Machine Learning is the study of methods for programming computers to learn. Computers are applied to a wide range of tasks, and for most of these it is relatively easy for programmers to design and implement the necessary software. However, there are many tasks for which this is difficult or impossible. These can be divided into four general categories. First, there are problems for which there exist no human experts. For example, in modern automated manufacturing facilities, there is a need to predict machine failures before they occur by analyzing sensor readings. Because the machines are new, there are no human experts who can be interviewed by a programmer to provide the knowledge necessary to build a computer system. A machine learning system can study recorded data and subsequent machine failures and learn prediction rules. Second, there are problems where human experts exist, but where they are unable to explain their expertise. This is the case in many perceptual tasks, such as speech recognition, hand-writing recognition, and natural language understanding. Virtually all humans exhibit expert-level abilities on these tasks, but none of them can describe the detailed steps that they follow as they perform them. Fortunately, humans can provide machines with examples of the inputs and correct outputs for these tasks, so machine learning algorithms can learn to map the inputs to the outputs. Third, there are problems where phenomena are changing rapidly. In finance, for example, people would like to predict the future behavior of the stock market, of consumer purchases, or of exchange rates. These behaviors change frequently, so that even if a programmer could construct a good predictive computer program, it would need to be rewritten frequently. A learning program can relieve the programmer of this burden by constantly modifying and tuning a set of learned prediction rules. Fourth, there are applications that need to be customized for each computer user separately. Consider, for example, a program to filter unwanted electronic mail messages. Different users will need different filters. It is unreasonable to expect each user to program his or her own rules, and it is infeasible to provide every user with a software engineer to keep the rules up-to-date. A machine learning system can learn which mail messages the user rejects and maintain the filtering rules automatically. Machine learning addresses many of the same research questions as the fields of statistics, data mining, and psychology, but with differences of emphasis. Statistics focuses on understanding the phenomena that have generated the data, often with the goal of testing different hypotheses about those phenomena. Data mining seeks to find patterns in the data that are understandable by people. Psychological studies of human learning aspire to understand the mechanisms underlying the various learning behaviors exhibited by people (concept learning, skill acquisition, strategy change, etc.).

Machine learning

Data Mining Practical Machine Learning Tools and Techniques

https://www.science.smith.edu/~jcardell/Courses/EGR328/Readings/WSNSurvey2.pdf

Wireless sensor network survey

http://www.csun.edu/~andrzej/COMP529-S05/papers/Mesh%20Networks%20Survey.pdf

Wireless mesh networks: a survey

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) consist of a collection of wireless mobile nodes which dynamically exchange data among themselves without the reliance on a fixed base station or a wired backbone network MANET nodes are typically distinguished by their limited power, processing, and memory resources as well as high degree of mobility In such networks, the wireless mobile nodes may dynamically enter the network as well as leave the network Due to the limited transmission range of wireless network nodes, multiple hops are usually needed for a node to exchange information with any other node in the network Thus routing is a crucial issue to the design of a MANET In this paper, we specifically examine the issues of multipath routing in MANETs Multipath routing allows the establishment of multiple paths between a single source and single destination node It is typically proposed in order to increase the reliability of data transmission (ie, fault tolerance) or to provide load balancing Load balancing is of especial importance in MANETs because of the limited bandwidth between the nodes We also discuss the application of multipath routing to support application constraints such as reliability, load-balancing, energy-conservation, and Quality-of-Service (QoS)

/pdf/multipath-routing-in-mobile-ad-hoc-networks-issues-and-4nimg1w1i9.pdf

Multipath Routing in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: Issues and Challenges

When highly mobile nodes are interconnected via wireless links, the resulting network can be used as a transit network to connect other disjoint ad-hoc networks. In this paper, we compare five different opportunistic forwarding schemes, which vary in their overhead, their success rate, and the amount of knowledge about neighboring nodes that they require. In particular, we present the MoVe algorithm, which uses velocity information to make intelligent opportunistic forwarding decisions. Using auxiliary information to make forwarding decisions provides a reasonable trade-off between resource overhead and performance.

Knowledge-based opportunistic forwarding in vehicular wireless ad hoc networks

Autonomous vehicles capable of navigating unpredictable real-world environments with little human feedback are a reality today. Such systems rely heavily on onboard sensors such as cameras, radar/LIDAR, and GPS as well as capabilities such as 3G/4G connectivity and V2V/V2I communication to make real-time maneuvering decisions. Autonomous vehicle control imposes very strict requirements on the security of the communication channels used by the vehicle to exchange information as well as the control logic that performs complex driving tasks such as adapting vehicle velocity or changing lanes. This study presents a first look at the effects of security attacks on the communication channel as well as sensor tampering of a connected vehicle stream equipped to achieve CACC. Our simulation results show that an insider attack can cause significant instability in the CACC vehicle stream. We also illustrate how different countermeasures, such as downgrading to ACC mode, could potentially be used to improve the security and safety of the connected vehicle streams.

/pdf/security-vulnerabilities-of-connected-vehicle-streams-and-3z7r7ellqk.pdf

Security vulnerabilities of connected vehicle streams and their impact on cooperative driving

https://escholarship.org/content/qt3bq0c3rj/qt3bq0c3rj.pdf?t=o182yb

Dipak Ghosal

Papers

Wireless sensor network survey

Multipath Routing in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: Issues and Challenges

Knowledge-based opportunistic forwarding in vehicular wireless ad hoc networks

Security vulnerabilities of connected vehicle streams and their impact on cooperative driving

Platoon management with cooperative adaptive cruise control enabled by VANET