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Edouard Machery

Other affiliations: University of Paris, University of Sydney, Max Planck Society  ...read more
Bio: Edouard Machery is an academic researcher from University of Pittsburgh. The author has contributed to research in topics: Experimental philosophy & Philosophy of mind. The author has an hindex of 37, co-authored 171 publications receiving 7049 citations. Previous affiliations of Edouard Machery include University of Paris & University of Sydney.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
Daniel J. Benjamin1, James O. Berger2, Magnus Johannesson1, Magnus Johannesson3, Brian A. Nosek4, Brian A. Nosek5, Eric-Jan Wagenmakers6, Richard A. Berk7, Kenneth A. Bollen8, Björn Brembs9, Lawrence D. Brown7, Colin F. Camerer10, David Cesarini11, David Cesarini12, Christopher D. Chambers13, Merlise A. Clyde2, Thomas D. Cook14, Thomas D. Cook15, Paul De Boeck16, Zoltan Dienes17, Anna Dreber3, Kenny Easwaran18, Charles Efferson19, Ernst Fehr20, Fiona Fidler21, Andy P. Field17, Malcolm R. Forster22, Edward I. George7, Richard Gonzalez23, Steven N. Goodman24, Edwin J. Green25, Donald P. Green26, Anthony G. Greenwald27, Jarrod D. Hadfield28, Larry V. Hedges15, Leonhard Held20, Teck-Hua Ho29, Herbert Hoijtink30, Daniel J. Hruschka31, Kosuke Imai32, Guido W. Imbens24, John P. A. Ioannidis24, Minjeong Jeon33, James Holland Jones34, Michael Kirchler35, David Laibson36, John A. List37, Roderick J. A. Little23, Arthur Lupia23, Edouard Machery38, Scott E. Maxwell39, Michael A. McCarthy21, Don A. Moore40, Stephen L. Morgan41, Marcus R. Munafò42, Shinichi Nakagawa43, Brendan Nyhan44, Timothy H. Parker45, Luis R. Pericchi46, Marco Perugini47, Jeffrey N. Rouder48, Judith Rousseau49, Victoria Savalei50, Felix D. Schönbrodt51, Thomas Sellke52, Betsy Sinclair53, Dustin Tingley36, Trisha Van Zandt16, Simine Vazire54, Duncan J. Watts55, Christopher Winship36, Robert L. Wolpert2, Yu Xie32, Cristobal Young24, Jonathan Zinman44, Valen E. Johnson18, Valen E. Johnson1 
University of Southern California1, Duke University2, Stockholm School of Economics3, University of Virginia4, Center for Open Science5, University of Amsterdam6, University of Pennsylvania7, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill8, University of Regensburg9, California Institute of Technology10, New York University11, Research Institute of Industrial Economics12, Cardiff University13, Mathematica Policy Research14, Northwestern University15, Ohio State University16, University of Sussex17, Texas A&M University18, Royal Holloway, University of London19, University of Zurich20, University of Melbourne21, University of Wisconsin-Madison22, University of Michigan23, Stanford University24, Rutgers University25, Columbia University26, University of Washington27, University of Edinburgh28, National University of Singapore29, Utrecht University30, Arizona State University31, Princeton University32, University of California, Los Angeles33, Imperial College London34, University of Innsbruck35, Harvard University36, University of Chicago37, University of Pittsburgh38, University of Notre Dame39, University of California, Berkeley40, Johns Hopkins University41, University of Bristol42, University of New South Wales43, Dartmouth College44, Whitman College45, University of Puerto Rico46, University of Milan47, University of California, Irvine48, Paris Dauphine University49, University of British Columbia50, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich51, Purdue University52, Washington University in St. Louis53, University of California, Davis54, Microsoft55
TL;DR: The default P-value threshold for statistical significance is proposed to be changed from 0.05 to 0.005 for claims of new discoveries in order to reduce uncertainty in the number of discoveries.
Abstract: We propose to change the default P-value threshold for statistical significance from 0.05 to 0.005 for claims of new discoveries.

1,586 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: This article proposed to change the default P-value threshold for statistical significance for claims of new discoveries from 0.05 to 0.005, which is the threshold used in this paper.
Abstract: We propose to change the default P-value threshold for statistical significance for claims of new discoveries from 0.05 to 0.005.

1,415 citations

Book ChapterDOI
01 Sep 2010
TL;DR: This article examined whether morality really evolved, as many philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, and biologists claim, and concluded that two versions of the claim are relatively well supported, but that they are unlikely to have significant philosophical consequences, while the stronger version is in fact empirically unsupported.
Abstract: This chapter examines whether morality really evolved, as many philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, and biologists claim. It distinguishes three possible versions of this claim and reviews the evidence in support of each. It concludes that two versions of the claim that morality evolved are relatively well supported, but that they are unlikely to have significant philosophical consequences, while the stronger version, which is of real interest to philosophers, is in fact empirically unsupported.

