Donald R. Songer

Bio: Donald R. Songer is an academic researcher from University of South Carolina. The author has contributed to research in topics: Supreme court & Court of record. The author has an hindex of 32, co-authored 82 publications receiving 3351 citations.

The Unanimous Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada as a Test of the Attitudinal Model

Abstract: . Most of the empirical work on the decision making of justices on the Supreme Court of Canada has taken as its exclusive focus the divided decisions of the Court. In contrast to this extensive body of research on divided decision, the much more limited knowledge of unanimous decisions is troubling because such decisions constitute nearly three-quarters of all of the formal decisions of the Court. The analysis reported below provides a first step towards understanding the neglected nature of unanimous decisions. This investigation of the nature and causes of unanimity in the Supreme Court of Canada explores two competing explanations: one drawn from the most widely accepted general explanation of judicial voting (that is, the attitudinal model) and the other from the perspectives of the justices themselves. To determine that perspective, the author interviewed ten of the current or recent justices on the Court. After describing these two alternative accounts of unanimity, empirical tests are conducted of the implications of each view. We find substantially more support for the perspectives of the justices than for the perspective derived from the attitudinal model on unanimity.Resume. La majeure partie du travail de recherche empirique portant sur la maniere dont les juges de la Cour supreme du Canada prennent leurs decisions se concentre exclusivement sur les decisions divisees de cette institution. En contraste avec cette foison d'etudes sur les decisions divisees, le corpus beaucoup plus limite de connaissances sur les decisions unanimes pose un probleme important, car celles-ci representent presque les trois quarts de la totalite des decisions formelles de la Cour supreme. L'analyse presentee ci-dessous se veut un premier pas vers une meilleure connaissance de la nature, trop negligee jusqu'a present, de ces decisions unanimes. Cette investigation sur la nature et les causes de l'unanimite dans les decisions de la Cour supreme du Canada explore deux voies se trouvant en competition : l'une qui resulte de l'explication la plus largement acceptee du vote judiciaire (soit le modele attitudinal), et l'autre qui decoule de la perspective personnelle des juges. Pour elucider cette perspective propre des juges, les auteurs ont interviewe dix juges actuels et recents de la Cour supreme du Canada. Apres avoir decrit ces deux explications alternatives de l'unanimite, ils effectuent des tests empiriques sur les implications respectives du modele attitudinal et des perspectives propres des juges. L'etude revele que les perspectives propres des juges ont beaucoup plus de poids que la perspective derivee du modele attitudinal en ce qui concerne l'unanimite.

Party Capability and the US Courts of Appeals: Understanding Why the “Haves” Win

Abstract: While many studies have examined party capability theory, few have empirically examined the potential causal mechanisms underlying the theory. We do this by combining quantitative analyses with qualitative data drawn from interviews with over 60 US courts of appeals judges. We find that the “haves,” or repeat players, hire better lawyers and that these lawyers independently contribute to the success of the repeat players. We also find that the advantages of the haves extend to all parties, though to a lesser extent than the advantages enjoyed by the US government. These results remain robust after controlling for ideology.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF JUDICIAL IMPACT: Miranda in Five State Courts

Abstract: For over three decades, numerous studies on the impact of the United States Supreme Court have made it obvious that the legal rules and policy preferences of the Court do not automatically determin...

Gender Diversity in the Intermediate Appellate Courts of Canada

Abstract: A large sample of cases from the courts of appeal in five large Canadian provinces are examined to assess the impact of gender diversification on appellate courts. The findings are that there are significant gender differences on the courts of appeal that parallel those on the Supreme Court of Canada. Women are significantly more likely than men are to support the government in criminal cases and to support the individual in civil liberties cases. Moreover, strong panel effects are discovered. As the number of female judges increases, the more male judges tend to adopt the typical female approach to judicial outcomes; no evidence is found that supports critical mass theory.

In a Different Voice. Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge, MA (Harvard University Press) 1982.

Abstract: Introduction 1. Woman's Place in Man's Life Cycle 2. Images of Relationship 3. Concepts of Self and Morality 4. Crisis and Transition 5. Women's Rights and Women's Judgment 6. Visions of Maturity References Index of Study Participants General Index

Log-concave probability and its applications

Abstract: In many applications, assumptions about the log-concavity of a probability distribution allow just enough special structure to yield a workable theory. This paper catalogs a series of theorems relating log-concavity and/or log-convexity of probability density functions, distribution functions, reliability functions, and their integrals. We list a large number of commonly-used probability distributions and report the log-concavity or log-convexity of their density functions and their integrals. We also discuss a variety of applications of log-concavity that have appeared in the literature.

Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?

