In the first two volumes of this work, Paul Ricoeur examined the relations between time and narrative in historical writing, fiction, and theories of literature. This final volume, a comprehensive reexamination and synthesis of the ideas developed in volumes 1 and 2, stands as Ricoeur's most complete and satisfying presentation of his own philosophy.

Time and Narrative

This paper describes a corpus annotation project to study issues in the manual annotation of opinions, emotions, sentiments, speculations, evaluations and other private states in language. The resulting corpus annotation scheme is described, as well as examples of its use. In addition, the manual annotation process and the results of an inter-annotator agreement study on a 10,000-sentence corpus of articles drawn from the world press are presented.

/pdf/annotating-expressions-of-opinions-and-emotions-in-language-2840ogqx29.pdf

Annotating Expressions of Opinions and Emotions in Language

What is narrative? How does it work and how does it shape our lives? H. Porter Abbott emphasizes that narrative is found not just in literature, film, and theatre, but everywhere in the ordinary course of people's lives. This widely used introduction, now revised and expanded in its third edition, is informed throughout by recent developments in the field and includes one new chapter. The glossary and bibliography have been expanded, and new sections explore unnatural narrative, retrograde narrative, reader-resistant narratives, intermedial narrative, narrativity, and multiple interpretation. With its lucid exposition of concepts, and suggestions for further reading, this book is not only an excellent introduction for courses focused on narrative but also an invaluable resource for students and scholars across a wide range of fields, including literature and drama, film and media, society and politics, journalism, autobiography, history, and still others throughout the arts, humanities, and social sciences.

The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative

The theory developed here is that quotations are demonstrations that are component parts of language use. Demonstrations are unlike descriptions in two main ways. They are nonserious rather than serious actions. A person demonstrating a limp isn't actually or really limping. And they depict rather than describe their referents, though they depict only selected aspects of the referents. The demonstrator of the limp depicts some but not all of its aspects. Quotations, we argue, have all the properties of genuine demonstrations. They too are nonserious actions and selective depictions. For evidence we appeal to a wide range of phenomena in spontaneous spoken and written quotations.*

Quotations as Demonstrations

Subjectivity in natural language refers to aspects of language used to express opinions, evaluations, and speculations. There are numerous natural language processing applications for which subjectivity analysis is relevant, including information extraction and text categorization. The goal of this work is learning subjective language from corpora. Clues of subjectivity are generated and tested, including low-frequency words, collocations, and adjectives and verbs identified using distributional similarity. The features are also examined working together in concert. The features, generated from different data sets using different procedures, exhibit consistency in performance in that they all do better and worse on the same data sets. In addition, this article shows that the density of subjectivity clues in the surrounding context strongly affects how likely it is that a word is subjective, and it provides the results of an annotation study assessing the subjectivity of sentences with high-density features. Finally, the clues are used to perform opinion piece recognition (a type of text categorization and genre detection) to demonstrate the utility of the knowledge acquired in this article.

http://ensani.ir/storage/files/20101126155304-344.pdf

Learning Subjective Language

This book investigates the entire spectrum of techniques for portraying the mental lives of fictional characters in both the stream-of-consciousness novel and other fiction. Each chapter deals with one main technique, illustrated from a wide range of nineteenth- and twentieth-century fiction by writers including Stendhal, Dostoevsky, James, Mann, Kafka, Joyce, Proust, Woolf, and Sarraute.

Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction

Cohn, Dorrit. The Distinction of Fiction. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 197 pp. $42.00 hardcover. Reading Dorrit Cohn's The Distinction of Fiction made me feel proud of myself. Along the way I kept thinking, "this is the best book I've read this year," only to learn, some weeks later, that The Distinction of Fiction had won the MLA's Aldo Scaglioni Prize for the best book of the year in the field of Comparative Literature. Anyone now reading Cohn's fascinating, magisterial essay on the specificity of fictional narration ("artifiction") can recover this thrill: pride in oneself and pride in one's community. "Community" is a key term: this book is the outcome of Cohn's reflection on the nature and workings of fictional discourse within the systematic knowledge elaborated by a community of narratologists, Cohn prima inter pares. Her conclusions arise from a fine assaying of the scholarship that has accumulated around such fundamental questions as: how does the (fictional) substance of the literary work come to light? With what authority? With what distinction? The matter in parenthesis is crucial because what is always at stake in Cohn's reflections is the differentiation-and, hence, the salvaging - of fictional works from those that, for Cohn, are decidedly nonfictional; works, like history and biography, that claim to refer to a pre-given world and by such conventions of claiming, do so. Not all narrative is fiction; everything is not (the same kind of) text. On this path of thinking one continually has glimpses of the depth and importance of the issues involved-glimpsed, like a wide exhilarating landscape through a precisely framed window: fundamental issues of truth, reference, authority. From the start The Distinction of Fiction argues for the existence of inalienable markers of fictional narrative and maintains continuity by returning to them. The existence of such "distinctions" flies in the face of claims held by speech-act theorists such as John Searle, who argues: "There is no textual property, syntactic or semantic, that will identify a text as a work of fiction" (20). Yet, for Cohn, various markers of fiction make themselves felt. All fiction is constituted by a preterite or by an "absolute" present that departs from ordinary conceptions of past or present. Here the past "no longer needs to refer to the speaker's own past;" for example, "it can refer to the 'now' of an individual whose plane 'left tomorrow'" (25). As in all narrative, however, the narrated event precedes the event of narration. The language of fiction cannot say what is the plot-event in the instant of its emergence; such language may be its own event but cannot coincide with the event of what is narrated-and this is true too, as Cohn shows in a tour de force, even in the first-person present-- tense "artifiction" of J.M. Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians. The difference between the verb tense of the fiction and its peculiar disjunctive temporality is one of its eternal distinctions. Cohn's distinctions have immediate practical force. For example: from the foregoing, it would appear that Alexander Nehamas's provocative thesis in Nietzsche: Life as Literature that Nietzsche becomes in his work the literary character that he is-Nietzsche as narrator "fusing" with Nietzsche as character-must collide with the untenable supposition that the substance of the narrated could coincide with that of the narrating instance. The second feature marking the difference between fiction and factual writing is that peculiar device of extrospection which Cohn, in a previous work of narratology, has called "transparent minds" (Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction [Princeton: Princeton UP, 1978]). This is the privilege of the narrator only of fiction, who may report with authority the contents of consciousness of some person other than the narrator. The mind of the other is presented as if it were transparent. …

