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Edoardo Chiti

Bio: Edoardo Chiti is an academic researcher from Tuscia University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Administrative law & Legislation. The author has an hindex of 9, co-authored 30 publications receiving 402 citations.

Papers
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Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the European responses to the crisis since autumn 2008 have already set in motion a number of processes which are reshaping the EU polity, including the emergence of a new EU method of action, which breaks with the historically rooted balance of voices within the EU, while directing it towards a distinct form of reinforced intergovernmentalism.
Abstract: The wide-ranging debate on the responses to the crisis increasingly calls into question the future of the EU as a polity. This article contributes to such discussion in legal scholarship by arguing that the European responses to the crisis since autumn 2008 have already set in motion a number of processes which are reshaping the EU polity. Three important but often misrepresented processes are identified. The first is the emergence of a new EU method of action, which breaks with the historically rooted balance of voices within the EU, while directing it towards a distinct form of reinforced intergovernmentalism. The second process corresponds to the trend to have recourse to arrangements both partly internal and partly external to the EU framework. Such a process opens the way to the autonomization of the EMU, and of the eurozone within the EMU, which endangers the legal and institutional unity of the EU. The third is the transformation of the EMU from a "community of benefits" to a "community of benefits and risk-sharing", which reshapes the traditional construction of the EMU and might prefigure a federal transformation of the EU, but it also raises functional and legitimacy issues. These developments have the potential to undermine prerequisites of the EU as a project oriented towards democratic constitutionalism: they may ultimately lead to a de-institutionalization of the EU; they exhaust the main democratic legitimacy sources of the EU polity; and they undermine the already fragile social embeddedness of EU institutions.

77 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Edoardo Chiti1
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors identify European agencies' rulemaking powers, mapping the procedures through which such powers are exercised and assessing the existing procedural arrangements, arguing that the two main types of EU rulemaking cannot be said to be subject to a really common procedural framework.
Abstract: This article aims at identifying European agencies' rulemaking powers, mapping the procedures through which such powers are exercised and assessing the existing procedural arrangements. The first section analyses the main forms of European agencies' rulemaking. It shows, on the one hand, that not all European agencies are actually engaged in the adoption of administrative rules, on the other hand, that European agencies carrying out rulemaking activities tend to converge on two specific forms of rulemaking, namely participation in the adoption of binding implementing rules and regulation by soft law. The second section, devoted to mapping the procedures through which rulemaking powers are exercised, argues that the two main types of European agencies' rulemaking cannot be said to be subject to a really common procedural framework. In both cases, the emerging procedural rules implement the same principles of transparency and participation and rely on the same consultation mechanism, sometimes complemented by regulatory impact assessment. Yet, proceduralisation has an uneven development: while the establishment of a procedural discipline is quite common with reference to participation in the adoption of binding implementing rules, regulation by soft law remains largely under‐proceduralised. The last section proposes an assessment of the European agencies' rulemaking procedures. Two main shortcomings are identified: the asymmetry between the tendency to proceduralise the adoption of binding implementing rules and the parallel tendency to keep informal the process of adoption of soft law measures; and the too rudimental development of consultation.

45 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the adoption of a number of Community regulations, each for a specific sector, to be implemented not just by a central authority, but by a plurality of national, supranational and sometimes mixed authorities, with a special role assigned to a Community office set up by the same legislation for a given sector, and granting it legal personality.
Abstract: This paper focuses on the adoption of a number of Community regulations, each for a specific sector, to be implemented not just by a supranational administration (central or peripheral), but by a plurality of national, supranational and sometimes mixed authorities, with a special role assigned to a Community office set up by the same legislation for a given sector, and granting it legal personality The purpose of this paper is to verify whether the various regulations by sector ought not to be regarded as variants of an emergent general model of joint exercise of certain Community functions It is argued that such general model is still in the making, but it is in the process of becoming consolidated, notwithstanding the variety of approaches adopted by European legislators Such a pattern is characterised by specific, differentiated organisational and procedural features This conclusion is relevant in several different ways, the first of which is that it provides new conceptual tools for interpreting and explaining the process of administrative integration between supranational and national public authorities, in particular by specifying the taxonomy of the patterns through which a Community function can be carried out by two different authorities acting jointly Second, the decentralised integration model should be considered as a sound and feasible option for the administrative evolution of the Community legal system