471 citations

Book
27 Feb 2009
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss concepts in philosophy versus concepts in psychology and propose a theory of concepts connecting concepts connected with concepts in psychophysics and psychology, which is called Peacocke's Simple Account.
Abstract: List of Figures List of Tables Preface Acknowledgments Permissions CHAPTER 1 CONCEPTS IN PSYCHOLOGY 1. "Concept" in Psychology 2. Evidence for the Existence of Concepts 3. What is a Psychological Theory of Concepts? 4. Alternative Characterizations of the Notion of Concept CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTS IN PHILOSOPHY 1. "Concept" in Philosophy 2. Concepts in Philosophy versus Concepts in Psychology 3. How are the Psychological and the Philosophical Theories of Concepts Connected? Peacocke's Simple Account 4. How are the Psychological and the Philosophical Theories of Concepts Connected? The Foundationalist Account CHAPTER 3 THE HETEROGENEITY HYPOTHESIS 1. The Received View 2. The Heterogeneity Hypothesis 3. Hybrid Theories of Concepts CHAPTER 4 THREE FUNDAMENTAL KINDS OF CONCEPTS: PROTOTYPES, EXEMPLARS, THEORIES 1. The Classical Theory of concepts 2. The Prototype Paradigm of Concepts 3. The Exemplar Paradigm of Concepts 4. The Theory Paradigm of Concepts 5. Alternative Views of Concepts 6. Three Theoretical Entities that Have Little in Common CHAPTER 5 MULTI-PROCESS THEORIES 1. Multi-Process Theories 2. Examples of Multi-Process Theories CHAPTER 6 CATEGORIZATION AND CONCEPT LEARNING 1. Categorization and Concept Learning 2. Studying Categorization and Concept Learning 3. Evidence for the Existence of Prototypes 4. Evidence for the Existence of Exemplars 5. Evidence for the Existence of Theories 6. Organization of the Categorization Processes and of the Concept Learning Processes CHAPTER 7 INDUCTION, CONCEPT COMBINATION, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY: 1. Induction 2. Concept Combination 3. Neuropsychology CHAPTER 8 CONCEPT ELIMINATIVISM 1. Two Inconclusive Arguments against the Notion of Concept 2. Natural Kinds and Scientific Eliminativism 3. The Argument for the Elimination of "Concept" 4. Objections and Replies Conclusion References Index of Names Index of Subjects

470 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Results constitute prima facie evidence that semantic intuitions vary from culture to culture, and the paper argues that this fact raises questions about the nature of the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference.

415 citations


Cited by
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Book
08 Sep 2020
TL;DR: A review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species – frequent outliers.
Abstract: Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world's top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers - often implicitly - assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these "standard subjects" are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species - frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior - hence, there are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions of human nature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges.

6,370 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: As an example of how the current "war on terrorism" could generate a durable civic renewal, Putnam points to the burst in civic practices that occurred during and after World War II, which he says "permanently marked" the generation that lived through it and had a "terrific effect on American public life over the last half-century."
Abstract: The present historical moment may seem a particularly inopportune time to review Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam's latest exploration of civic decline in America. After all, the outpouring of volunteerism, solidarity, patriotism, and self-sacrifice displayed by Americans in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks appears to fly in the face of Putnam's central argument: that \"social capital\" -defined as \"social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them\" (p. 19)'has declined to dangerously low levels in America over the last three decades. However, Putnam is not fazed in the least by the recent effusion of solidarity. Quite the contrary, he sees in it the potential to \"reverse what has been a 30to 40-year steady decline in most measures of connectedness or community.\"' As an example of how the current \"war on terrorism\" could generate a durable civic renewal, Putnam points to the burst in civic practices that occurred during and after World War II, which he says \"permanently marked\" the generation that lived through it and had a \"terrific effect on American public life over the last half-century.\" 3 If Americans can follow this example and channel their current civic

5,309 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Moral Foundations Questionnaire is developed on the basis of a theoretical model of 5 universally available (but variably developed) sets of moral intuitions and convergent/discriminant validity evidence suggests that moral concerns predict personality features and social group attitudes not previously considered morally relevant.
Abstract: The moral domain is broader than the empathy and justice concerns assessed by existing measures of moral competence, and it is not just a subset of the values assessed by value inventories. To fill the need for reliable and theoretically grounded measurement of the full range of moral concerns, we developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire on the basis of a theoretical model of 5 universally available (but variably developed) sets of moral intuitions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. We present evidence for the internal and external validity of the scale and the model, and in doing so we present new findings about morality: (a) Comparative model fitting of confirmatory factor analyses provides empirical justification for a 5-factor structure of moral concerns; (b) convergent/discriminant validity evidence suggests that moral concerns predict personality features and social group attitudes not previously considered morally relevant; and (c) we establish pragmatic validity of the measure in providing new knowledge and research opportunities concerning demographic and cultural differences in moral intuitions. These analyses provide evidence for the usefulness of Moral Foundations Theory in simultaneously increasing the scope and sharpening the resolution of psychological views of morality.

1,821 citations

Journal ArticleDOI

1,589 citations