Dong Hao

Bio: Dong Hao is an academic researcher from University of Electronic Science and Technology of China. The author has contributed to research in topics: Common value auction & Game theory. The author has an hindex of 12, co-authored 38 publications receiving 552 citations. Previous affiliations of Dong Hao include Kyushu University.

Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game

Abstract: Recently, Press and Dyson have proposed a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies for the two-player iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, so-called zero-determinant strategies. A player adopting zero-determinant strategies is able to pin the expected payoff of the opponents or to enforce a linear relationship between his own payoff and the opponents’ payoff, in a unilateral way. This paper considers zero-determinant strategies in the iterated public goods game, a representative multi-player game where in each round each player will choose whether or not to put his tokens into a public pot, and the tokens in this pot are multiplied by a factor larger than one and then evenly divided among all players. The analytical and numerical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-player games: (i) with small number of players or a small multiplication factor, a player is able to unilaterally pin the expected total payoff of all other players; (ii) a player is able to set the ratio between his payoff and the total payoff of all other players, but this ratio is limited by an upper bound if the multiplication factor exceeds a threshold that depends on the number of players.

Link prediction via matrix completion

Abstract: Inspired by the practical importance of social networks, economic networks, biological networks and so on, studies on large and complex networks have attracted a surge of attention in the recent years. Link prediction is a fundamental issue to understand the mechanisms by which new links are added to the networks. We introduce the method of robust principal component analysis (robust PCA) into link prediction, and estimate the missing entries of the adjacency matrix. On the one hand, our algorithm is based on the sparse and low-rank property of the matrix, while, on the other hand, it also performs very well when the network is dense. This is because a relatively dense real network is also sparse in comparison to the complete graph. According to extensive experiments on real networks from disparate fields, when the target network is connected and sufficiently dense, whether it is weighted or unweighted, our method is demonstrated to be very effective and with prediction accuracy being considerably improved compared to many state-of-the-art algorithms.

Diversity of timescale promotes the maintenance of extortioners in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Abstract: Recently, a class of interesting strategies, named extortion strategies, has attracted considerable attention since such extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game In this paper, we investigate the influence of the strategy-selection timescale on the evolution of extortion and cooperation in networked systems Through connecting the lifetime of individuals' strategies with their fitness, we find that extortioners can form long-term stable relationships with cooperative neighbors, whereas the lifetime of a defection strategy is short according to the myopic best response rule With the separation of interaction and strategy-updating timescales, the extortioners in a square lattice are able to form stable, cross-like structures with cooperators due to the snowdrift-like relation In scale-free networks the hubs are most likely occupied by extortioners, who furthermore induce their low-degree neighbors to behave as cooperators Since extortioners in scale-free networks can meet more cooperators than their counterparts in the square lattice, the latter results in higher average fitness of the whole population than the former The extortioners play the role of a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation, and the diversity of strategy-selection timescale furthermore promotes the maintenance of extortioners with cooperators in networked systems

Link prediction via linear optimization

Abstract: Link prediction is an elemental challenge in network science, which has already found applications in guiding laboratorial experiments, digging out drug targets, recommending online friends, probing network evolution mechanisms, and so on. With a simple assumption that the likelihood of the existence of a link between two nodes can be unfolded by a linear summation of neighboring nodes’ contributions, we obtain the analytical solution of the optimal likelihood matrix, which shows remarkably better performance in predicting missing links than the state-of-the-art algorithms for not only simple networks, but also weighted and directed networks. To our surprise, even some degenerated local similarity indices from the solution outperform well-known local indices, which largely refines our knowledge, for example, the number of 3-hop paths between two nodes more accurately predicts missing links than the number of 2-hop paths (i.e., the number of common neighbors), while in previous methods, longer paths are always considered to be less important than shorter paths.

Extortion under uncertainty: Zero-determinant strategies in noisy games.

Abstract: Repeated game theory has been one of the most prevailing tools for understanding long-running relationships, which are the foundation in building human society. Recent works have revealed a new set of "zero-determinant" (ZD) strategies, which is an important advance in repeated games. A ZD strategy player can exert unilateral control on two players' payoffs. In particular, he can deterministically set the opponent's payoff or enforce an unfair linear relationship between the players' payoffs, thereby always seizing an advantageous share of payoffs. One of the limitations of the original ZD strategy, however, is that it does not capture the notion of robustness when the game is subjected to stochastic errors. In this paper, we propose a general model of ZD strategies for noisy repeated games and find that ZD strategies have high robustness against errors. We further derive the pinning strategy under noise, by which the ZD strategy player coercively sets the opponent's expected payoff to his desired level, although his payoff control ability declines with the increase of noise strength. Due to the uncertainty caused by noise, the ZD strategy player cannot ensure his payoff to be permanently higher than the opponent's, which implies dominant extortions do not exist even under low noise. While we show that the ZD strategy player can still establish a novel kind of extortions, named contingent extortions, where any increase of his own payoff always exceeds that of the opponent's by a fixed percentage, and the conditions under which the contingent extortions can be realized are more stringent as the noise becomes stronger.

疟原虫var基因转换速率变化导致抗原变异[英]／Paul H, Robert P, Christodoulou Z, et al//Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

Abstract: 抗原变异可使得多种致病微生物易于逃避宿主免疫应答。表达在感染红细胞表面的恶性疟原虫红细胞表面蛋白1（PfPMP1）与感染红细胞、内皮细胞、树突状细胞以及胎盘的单个或多个受体作用，在黏附及免疫逃避中起关键的作用。每个单倍体基因组var基因家族编码约60种成员，通过启动转录不同的var基因变异体为抗原变异提供了分子基础。

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Abstract: where A represents the magnetic vector potential, is an integral of the hydromagnetic equations. This -integral made it possible to formulate a variational principle for the force-free magnetic fields. The integral expresses the fact that motions cannot transform a given field in an entirely arbitrary different field, if the conductivity of the medium isconsidered infinite. In this paper we shall show that the full set of hydromagnetic equations admit five more integrals, besides the energy integral, if dissipative processes are absent. These integrals, as we shall presently verify, are I2 =fbHvdV, (2)