30 citations


Cited by
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that current widespread characterisations of EU governance as multi-level and networked overlook the emergent architecture of the EU's public rule making, and they trace its emergence and diffusion across a wide range of policy domains, including telecommunications, energy, drug authorisation, occupational health and safety, employment promotion, social inclusion, pensions, health care, environmental protection, food safety, maritime safety, financial services, competition policy, state aid, anti-discrimination policy and fundamental rights.
Abstract: This article argues that current widespread characterisations of EU governance as multi-level and networked overlook the emergent architecture of the EU's public rule making. In this architecture, framework goals (such as full employment, social inclusion, 'good water status', a unified energy grid) and measures for gauging their achievement are established by joint action of the Member States and EU institutions. Lower-level units (such as national ministries or regulatory authorities and the actors with whom they collaborate) are given the freedom to advance these ends as they see fit. But in return for this autonomy, they must report regularly on their performance and participate in a peer review in which their results are compared with those pursuing other means to the same general ends. Finally, the framework goals, performance measures, and decision-making procedures themselves are periodically revised by the actors, including new participants whose views come to be seen as indispensable to full and fair deliberation. Although this architecture cannot be read off from either Treaty provisions or textbook accounts of the formal competences of EU institutions, the article traces its emergence and diffusion across a wide range of policy domains, including telecommunications, energy, drug authorisation, occupational health and safety, employment promotion, social inclusion, pensions, health care, environmental protection, food safety, maritime safety, financial services, competition policy, state aid, anti-discrimination policy and fundamental rights.

696 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the allocation of regulatory authority in the EU and propose a transnational regulatory network as a back-road to the informal Europeanization of government regulation, arguing that the informalization of governance is vulnerable to strong distributive conflict and raises unresolved problems of democratic legitimacy.
Abstract: This article investigates the allocation of regulatory authority in the EU. By introducing the concept of a ‘regulatory regime’, it criticizes not only earlier accounts of the EU ‘regulatory state’, but also current delegation approaches. As a starting point, it identifies a dilemma for the EU regulatory policy. Despite the rising need for uniform EU-level rules in the internal market, the bulk of formal powers and the institutional focus of regulatory activities continue to be located at the national level. This results in a supranational regulatory gap. Our thesis is that this gap is partly filled by transnational regulatory networks. Under certain conditions, regulatory networks offer a back road to the informal Europeanization of government regulation. However, the informalization of governance is vulnerable to strong distributive conflict, and, if effective, it raises unresolved problems of democratic legitimacy. Edgar Grande, Chair in Comparative Politics, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat Munchen, Ges...

306 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the absence of a clearly defined principal in the EU enables us to understand the relative weakness of existing agencies and the multiplicity of controls to which they are subjected.
Abstract: Whereas a principal–agent model has widely been used to analyse the establishment of manifold autonomous agencies at the European level, it fails to capture some key elements of this process, such as the recurrent inter-institutional struggle of agency institutional design or the Commission's basic ambivalence vis-a-vis independent regulators. In contrast, acknowledging the absence of a clearly defined principal in the EU enables us to understand the relative weakness of existing agencies and the multiplicity of controls to which they are subjected. In such a system, strong EU regulators are unlikely to be established.

147 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the Commission constitutes by far the most important partner of EU agencies and it is argued that EU agencies which might be able to act relatively independently of national governments and the Council, but not necessarily independently from the Commission, would contribute to executive centre formation at the European level and thus to further transformation of the current political-administrative order.
Abstract: The jury is still out with respect to whether European Union (EU)-level agencies act primarily as tools of national governments or not, although parts of the literature as well as the legal framework of EU agencies seem to favour the former interpretation. We argue that EU agencies which might be able to act relatively independently of national governments and the Council, but not necessarily independently from the Commission, would contribute to executive centre formation at the European level and thus to further transformation of the current political-administrative order. By measuring along several dimensions, we demonstrate that the Commission constitutes by far the most important partner of EU agencies. EU agencies deal (somewhat surprisingly) to a considerable extent with (quasi-) regulatory and politicized issues. When engaging in such areas, national ministries and the Council tend to strengthen their position, however, not to the detriment of the Commission. In addition to the Commission, nationa...

118 citations

MonographDOI
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: In this paper, two layers of the European economic constitution are discussed, and the authors propose a framework for the analysis of the economic crisis and the response to the crisis, as well as the reform of the macroeconomic constitution.
Abstract: Part I. Setting the Scene: 1. Introduction: framework of the analysis 2. Two layers of the European economic constitution 3. Towards the crisis: an economic narrative 4. Responses to the crisis Part II. Constitutional Mutation: 5. Constitutionality of European measures 6. Realignment of the principles of the macroeconomic constitution 7. Democracy and social rights Part III. What Next?: 8. Initiatives on the table.

112 citations