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Donald R. Songer

Bio: Donald R. Songer is an academic researcher from University of South Carolina. The author has contributed to research in topics: Supreme court & Court of record. The author has an hindex of 32, co-authored 82 publications receiving 3351 citations.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the similarities and differences between published and unpublished district judge decisions were analyzed by analyzing the treatment of each on appeal. But, the focus of empirical analysis has been on the published opinions of courts, while a large number of cases are decided without an accompanying published opinion.
Abstract: r he past two decades have witnessed an increasing number of empirical analyses of the votes of judges in the lower federal courts (e.g., Richardson and Vines, 1970; Carp and Rowland, 1983; Atkins, 1972; Goldman, 1966; Goldman, 1975; Vines, 1964; Dolbeare, 1969; Johnson, 1979; Kritzer, 1978; Howard, 1981; Songer, 1982; Walker, 1972). Although great variety in the methods employed may be found in these empirical studies, virtually all of them share one approach common to Supreme Court studies: their analysis of judges' decisions and votes is restricted to data obtained from the published opinions of the courts. While the focus of empirical analysis has been on the published opinions of courts, a large number of cases are decided without an accompanying published opinion. The phenomenon is most evident in the district courts where fewer than 10% of cases terminated by court action have published opinions (Vestal, 1970). A vast body of data on the outputs of the federal courts therefore remains largely unexplored by public law scholars. As Carp and Rowland suggest, "We know very little about the contents or impact of these many unreported opinions" (1983, p. 17). The present study attempts to shed some light on the similarities and differences between published and unpublished district judge decisions by analyzing the treatment of each on appeal. The primary outlet for the publication of federal trial court opinions is the Federal Supplement compiled by West Publishing Company. The rates of opinion publication vary widely among judges. A study of opinion writing in 1968 uncovered one district judge who had 36 opinions published during the year, while at the other extreme 30 judges published four or fewer opinions (Vestal, 1970, pp. 676-77). The criterion for publication decisions of federal judges was stated succinctly by the Judicial Conference in 1964: "The judges of the courts of appeals and the district courts authorize the publication of only those opinions which are of general precedential value." It is assumed that district and appeals court judges are called upon to decide many cases that require only the

42 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of informational cues and signals regarding the nature of the judge and the judge's compatibility with presidential preferences.
Abstract: We address an important aspect of judicial careers: the elevation of judges from the U.S. District Courts to the Courts of Appeals. We argue that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of informational cues and signals regarding the nature of the judge and the judge’s compatibility with presidential preferences. We also expect norms involving the intersection between geography and Senate politics to affect a judge’s elevation chances. Using data on district court judges appointed between 1946 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of the judge’s ideological compatibility with the president, the judge’s previous ABA rating, and Senate norms involving state “ownership” of appeals court seats. Blunt indicators of policy preferences trump direct signals when presidents decide whom to elevate, leaving judges little control over their career prospects and thus less incentive to slant their decisions in the direction of the president’s preferences.

37 citations

Book
27 Dec 2008
TL;DR: Songer as discussed by the authors examined the impact of institutional changes on the proceedings and decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada from 1970 to 2003 and found that the Court has remained a politically moderate and democratic institution despite its considerable power and influence.
Abstract: In the last half-century, the Supreme Court of Canada has undergone major upheaval. The most drastic change occurred with the adoption of the Charter of Rights in 1982, which substantially increased the Court's role in resolving controversial political and social issues. The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada examines the impact of institutional changes on the proceedings and decisions of the Court from 1970 to 2003. The first book on the Supreme Court to incorporate extensive in-depth interviews with former justices, this study provides both insiders' accounts of how decisions are made and an empirical analysis of more than 3,000 Court decisions. Drawing on this extensive commentary and statistical data, Donald R. Songer demonstrates that the Court has remained a politically moderate and democratic institution despite its considerable power and influence. The most comprehensive account of its kind to date, The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada makes a significant contribution to the literature and will be of particular interest to scholars and students of judicial behaviour and comparative law.