The distinction of fiction

Cohn, Dorrit. The Distinction of Fiction. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 197 pp. $42.00 hardcover. Reading Dorrit Cohn's The Distinction of Fiction made me feel proud of myself. Along the way I kept thinking, \"this is the best book I've read this year,\" only to learn, some weeks later, that The Distinction of Fiction had won the MLA's Aldo Scaglioni Prize for the best book of the year in the field of Comparative Literature. Anyone now reading Cohn's fascinating, magisterial essay on the specificity of fictional narration (\"artifiction\") can recover this thrill: pride in oneself and pride in one's community. \"Community\" is a key term: this book is the outcome of Cohn's reflection on the nature and workings of fictional discourse within the systematic knowledge elaborated by a community of narratologists, Cohn prima inter pares. Her conclusions arise from a fine assaying of the scholarship that has accumulated around such fundamental questions as: how does the (fictional) substance of the literary work come to light? With what authority? With what distinction? The matter in parenthesis is crucial because what is always at stake in Cohn's reflections is the differentiation-and, hence, the salvaging - of fictional works from those that, for Cohn, are decidedly nonfictional; works, like history and biography, that claim to refer to a pre-given world and by such conventions of claiming, do so. Not all narrative is fiction; everything is not (the same kind of) text. On this path of thinking one continually has glimpses of the depth and importance of the issues involved-glimpsed, like a wide exhilarating landscape through a precisely framed window: fundamental issues of truth, reference, authority. From the start The Distinction of Fiction argues for the existence of inalienable markers of fictional narrative and maintains continuity by returning to them. The existence of such \"distinctions\" flies in the face of claims held by speech-act theorists such as John Searle, who argues: \"There is no textual property, syntactic or semantic, that will identify a text as a work of fiction\" (20). Yet, for Cohn, various markers of fiction make themselves felt. All fiction is constituted by a preterite or by an \"absolute\" present that departs from ordinary conceptions of past or present. Here the past \"no longer needs to refer to the speaker's own past;\" for example, \"it can refer to the 'now' of an individual whose plane 'left tomorrow'\" (25). As in all narrative, however, the narrated event precedes the event of narration. The language of fiction cannot say what is the plot-event in the instant of its emergence; such language may be its own event but cannot coincide with the event of what is narrated-and this is true too, as Cohn shows in a tour de force, even in the first-person present-- tense \"artifiction\" of J.M. Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians. The difference between the verb tense of the fiction and its peculiar disjunctive temporality is one of its eternal distinctions. Cohn's distinctions have immediate practical force. For example: from the foregoing, it would appear that Alexander Nehamas's provocative thesis in Nietzsche: Life as Literature that Nietzsche becomes in his work the literary character that he is-Nietzsche as narrator \"fusing\" with Nietzsche as character-must collide with the untenable supposition that the substance of the narrated could coincide with that of the narrating instance. The second feature marking the difference between fiction and factual writing is that peculiar device of extrospection which Cohn, in a previous work of narratology, has called \"transparent minds\" (Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction [Princeton: Princeton UP, 1978]). This is the privilege of the narrator only of fiction, who may report with authority the contents of consciousness of some person other than the narrator. The mind of the other is presented as if it were transparent. …

The Distinction of Fiction

have been drawn, withdrawn, retraced, and re-effaced on various grounds-logical, ontological, phenomenological, pragmatic, speechactional, deconstructive, semantic-without looking to the discipline that has dug most deeply into the ground of narrative itself. There is a certain poetologic justice to this snub: narratologists themselves have, to a quite astonishing degree, ignored the question of demarcation between fiction and nonfiction. One can hardly deplore this omission in studies that openly (by way of title, subtitle, and/or prefatory remarks) limit their area of investigation to fictional narratives (Chatman 1978; Rimmon-Kenan 1983). But most narratological studies, including such classics of the discipline as Barthes's "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative" (1977 [1966]) and Genette's Narrative Discourse (1980), don't explicitly restrict their field, and some even quite expressly announce that they intend to encompass nonfiction as well (Bal 1985; Prince 1982b). In the absence of counterindications of any sort, a narrative poetics of this overarching kind leads one to believe that the entire panoply of conventions, the "figures," structural types, and discursive modes it identifies, applies equally within and without fiction, even when-as is nearly always the case-its textual exemplifications are drawn exclusively from the

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/1773077

Dorrit Cohn

Papers

Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction

The distinction of fiction

The Distinction of Fiction

Signposts of Fictionality: A Narratological Perspective

Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction