transformation of non security concerns to national security issues, through emergency measures, was proposed, with the aim of recasting ASEAN's response to the concerns of China beyond the maritime dispute.
Abstract: The central themes that this chapter seeks to put forward revolve around what may be additional narratives that recast ASEAN’s response to the concerns of the SCS, beyond the maritime dispute. The first of these focuses on the argument that the sovereignty issues of the SCS dispute are underlined by relatively less sensitive and functional maritime security issues. These are highlighted by a broadened definition of securitization, which looks beyond the transformation of non security concerns to national security issues, through emergency measures. Instead, securitization may be seen from a practice-based perspective. At the core is the process of evolving an ASEAN maritime security community, particularly the ASEAN members-states’ non-traditional and non-controversial practices of maritime safety, marine environmental protection, etc. which may be de-coupled from traditional maritime security such as boundary issues and maritime claims. When undertaken, these have had a de-conflicting impact on ASEAN’s tenuous relations with China.