37 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper analyzed a data set consisting of all non-unanimous published Supreme Court decisions for the period 1949 to 2000 and found that since the Court gained substantial docket control, the types of cases the Court hears has changed from the period studied by Tate and Sittiwong.
Abstract: . This study seeks to add to the current understanding of the political nature of the Supreme Court of Canada. We analyze a data set consisting of all nonunanimous published Supreme Court decisions for the period 1949 to 2000. A prior study by Tate and Sittiwong (1989) suggested a model of judge attributes for the period 1949 to 1985. We build on that analysis by extending the time period to 2000, which allows the impact of gender also to be assessed. We find that since the Court gained substantial docket control, the types of cases the Court hears has changed from the period studied by Tate and Sittiwong. In the more recent period, civil rights and liberties cases are much more substantial in number. We conclude some of the variables in the Tate and Sittiwong study may be time bound and we suggest a new model of attitudinal voting.Resume. Cet etude cherche de augmenter le savoir courant du le nature politique du Cour supreme du Canada. Nous analysons un ensemble de donnees non unanime compose de tout decisions publie du Cour supreme entre les annees 1949 a 1985. Une enquete precede fait par Tate et Sittiwong (1989) a propose un modele des attributs des juges pour la periode entre 1949 a 1985. Nous poursuivons laquelle analyse pour prolonger la periode du temps jusqu'a 2000, ce que on permettre evalue l'effet du sexe aussi. Nous trouvons que comme le Cour a conquis considerable control du registre, les gendres dossier entendre par le Cour ont change depuis le periode de enquete de Tate y Sittiwong. Pendent le periode plus recent les dossiers concernant les droits civiles et libertes sont beaucoup plus nombreux. Nous concluons que possiblement, quelques variables de l'enquete du Tate et Sittiwong soient liees par le temp et nous proposent un modele neuf des votes attitudinal.

36 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article examined the voting behavior of Canadian Supreme Court justices and found that they exhibit a much higher degree of ideological complexity than the U.S. justices of the Rehnquist court.
Abstract: According to attitudinal theorists, justices on the U.S. Supreme Court decide cases largely on political preferences that fall within one dimension of ideology. The focus of this study is to test whether a unidimensional ideological model explains the voting behavior of Canadian Supreme Court justices (1992—1997). The factor-analytic results in three areas of law, two of which have never been examined in this way in Canada, provide substantial evidence of ideological voting. Yet unlike the U.S. justices of the Rehnquist court, Canadian justices exhibit a much higher degree of ideological complexity. These findings call into question the widely held assumption of unidimensional decision making that is in vogue in the U.S. literature today, and they suggest that attitudinal theorists and comparative scholars must be cognizant that multiple dimensions of attitudinal voting might occur in high courts that are not as ideologically polarized as the U.S. Supreme Court.

34 citations


Cited by
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01 Jan 1982
Abstract: Introduction 1. Woman's Place in Man's Life Cycle 2. Images of Relationship 3. Concepts of Self and Morality 4. Crisis and Transition 5. Women's Rights and Women's Judgment 6. Visions of Maturity References Index of Study Participants General Index

7,539 citations

Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a series of theorems relating log-concavity and/or logconvexity of probability density functions, distribution functions, reliability functions, and their integrals are presented.
Abstract: In many applications, assumptions about the log-concavity of a probability distribution allow just enough special structure to yield a workable theory. This paper catalogs a series of theorems relating log-concavity and/or log-convexity of probability density functions, distribution functions, reliability functions, and their integrals. We list a large number of commonly-used probability distributions and report the log-concavity or log-convexity of their density functions and their integrals. We also discuss a variety of applications of log-concavity that have appeared in the literature.

