Eberhard Feess

TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model of the European electricity market that allows analyzing the impact of consumers' price sensitivity, defined as the willingness to change energy providers, on equilibrium prices.

TL;DR: In this paper, the impact of three different transfer fee systems on payoffs, contract lengths, training and effort incentives in European football is analyzed, and it is shown that the different systems differ only with respect to the contract length if the contract which maximizes the expected joint surplus of the initial club and the player is feasible under each system.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model of the European electricity market that allows analyzing the impact of consumers' price sensitivity, defined as the willingness to change energy providers, on equilibrium prices.

TL;DR: In this paper, the impact of three different transfer fee systems on payoffs, contract lengths, training and effort incentives in European football is analyzed, and it is shown that the different systems differ only with respect to the contract length if the contract which maximizes the expected joint surplus of the initial club and the player is feasible under each system.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a two-period model with one firm in each country competing on a third market and derive the optimal environmental policy for both periods from a national point of view.