Dieter Nattkemper

Bio: Dieter Nattkemper is an academic researcher from Humboldt University of Berlin. The author has contributed to research in topics: Stimulus (physiology) & Action (philosophy). The author has an hindex of 10, co-authored 26 publications receiving 517 citations. Previous affiliations of Dieter Nattkemper include Humboldt State University.

Learning of event sequences is based on response-effect learning: further evidence from a serial reaction task.

Abstract: Four experiments provide converging evidence that serial learning in a serial reaction task is based on response-effect learning, mediated by the learning of the relations between a response and the stimulus that follows it. In Experiment 1, the authors varied the stimulus sequence and the response-stimulus relations while holding the response sequence constant. Learning effects depended on the complexity of the response-stimulus relations but not on the stimulus-stimulus relations. In Experiment 2, transfer of serial learning from 1 stimulus sequence to another was only found when both sequences had identical response-stimulus relations. In Experiment 3, a variation of the stimulus sequence alone had no effect on serial learning, whereas in Experiment 4 learning effects increased when the response-stimulus relations but not the stimulus-stimulus relations were simplified. These findings suggest that serial learning is based on mechanisms of voluntary action control.

Instruction-induced feature binding.

Abstract: In order to test whether or not instructions specifying the stimulus–response (S–R) mappings for a new task suffice to create bindings between specified stimulus and response features, we developed a dual task paradigm of the ABBA type in which participants saw new S–R instructions for the A-task in the beginning of each trial. Immediately after the A-task instructions, participants had to perform a logically independent B-task. The imperative stimulus for the A-task was presented after the B-task had been executed. The present data show that the instructed S–R mappings influence performance on the embedded B-task, even when they (1) have never been practiced, and (2) are irrelevant with respect to the B-task. These results imply that instructions can induce bindings between S- and R-features without prior execution of the task at hand.

The role of anticipation and intention in the learning of effects of self-performed actions

Abstract: The anticipative learning model for acquiring action-effect relations states that the acquisition of action-effect relations depends on processes that are part of action planning, in particular the anticipation of possible effects Experiment 1 shows that response planning is indeed crucial for the learning of response effects In this experiment distractors (tones) were presented either during response preparation or in the time interval between response execution and the presentation of a response effect Response-effect learning was impaired when the distractors were presented during response preparation The finding is consistent with the assumption that the distractors impaired the anticipation of potential effects and therefore reduced effect learning In Experiment 2 all responses had two effects Participants were instructed to produce one of the effects Under this condition, response-effect learning was only found for the instructed effect, not for the non-instructed effect The two experiments thus support the view that response-effect learning is selective and depends on the anticipation of potential effects during response planning The results are discussed in terms of a model that explains both the learning of response-effect relations and the use of these effects for action control within the same theoretical framework

Strategic influences on implementing instructions for future actions

Abstract: Temporal and strategic factors that might influence the transformation of verbal task rules into functional stimulus–response associations were investigated in three experiments. In a dual task paradigm of the ABBA type participants were presented new S–R instructions for the A-task at the beginning of each trial. On varying proportions of trials No-go signals rendered the instructed A-task mappings irrelevant before instruction implementation was assessed during performance of an unrelated B-task. Our results indicate that participants refrain from implementing the mappings during instruction presentation when No-go signals appear frequently and late (Exp. 2), and that they can interrupt implementing instructed S–R mappings when frequent No-go signals appear early enough during implementation (Exp. 3). When No-go signals are rare and late, however (Exp. 1), the instructed stimulus features always activate their associated responses during performance of the embedded B-task in an automatic manner. Together, these findings suggest that participants strategically control whether or not they implement verbal instructions. Once implemented, however, instructed S–R associations influence behaviour even when the instructed mappings are no longer task relevant.

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting out our sensory experience

Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

Action control according to TEC (theory of event coding)

Abstract: The theory of event coding (TEC) is a general framework explaining how perceived and produced events (stimuli and responses) are cognitively represented and how their representations interact to generate perception and action. This article discusses the implications of TEC for understanding the control of voluntary action and makes an attempt to apply, specify, and concretize the basic theoretical ideas in the light of the available research on action control. In particular, it is argued that the major control operations may take place long before a stimulus is encountered (the prepared-reflex principle), that stimulus-response translation may be more automatic than commonly thought, that action selection and execution are more interwoven than most approaches allow, and that the acquisition of action-contingent events (action effects) is likely to subserve both the selection and the evaluation of actions.

A review of contemporary ideomotor theory.

Abstract: A framework for action planning, called ideomotor theory, suggests that actions are represented by their perceivable effects. Thus, any activation of the effect image, either endogenously or exogenously, will trigger the corresponding action. We review contemporary studies relating to ideomotor theory in which researchers have investigated various manipulations of action effects and how those effects acquire discriminative control over the actions. Evidence indicates that the knowledge about the relation between response and effect is still a critical component even when other factors, such as stimulus-response or response-response relations, are controlled. When consistent tone effects are provided after responses are made, performance in serial-reaction tasks is better than when the effects are random. Methodology in which acquisition and test stages are used with choice-reaction tasks shows that an action is automatically associated with its effect bilaterally and that anticipation of the effect facilitates action. Ideomotor phenomena include stimulus-response compatibility, in which the perceptual feature of the stimulus activates its corresponding action code when the stimulus itself resembles the effect codes. For this reason, other stimulus-driven action facilitation such as ideomotor action and imitation are treated as ideomotor phenomena and are reviewed. Ideomotor theory also implies that ongoing action affects perception of concurrent events, a topic which we review briefly. Issues concerning ideomotor theory are identified and evaluated. We categorize the range of ideomotor explanations into several groups by whether intermediate steps are assumed to complete sensorimotor transformation or not and by whether a general theoretical framework or a more restricted one is provided by the account.

Associative theories of goal-directed behaviour: a case for animal-human translational models.

Abstract: Associative accounts of goal-directed action, developed in the fields of human ideomotor action and that of animal learning, can capture cognitive belief-desire psychology of human decision-making. Whereas outcome-response accounts can account for the fact that the thought of a goal can call to mind the action that has previously procured this goal, response-outcome accounts capture decision-making processes that start out with the consideration of possible response alternatives followed only in the second instance by evaluation of their consequences. We argue that while the outcome-response mechanism plays a crucial role in response priming effects, the response-outcome mechanism is particularly important for action selection on the basis of current needs and desires. We therefore develop an integrative account that encapsulates these two routes of action selection within the framework of the associative-cybernetic model. This model has the additional benefit of providing mechanisms for the incentive modulation of goal-directed action and for the development of behavioural autonomy, and therefore provides a promising account of the multi-faceted process of animal as well as human instrumental decision-making.