1,104 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A critique of the traditional principal-agent model and a presentation of a broader theoretical framework for conceptualizing bureaucratic politics are presented in this article. But how valid are these assumptions? Can instances be found in which these assumptions do not hold? What happens when we vary these assumptions, and what happens when they vary?
Abstract: Principal-agent models have been the basis for an extensive set of studies relating bureaucracy to elected officials. Yet despite the outpouring of research, there has been little attempt to test the basic assumptions of the principal-agent model. The model makes two assumptions: that goal conflict exists between principals and agents and that agents have more information than their principals, which results in an information asymmetry between them. But how valid are these assumptions? Can instances be found in which these assumptions do not hold? What happens when we vary these assumptions? In this article, we present both a critique of the traditional principal-agent model and a presentation of a broader theoretical framework for conceptualizing bureaucratic politics. Principal-agent models, derived from such disparate disciplines as law, finance, accounting, and economics, have become the basis for an extensive set of studies relating bureaucracy to elected officials (see Mitnick 1973, 1975, and 1980; Moe 1982, 1984, and 1985; Wood 1988; Wood and Waterman 1991, 1993, and 1994; Scholz and Wei 1986). Such models also have been extended to presidents' decisions to use force (Downs and Rocke 1994) and to the Supreme Court and its relationship to lower courts (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994). Despite this outpouring of research, few studies have directly examined the basic terminology and assumptions of the principalagent model. In this article our objectives are to examine principal-agent theory critically, to relax some of its restrictive assumptions, and in the process to present a more general theory of relationships between the bureaucracy and its political environment. Although our critique may be relevant to other uses of the principal-agent model, we limit our assessment to its use as a J-PART 8(1998):2:173-202 theory of bureaucracy. 173/ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion? THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL Despite the widespread referencing of the principal-agent model, only in rare instances does a researcher actually discuss the model and how its assumptions fit the problem to be studied. For this reason it is useful to review the model in its various incarnations and to examine its basic assumptions. The principalagent model, as applied in such disciplines as sociology, political science, and public administration, is in essence a theory about contractual relationships between buyers and sellers (see Ross 1973; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985). As described by Charles Perrow: In its simplest form, agency theory assumes that social life is a series of contracts. Conventionally, one member, the 'buyer' of goods or services is designated the 'principal,' and the other, who provides the goods or service is the 'agent'—hence the term 'agency theory.' The principal-agent relationship is governed by a contract specifying what the agent should do and what the principal must do in return. (1986, 224) A common application in economics is the market for professional services, say between a patient—the principal—and a physician—the agent (Evans 1980). Assuming that both are rational utility maximizers, a patient and a physician are likely to have different goals. The patient would like to be made healthy but pay as little as possible. The physician would be interested in income so, therefore, faces the temptation to provide more medical services than are necessary or to charge a higher price than is warranted. In this exchange, patients are at a disadvantage because they cannot directly evaluate the services provided by the physician. In short, an information asymmetry exists, with an advantage to the physician. Principals seek to manipulate and mold the behavior of agents so that they will act in a manner consistent with the principals' preferences. The contractual arrangement is one tool for accomplishing this goal. The contractual arrangement played an important role in Mitnick's (1973 and 1975) formulation of an institutional or regulatory principal-agent model. Rather than focus on buyers and sellers in an exchange, Mitnick examined the relationship between agents in the regulatory bureaucracy and their political principals (e.g., legislators and interest groups). Mitnick's (1980, 146) framework included \"a typology of agency relationships generated from such dimensions as the level of consent between agent and principal regarding the agent's actions (e.g., whether or not a contract exists, a contract which may be formal or informal), the source of specification of the agent's acts . . . . and the level of discretion possessed by the agent.\" Mitnick noted 174/J-PART, April 1998 Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion? that agents could be motivated by the public interest or by their own narrow self-interest. Since agents enjoy information advantages over their political principals, he added, \"The regulators are thus seen as agents to be policed to adherence to the 'public interest* goals of some principal 'public.'\" But \"such policing is not costless. . . . Principals must pay specification costs to identify acts of the agent that would satisfy the principal's preferences, and policing costs in monitoring and enforcing compliance\" (p. 150). Given the existence of these costs, Mitnick concluded (p. 151), \"The rational principal attempts policing only if he expects a net return . . . We suggest that because of bounded rationality and information costs, not to speak of fundamental problems in valuation, the return to the given public interest criteria may be more difficult to measure and predict than certain obvious indicators wrongly assumed to be correlated with return to that interest.\" In other words, in the principal-agent relationship there is an \"inevitability of control loss\" phenomenon (p. 17). The idea that costs are involved in monitoring an agent, and that principals rationally can decide not to monitor their agents' behavior, explains why the public interest is so often made subservient to private interests in the regulatory arena (one of the main concerns of the regulatory literature). It also raises an important distinction between the economic and the institutional or regulatory principal-agent models. In the institutional model, if a political principal such as the legislature decides that it is not in its rational self-interest to police or monitor its bureaucratic agents, that principal is unlikely to directly bear any cost incurred by the agent's continued shirking. Instead, the bulk of that cost is passed along to the general public, which in a democracy is the legislative branch's political principal. Legislators would pay only a direct cost for their lax oversight of the bureaucracy if the public became aware of it (e.g., if there were a scandal) and sought retribution against legislators at the polls. On the other hand, in the economic model, if the buyer did not adequately monitor the agent's behavior, then the buyer (i.e., the principal) would directly bear the cost, for example, by paying higher fees for services rendered. Likewise, as Mitnick notes, the nature of the contractual arrangement in the regulatory arena can be either formal or informal, whereas formal contracts would be more likely to be adopted in the market-place setting. As these examples demonstrate, important differences emerge once we begin to apply the principal-agent model from market place transactions to the regulatory arena. When political scientists first applied principal-agent theory to bureaucratic settings, further differences emerged from the 175/ J-PART, April 1998 Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion? economic model. In its new formulation, as with buyers and sellers, it is assumed that politicians (principals) and bureaucrats (agents) do not necessarily share similar goals, or to use Mitnick's (1986, 4) terminology, \"have potentially differing preferences. . . .\" If we assume that they are rational utility maximizers (politicians maximizing reelection chances and bureaucrats maximizing budgets), politicians have an interest in policies that benefit their constituents but have no interest in paying excessively for them. Because politicians and political coalitions change over time and bureaucracies develop separate interests through institutionalization and changing external relationships, a potential conflict occurs when the goals and objectives of principals and agents are at odds. Over time politicians may seek to alter established policy toward their preferred objectives, which may or may not be the same as those of the original legislation or political coalition. Bureaucratic interests also diverge from the original policy through time as politicians develop expertise about how the policy should be implemented or gain support from constituencies that favor different approaches. Even if no policy disagreement exists, principal-agent theory suggests that bureaucrats are likely to shirk, to produce outputs at a higher than needed cost, or to produce a level of outputs that is lower than desired. Agency theory posits a dynamic process of interaction between principals and agents, which develops through time. In this process, bureaucrats are assumed to have distinct informational and expertise advantages over politicians. They better understand the policy and the organizational procedures that are required to implement it. They have both the opportunity and the incentive to manipulate politicians and processes for political gain (see Niskanen 1971; Miller and Moe 1983). For some policies, especially those of a technical nature, bureaucracies are more knowledgeable about organizational needs than politicians are, so politicians are reluctant to intervene. Therefore, the key question for agency theory is, How can politicians vested with contemporaneous legitimacy overcome these uncertainties and the bureaucracy's inherent tendency to shirk? (See Wood and Waterman 19