Abstract: Principal-agent models have been the basis for an extensive set of studies relating bureaucracy to elected officials. Yet despite the outpouring of research, there has been little attempt to test the basic assumptions of the principal-agent model. The model makes two assumptions: that goal conflict exists between principals and agents and that agents have more information than their principals, which results in an information asymmetry between them. But how valid are these assumptions? Can instances be found in which these assumptions do not hold? What happens when we vary these assumptions? In this article, we present both a critique of the traditional principal-agent model and a presentation of a broader theoretical framework for conceptualizing bureaucratic politics. Principal-agent models, derived from such disparate disciplines as law, finance, accounting, and economics, have become the basis for an extensive set of studies relating bureaucracy to elected officials (see Mitnick 1973, 1975, and 1980; Moe 1982, 1984, and 1985; Wood 1988; Wood and Waterman 1991, 1993, and 1994; Scholz and Wei 1986). Such models also have been extended to presidents' decisions to use force (Downs and Rocke 1994) and to the Supreme Court and its relationship to lower courts (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994). Despite this outpouring of research, few studies have directly examined the basic terminology and assumptions of the principalagent model. In this article our objectives are to examine principal-agent theory critically, to relax some of its restrictive assumptions, and in the process to present a more general theory of relationships between the bureaucracy and its political environment. Although our critique may be relevant to other uses of the principal-agent model, we limit our assessment to its use as a J-PART 8(1998):2:173-202 theory of bureaucracy. 173/ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion? THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL Despite the widespread referencing of the principal-agent model, only in rare instances does a researcher actually discuss the model and how its assumptions fit the problem to be studied. For this reason it is useful to review the model in its various incarnations and to examine its basic assumptions. The principalagent model, as applied in such disciplines as sociology, political science, and public administration, is in essence a theory about contractual relationships between buyers and sellers (see Ross 1973; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985). As described by Charles Perrow: In its simplest form, agency theory assumes that social life is a series of contracts. Conventionally, one member, the 'buyer' of goods or services is designated the 'principal,' and the other, who provides the goods or service is the 'agent'—hence the term 'agency theory.' The principal-agent relationship is governed by a contract specifying what the agent should do and what the principal must do in return. (1986, 224) A common application in economics is the market for professional services, say between a patient—the principal—and a physician—the agent (Evans 1980). Assuming that both are rational utility maximizers, a patient and a physician are likely to have different goals. The patient would like to be made healthy but pay as little as possible. The physician would be interested in income so, therefore, faces the temptation to provide more medical services than are necessary or to charge a higher price than is warranted. In this exchange, patients are at a disadvantage because they cannot directly evaluate the services provided by the physician. In short, an information asymmetry exists, with an advantage to the physician. Principals seek to manipulate and mold the behavior of agents so that they will act in a manner consistent with the principals' preferences. The contractual arrangement is one tool for accomplishing this goal. The contractual arrangement played an important role in Mitnick's (1973 and 1975) formulation of an institutional or regulatory principal-agent model. Rather than focus on buyers and sellers in an exchange, Mitnick examined the relationship between agents in the regulatory bureaucracy and their political principals (e.g., legislators and interest groups). Mitnick's (1980, 146) framework included \"a typology of agency relationships generated from such dimensions as the level of consent between agent and principal regarding the agent's actions (e.g., whether or not a contract exists, a contract which may be formal or informal), the source of specification of the agent's acts . . . . and the level of discretion possessed by the agent.\" Mitnick noted 174/J-PART, April 1998 Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion? that agents could be motivated by the public interest or by their own narrow self-interest. Since agents enjoy information advantages over their political principals, he added, \"The regulators are thus seen as agents to be policed to adherence to the 'public interest* goals of some principal 'public.'\" But \"such policing is not costless. . . . Principals must pay specification costs to identify acts of the agent that would satisfy the principal's preferences, and policing costs in monitoring and enforcing compliance\" (p. 150). Given the existence of these costs, Mitnick concluded (p. 151), \"The rational principal attempts policing only if he expects a net return . . . We suggest that because of bounded rationality and information costs, not to speak of fundamental problems in valuation, the return to the given public interest criteria may be more difficult to measure and predict than certain obvious indicators wrongly assumed to be correlated with return to that interest.\" In other words, in the principal-agent relationship there is an \"inevitability of control loss\" phenomenon (p. 17). The idea that costs are involved in monitoring an agent, and that principals rationally can decide not to monitor their agents' behavior, explains why the public interest is so often made subservient to private interests in the regulatory arena (one of the main concerns of the regulatory literature). It also raises an important distinction between the economic and the institutional or regulatory principal-agent models. In the institutional model, if a political principal such as the legislature decides that it is not in its rational self-interest to police or monitor its bureaucratic agents, that principal is unlikely to directly bear any cost incurred by the agent's continued shirking. Instead, the bulk of that cost is passed along to the general public, which in a democracy is the legislative branch's political principal. Legislators would pay only a direct cost for their lax oversight of the bureaucracy if the public became aware of it (e.g., if there were a scandal) and sought retribution against legislators at the polls. On the other hand, in the economic model, if the buyer did not adequately monitor the agent's behavior, then the buyer (i.e., the principal) would directly bear the cost, for example, by paying higher fees for services rendered. Likewise, as Mitnick notes, the nature of the contractual arrangement in the regulatory arena can be either formal or informal, whereas formal contracts would be more likely to be adopted in the market-place setting. As these examples demonstrate, important differences emerge once we begin to apply the principal-agent model from market place transactions to the regulatory arena. When political scientists first applied principal-agent theory to bureaucratic settings, further differences emerged from the 175/ J-PART, April 1998 Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion? economic model. In its new formulation, as with buyers and sellers, it is assumed that politicians (principals) and bureaucrats (agents) do not necessarily share similar goals, or to use Mitnick's (1986, 4) terminology, \"have potentially differing preferences. . . .\" If we assume that they are rational utility maximizers (politicians maximizing reelection chances and bureaucrats maximizing budgets), politicians have an interest in policies that benefit their constituents but have no interest in paying excessively for them. Because politicians and political coalitions change over time and bureaucracies develop separate interests through institutionalization and changing external relationships, a potential conflict occurs when the goals and objectives of principals and agents are at odds. Over time politicians may seek to alter established policy toward their preferred objectives, which may or may not be the same as those of the original legislation or political coalition. Bureaucratic interests also diverge from the original policy through time as politicians develop expertise about how the policy should be implemented or gain support from constituencies that favor different approaches. Even if no policy disagreement exists, principal-agent theory suggests that bureaucrats are likely to shirk, to produce outputs at a higher than needed cost, or to produce a level of outputs that is lower than desired. Agency theory posits a dynamic process of interaction between principals and agents, which develops through time. In this process, bureaucrats are assumed to have distinct informational and expertise advantages over politicians. They better understand the policy and the organizational procedures that are required to implement it. They have both the opportunity and the incentive to manipulate politicians and processes for political gain (see Niskanen 1971; Miller and Moe 1983). For some policies, especially those of a technical nature, bureaucracies are more knowledgeable about organizational needs than politicians are, so politicians are reluctant to intervene. Therefore, the key question for agency theory is, How can politicians vested with contemporaneous legitimacy overcome these uncertainties and the bureaucracy's inherent tendency to shirk? (See Wood and Waterman 19

Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process

Abstract: Any theory of the manner in which governmental policies get formulated and implemented, as well as the effects of those actions on the world, requires an understanding of the behavior of major types of governmental institutions (legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, chief executives), as well as the behavior of interest groups, the general public, and the media. The dominant paradigm of the policy process, the stages heuristic popularized by Jones (1970), Anderson (1975), and Peters (1986), has outlived its usefulness and must be replaced, in large part because it is not a causal theory. In the course of their empirical work, policy scholars have highlighted a number of phenomena that need to be incorporated into theories of the policy process. The development of such theories requires an integration ‘of both political scientists’ knowledge of specific institutions and behavior and policy scholars' attention to policy communities, substantive policy information, etc.Innovations by Policy Scholars in Understanding the Policy ProcessAt least since World War II, most political scientists have tended to focus on either a specific type of institution (legislatures, the presidency, courts, interest groups, administrative agencies, local governments, political parties) or on specific types of political behavior outside those institutions (public opinion, voting, political socialization). These have become the standard subfields within the discipline.In contrast, scholars interested in public policy have not been able to stay within these subfields because the policy process spans all of them. In the course of empirical work, policy scholars have highlighted a number of phenomena often neglected by political scientists without a policy focus:a) The importance of policy communities/networks/subsystems involving actors from numerous public and private institutions and from multiple levels of government;b) The importance of substantive policy information;c) The critical role of policy elites vis-a-vis the general public;d) The desirability of longitudinal studies of a decade or more;e) Differences in political behavior across policy types.

United States V. _____

Abstract: FACTS An officer in Midvale, Utah was doing some paperwork in his patrol car when he was approached by man, later identified as Nitokalisi Fonua (hereinafter, “Nick”). Nick “looked suspicious,” mainly because he was “jittery, looking around and appeared to be very nervous.” Nick’s suspicion rating jumped dramatically when, for no apparent reason, he informed the officer he had stolen a white GMC Blazer, which he had parked nearby. Naturally, the officer asked Nick if he would show him the Blazer, and Nick said sure. When they located the Blazer, the officer walked over and looked inside. The first thing he saw was a sawed-off shotgun on the back seat. Then he noticed some markings on the shotgun, “markings that looked gang-related.” Nick told the officer that the key to the Blazer was inside his motel room at the Days Inn. Also in the room, he said, were his “cousins,” meaning “people he knows from the streets.” The officer asked Nick “if we could obtain the keys to the vehicle so we could turn those back over to the owner.” Nick said the keys “were in the room somewhere” and that he “didn’t care” if the officer went in and retrieved them. Nick also gave the officer his key to the room. When backup arrived at the motel, officers knocked on the door which was opened by a man named Vake. There were two other occupants: a woman and Kimoana, the defendant. By this time, the officers were aware that Kimoana—not Nick—had rented the room. The first thing the officers saw as the door opened was the woman pointing “an unidentified black object” at the wall. Concerned for their safety, they ordered the occupants to “show their hands.” Then they pat searched them. Finding no weapons (the “unidentified black object” was a television remote control), they holstered their guns. Although the officers already had Nick’s consent to search the room, they sought and obtained consent from Vake. During the search, they found a “long-barreled revolver” under a mattress. As the result, Kimoana was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm.