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Showing papers by "Donald R. Songer published in 2000"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine how the Supreme Court uses signals and indices from lower courts to determine which cases to review, based on publicly observable case facts, the known preferences of a lower court, and its decision.
Abstract: W T He examine how the Supreme Court uses signals and indices from lower courts to determine which cases to review. In our game theoretic model, a higher court cues from publicly observable case facts, the known preferences of a lower court, and its decision. The lower court attempts to enforce its own preferences, exploiting ambiguity in cases'fact patterns. In equilibrium, a conservative higher court declines to review conservative decisions from lower courts regardless of the facts of the case or the relative ideology of the judges. But a conservative higher court probabilistically reviews liberal decisions, with the "audit rate" tied to observable facts and the ideology of the lower court judge. We derive comparative static results and test them with a random sample of search-and-seizure cases appealed to the Burger Court between 1972 and 1986. The evidence broadly supports the model. H ierarchical control of organizations is problematic throughout the realm of politics. Congress and presidents attempt to control agencies, upper levels of bureaucracies attempt to control lower levels, and higher courts strive to control lower courts. With incomplete information about their subordinates' decisions and knowledge, superiors in rule-based hierarchies often employ some form of auditing. In this article we study how the Supreme Court uses signals and indices from lower courts to pluck a relative handful of cases from a plethora of potential candidates for review. Our point of departure is the role of review in enforcing the doctrinal preferences of the Supreme Court within the judicial hierarchy. We begin by presenting a game-theoretic model of

239 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the voting behavior of state supreme court judges from 1982 through 1993 in two substantive areas of law not generally identified as women's issues: obscenity and death penalty sentencing.
Abstract: Prior research on the role of judge gender in voting behavior has led to competing theories about the impact of women judges. The purpose of this research is to determine whether female judges vote differently than their male colleagues. Methods. In an attempt to determine whether or not women judges are generally more willing to support the liberal position, this research examines the voting behavior of state supreme court judges from 1982 through 1993 in two substantive areas of law not generally identified as women's issues: obscenity and death penalty sentencing. The data include the universe of published obscenity decisions in that period and a random sample of death penalty decisions. The impact of judge gender is assessed through use of a logistic regression model. Results. Controlling for party and region, we find that women judges in state supreme courts tend to vote more liberally than their male counterparts in both death penalty and obscenity cases. Equally important, the presence of a woman on state supreme courts tends to increase the probability that male judges will also support the liberal position. Conclusions. The gender effects discovered do not appear to be an artifact of state ideology or the result of socialization patterns common to all women

97 citations


Book
06 Sep 2000
TL;DR: Songer et al. as discussed by the authors presented a comprehensive examination of the shifting role of the United States Courts of Appeals, investigating changes over time and presenting the first systematic analyses of those changes.
Abstract: While many fine works of scholarship examine the role of the Supreme Court in American politics, there has been a dearth of scholarly books that focus on the Courts of Appeals. "Continuity and Change on the United States Courts of Appeals "is unique both in its focus on this level of the judiciary and its approach that examines major trends over the twentieth century. Since the Supreme Court has the discretion to refuse to hear almost all cases appealed to it, the Courts of Appeals are usually the final option for litigants in the federal system. Unless overturned by the Supreme Court or, in cases decided on the basis of statute, by Congressional action, the rulings can have a significant impact on government policy.The authors present the first comprehensive examination of the shifting role of the Courts of Appeals, investigating changes over time and presenting the first systematic analyses of those changes. Their work is the first book to utilize the database of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, analyzing over 15,000 cases to examine trends between 1925 and 1988. The book answers questions such as who are the judges? What are their decisional tendencies? What has been the role of region and partisan politics? Who are the litigants? And who has won and who has lost throughout the twentieth century? It is the only current, up-to-date book on the Courts of Appeals and an essential read for all scholars and students interested in American politics and judicial behavior.Donald R. Songer is Professor of Political Science, University of South Carolina. Reginald S. Sheehan is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Program for Law and Juridical Politics, Michigan State University. Susan B. Haire is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia

96 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper examined the relationship between the status of litigants, especially the comparison of repeat player "haves" to oneshotters who are ususally "have nots" appearing as litigant in state supreme courts, and their rates of success in that forum.
Abstract: The question of who wins and loses in American courts has traditionally been viewed as one of the central questions in the study of judicial politics. State supreme courts are particularly important in this regard since they are the final arbiters for the vast majority of litigation in the nation. In this article we examine the relationship between the status of litigants, especially the comparison of repeat player “haves” to oneshotters who are ususally “have nots,‘ appearing as litigants in state supreme courts, and their rates of success in that forum. A quarter of a century ago, Galanter (1974) made a compelling case for the proposition that the ’‘haves’ tend to come out ahead in litigation.” Since then, studies have confirmed the advantages of repeat players in the context of a wide variety of courts. But none of these party capability studies have considered whether the oft-found advantages of repeat litigants can be offset by the addition of support for their opponents from organized groups appeari...

59 citations