583 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the course of their empirical work, policy scholars have highlighted the importance of policy communities/networks/subsystems involving actors from numerous public and private institutions and from multiple levels of government as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Any theory of the manner in which governmental policies get formulated and implemented, as well as the effects of those actions on the world, requires an understanding of the behavior of major types of governmental institutions (legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, chief executives), as well as the behavior of interest groups, the general public, and the media. The dominant paradigm of the policy process, the stages heuristic popularized by Jones (1970), Anderson (1975), and Peters (1986), has outlived its usefulness and must be replaced, in large part because it is not a causal theory. In the course of their empirical work, policy scholars have highlighted a number of phenomena that need to be incorporated into theories of the policy process. The development of such theories requires an integration ‘of both political scientists’ knowledge of specific institutions and behavior and policy scholars' attention to policy communities, substantive policy information, etc.Innovations by Policy Scholars in Understanding the Policy ProcessAt least since World War II, most political scientists have tended to focus on either a specific type of institution (legislatures, the presidency, courts, interest groups, administrative agencies, local governments, political parties) or on specific types of political behavior outside those institutions (public opinion, voting, political socialization). These have become the standard subfields within the discipline.In contrast, scholars interested in public policy have not been able to stay within these subfields because the policy process spans all of them. In the course of empirical work, policy scholars have highlighted a number of phenomena often neglected by political scientists without a policy focus:a) The importance of policy communities/networks/subsystems involving actors from numerous public and private institutions and from multiple levels of government;b) The importance of substantive policy information;c) The critical role of policy elites vis-a-vis the general public;d) The desirability of longitudinal studies of a decade or more;e) Differences in political behavior across policy types.

575 citations

13 Mar 2016
TL;DR: The case of Nitokalisi Fonua (hereinafter, "Nick") as mentioned in this paper, who admitted to stealing a white GMC Blazer from a motel room at the Days Inn in Utah.
Abstract: FACTS An officer in Midvale, Utah was doing some paperwork in his patrol car when he was approached by man, later identified as Nitokalisi Fonua (hereinafter, “Nick”). Nick “looked suspicious,” mainly because he was “jittery, looking around and appeared to be very nervous.” Nick’s suspicion rating jumped dramatically when, for no apparent reason, he informed the officer he had stolen a white GMC Blazer, which he had parked nearby. Naturally, the officer asked Nick if he would show him the Blazer, and Nick said sure. When they located the Blazer, the officer walked over and looked inside. The first thing he saw was a sawed-off shotgun on the back seat. Then he noticed some markings on the shotgun, “markings that looked gang-related.” Nick told the officer that the key to the Blazer was inside his motel room at the Days Inn. Also in the room, he said, were his “cousins,” meaning “people he knows from the streets.” The officer asked Nick “if we could obtain the keys to the vehicle so we could turn those back over to the owner.” Nick said the keys “were in the room somewhere” and that he “didn’t care” if the officer went in and retrieved them. Nick also gave the officer his key to the room. When backup arrived at the motel, officers knocked on the door which was opened by a man named Vake. There were two other occupants: a woman and Kimoana, the defendant. By this time, the officers were aware that Kimoana—not Nick—had rented the room. The first thing the officers saw as the door opened was the woman pointing “an unidentified black object” at the wall. Concerned for their safety, they ordered the occupants to “show their hands.” Then they pat searched them. Finding no weapons (the “unidentified black object” was a television remote control), they holstered their guns. Although the officers already had Nick’s consent to search the room, they sought and obtained consent from Vake. During the search, they found a “long-barreled revolver” under a mattress. As the result, Kimoana was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

483 citations