Elinor Ostrom

Bio: Elinor Ostrom is an academic researcher from Indiana University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Commons & Collective action. The author has an hindex of 126, co-authored 430 publications receiving 104959 citations. Previous affiliations of Elinor Ostrom include University of New Orleans & University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Abstract: Preface 1. Reflections on the commons 2. An institutional approach to the study of self-organization and self-governance in CPR situations 3. Analyzing long-enduring, self-organized and self-governed CPRs 4. Analyzing institutional change 5. Analyzing institutional failures and fragilities 6. A framework for analysis of self-organizing and self-governing CPRs Notes References Index.

A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems

Abstract: A major problem worldwide is the potential loss of fisheries, forests, and water resources Understanding of the processes that lead to improvements in or deterioration of natural resources is limited, because scientific disciplines use different concepts and languages to describe and explain complex social-ecological systems (SESs) Without a common framework to organize findings, isolated knowledge does not cumulate Until recently, accepted theory has assumed that resource users will never self-organize to maintain their resources and that governments must impose solutions Research in multiple disciplines, however, has found that some government policies accelerate resource destruction, whereas some resource users have invested their time and energy to achieve sustainability A general framework is used to identify 10 subsystem variables that affect the likelihood of self-organization in efforts to achieve a sustainable SES

Understanding Institutional Diversity

Abstract: Elinor Ostronr s Understanding Institutional Diversity draws an analogy between genetic rules of biological organisms and social rules of communities of humans. Just as natural scientists accumulated knowledge in the human genome project, the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework is presented as the scaffolding for accumulation of knowledge on institutions. It is a framework that many social scientists will appreciate, because of its notion that knowledge about institutions can only be attained in real-life action situations. For Ostrom, social scientists are like engineers facing complex technologies: the recognition of rules does not solve a dilemma but opens up chances for tinkering with the system. Ostrom develops a syntax for institutions by starting from the first principles of deontic logic and makes elegant distinctions between often-confused concepts. For example, a strategy determines who achieves what outcomes under which conditions; a norm is a strategy specified with what is permitted, obliged, or forbidden; and a rule is a norm specified with what are the consequences of not following the norm. These arguments are supported by an impressive pool of empirical work. The focus of empirical analysis is on interaction of participants in action arenas such as a home, a city council, a firm, or an international organisation. It is an appealing focus, because it enables shifting the scale of analysis from local to global and any 'holon' in between a key analytical strength for understanding how nested institutions operate simultaneously at different scales and interact across scales. One fascinating chapter is devoted to controlled laboratory experiments with games. Its findings are used to modify the dominant model of human behaviour: the utility-maximising individual is given its proper role among the other games of life. Bold moves like this are risky. The framework that Ostrom constructs covers a vast territory and is likely to trigger critical questions such as these from other scholars:

The Struggle to Govern the Commons

Abstract: Human institutions—ways of organizing activities—affect the resilience of the environment. Locally evolved institutional arrangements governed by stable communities and buffered from outside forces have sustained resources successfully for centuries, although they often fail when rapid change occurs. Ideal conditions for governance are increasingly rare. Critical problems, such as transboundary pollution, tropical deforestation, and climate change, are at larger scales and involve nonlocal influences. Promising strategies for addressing these problems include dialogue among interested parties, officials, and scientists; complex, redundant, and layered institutions; a mix of institutional types; and designs that facilitate experimentation, learning, and change.

Rules, games, and common-pool resources

Abstract: While the tragedy of the commons is real, there are many instances where institutions develop to protect against overexploitation. In this important work, the authors explore empirically, theoretically, and experimentally the nature of such institutions and the way they come about.

A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation

Abstract: There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitivemarkets butnot inbilateral bargainingsituations. Thereisalsostrong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selesh types dominate equilibrium behavior.

Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept

Abstract: A growing number of sociologists, political scientists, economists, and organizational theorists have invoked the concept of social capital in the search for answers to a broadening range of questions being confronted in their own fields. Seeking to clarify the concept and help assess its utility for organizational theory, we synthesize the theoretical research undertaken in these various disciplines and develop a common conceptual framework that identifies the sources, benefits, risks, and contingencies of social capital.

A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

Abstract: There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if a fraction of the people exhibits inequality aversion the puzzles can be resolved.

A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems

Abstract: A major problem worldwide is the potential loss of fisheries, forests, and water resources Understanding of the processes that lead to improvements in or deterioration of natural resources is limited, because scientific disciplines use different concepts and languages to describe and explain complex social-ecological systems (SESs) Without a common framework to organize findings, isolated knowledge does not cumulate Until recently, accepted theory has assumed that resource users will never self-organize to maintain their resources and that governments must impose solutions Research in multiple disciplines, however, has found that some government policies accelerate resource destruction, whereas some resource users have invested their time and energy to achieve sustainability A general framework is used to identify 10 subsystem variables that affect the likelihood of self-organization in efforts to achieve a sustainable SES

Resilience: the emergence of a perspective for social-ecological systems analyses

Abstract: The resilience perspective is increasingly used as an approach for understanding the dynamics of social–ecological systems. This article presents the origin of the resilience perspective and provides an overview of its development to date. With roots in one branch of ecology and the discovery of multiple basins of attraction in ecosystems in the 1960–1970s, it inspired social and environmental scientists to challenge the dominant stable equilibrium view. The resilience approach emphasizes non-linear dynamics, thresholds, uncertainty and surprise, how periods of gradual change interplay with periods of rapid change and how such dynamics interact across temporal and spatial scales. The history was dominated by empirical observations of ecosystem dynamics interpreted in mathematical models, developing into the adaptive management approach for responding to ecosystem change. Serious attempts to integrate the social dimension is currently taking place in resilience work reflected in the large numbers of sciences involved in explorative studies and new discoveries of linked social–ecological systems. Recent advances include understanding of social processes like, social learning and social memory, mental models and knowledge–system integration, visioning and scenario building, leadership, agents and actor groups, social networks, institutional and organizational inertia and change, adaptive capacity, transformability and systems of adaptive governance that allow for management of essential ecosystem services.