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Author

Edward E. Jones

Other affiliations: Duke University
Bio: Edward E. Jones is an academic researcher from Princeton University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Attribution & Social perception. The author has an hindex of 43, co-authored 72 publications receiving 18709 citations. Previous affiliations of Edward E. Jones include Duke University.


Papers
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Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe the naive explanation of human actions, theory of correspondent inferences, personal involvement and correspondence, and the recent research concerning phenomenal causality and the attribution of intentions.
Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter describes the naive explanation of human actions, theory of correspondent inferences, personal involvement and correspondence, and the recent research concerning phenomenal causality and the attribution of intentions. The cognitive task of establishing sufficient reason for an action involves processing the available information about, or making assumptions about, the links between stable individual dispositions and observed action. The dispositional attributes are inferred from the effects of action, but not every effect is equally salient in the inference process. The perceiver's fundamental task is to interpret or infer the causal antecedents of action. When a person's actions have certain consequences, it is important for the perceiver to determine whether the person was capable of producing these consequences in response to his intentions. Where an actor fails to produce certain effects that might have been anticipated by the perceiver, there may be ambiguity as to whether the actor did not want to produce the effects, or wanted but was not able to. The attribution of intentions is that actions are informative to the extent that they have emerged out of a context of choice and reflect a selection of one among plural alternatives. However, the distinctiveness of the effects achieved and the extent to which they do not represent stereotypic cultural values, determine the likelihood that information about the actor can be extracted from an action. To say that an inference is correspondent, then, is to say that a disposition is being rather directly reflected in behavior, and that this disposition is unusual in its strength or intensity. In-role behavior is supported by too many reasons to be informative about the actor. However, out-of-role behavior is more informative because the effects of such actions are distinctive and not to be dismissed as culturally desirable.

3,207 citations

Book
01 Jun 1987

1,994 citations

Book
01 Jan 1984
TL;DR: The psychology of marked relationships as discussed by the authors is one of the most commonly used topics in psychology courses and it has been shown that people have search numerous times for their favorite books like this social stigma the psychology of the marked relationships, but end up in infectious downloads.
Abstract: Thank you very much for reading social stigma the psychology of marked relationships. Maybe you have knowledge that, people have search numerous times for their favorite books like this social stigma the psychology of marked relationships, but end up in infectious downloads. Rather than enjoying a good book with a cup of coffee in the afternoon, instead they are facing with some infectious virus inside their computer.

1,684 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, three experiments were conducted within the framework of correspondent inference theory, where the subjects were instructed to estimate the "true" attitude of a target person after having either read or listened to a speech by him expressing opinions on a controversial topic.

1,544 citations


Cited by
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The extent to which method biases influence behavioral research results is examined, potential sources of method biases are identified, the cognitive processes through which method bias influence responses to measures are discussed, the many different procedural and statistical techniques that can be used to control method biases is evaluated, and recommendations for how to select appropriate procedural and Statistical remedies are provided.
Abstract: Interest in the problem of method biases has a long history in the behavioral sciences. Despite this, a comprehensive summary of the potential sources of method biases and how to control for them does not exist. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which method biases influence behavioral research results, identify potential sources of method biases, discuss the cognitive processes through which method biases influence responses to measures, evaluate the many different procedural and statistical techniques that can be used to control method biases, and provide recommendations for how to select appropriate procedural and statistical remedies for different types of research settings.

52,531 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Existing evidence supports the hypothesis that the need to belong is a powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation, and people form social attachments readily under most conditions and resist the dissolution of existing bonds.
Abstract: A hypothesized need to form and maintain strong, stable interpersonal relationships is evaluated in light of the empirical literature. The need is for frequent, nonaversive interactions within an ongoing relational bond. Consistent with the belongingness hypothesis, people form social attachments readily under most conditions and resist the dissolution of existing bonds. Belongingness appears to have multiple and strong effects on emotional patterns and on cognitive processes. Lack of attachments is linked to a variety of ill effects on health, adjustment, and well-being. Other evidence, such as that concerning satiation, substitution, and behavioral consequences, is likewise consistent with the hypothesized motivation. Several seeming counterexamples turned out not to disconfirm the hypothesis. Existing evidence supports the hypothesis that the need to belong is a powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation.

17,492 citations

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1985
TL;DR: There appears to be general agreement among social psychologists that most human behavior is goal-directed (e. g., Heider, 1958 ; Lewin, 1951), and human social behavior can best be described as following along lines of more or less well-formulated plans.
Abstract: There appears to be general agreement among social psychologists that most human behavior is goal-directed (e. g., Heider, 1958 ; Lewin, 1951). Being neither capricious nor frivolous, human social behavior can best be described as following along lines of more or less well-formulated plans. Before attending a concert, for example, a person may extend an invitation to a date, purchase tickets, change into proper attire, call a cab, collect the date, and proceed to the concert hall. Most, if not all, of these activities will have been designed in advance; their execution occurs as the plan unfolds. To be sure, a certain sequence of actions can become so habitual or routine that it is performed almost automatically, as in the case of driving from home to work or playing the piano. Highly developed skills of this kind typically no longer require conscious formulation of a behavioral plan. Nevertheless, at least in general outline, we are normally well aware of the actions required to attain a certain goal. Consider such a relatively routine behavior as typing a letter. When setting this activity as a goal, we anticipate the need to locate a typewriter, insert a sheet of paper, adjust the margins, formulate words and sentences, strike the appropriate keys, and so forth. Some parts of the plan are more routine, and require less conscious thought than others, but without an explicit or implicit plan to guide the required sequence of acts, no letter would get typed.

16,172 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that people are sometimes unaware of the existence of a stimulus that influenced a response, unaware of its existence, and unaware that the stimulus has affected the response.
Abstract: Evidence is reviewed which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Subjects are sometimes (a) unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to observe directly their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to report accurately about them. Accurate reports will occur when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce, and will not occur when stimuli are not salient or are not plausible causes.

10,186 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A judgmental heuristic in which a person evaluates the frequency of classes or the probability of events by availability, i.e., by the ease with which relevant instances come to mind, is explored.

8,823 citations