Elisabetta Carrara

Bio: Elisabetta Carrara is an academic researcher from Ericsson. The author has contributed to research in topics: The Internet & Key management. The author has an hindex of 6, co-authored 8 publications receiving 1108 citations.

The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)

Abstract: This document describes the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP), a profile of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), which can provide confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection to the RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP, the Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP).

MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing

Abstract: This document describes a key management scheme that can be used for real-time applications (both for peer-to-peer communication and group communication) In particular, its use to support the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol is described in detail Security protocols for real-time multimedia applications have started to appear This has brought forward the need for a key management solution to support these protocols [STANDARDS-TRACK]

Secure content sharing in digital rights management

Abstract: Method and system for securely sharing content in real-time systems over heterogeneous networks. Cryptographic mechanisms of the content are used to protect the confidentiality and the integrity of the content. The confidentiality/integrity protection may be performed either before storing the content on the content server (i.e., pre-encryption), or by the content server while the content is being sent (i.e., real-time encryption).

Key Management Extensions for Session Description Protocol (SDP) and Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP)

Abstract: This document defines general extensions for Session Description Protocol (SDP) and Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) to carry messages, as specified by a key management protocol, in order to secure the media. These extensions are presented as a framework, to be used by one or more key management protocols. As such, their use is meaningful only when complemented by an appropriate key management protocol. General guidelines are also given on how the framework should be used together with SIP and RTSP. The usage with the Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) key management protocol is also defined. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

Conversational IP multimedia security

Abstract: With the introduction of 3G systems multimedia applications over wireless will become widely available to the general public. One such application will be peer-to-peer conversational multimedia communication in which voice, video, still pictures and other media can be used simultaneously and in an interactive way. However, in an all IP environment it is important to have high quality and efficient security services to protect the traffic against eavesdropping and manipulations. In particular, end-to-end security is considered attractive. This paper investigates the security requirements that emerge from conversational IP multimedia applications in heterogeneous environments, with special emphasis on the requirements stemming from the wireless access. The design and the design goals of both SRTP, a security protocol for protection of media traffic, and multimedia Internet keying (MIKEY), a key management protocol specially developed for those environments, are also described.

Networking named content

Abstract: Current network use is dominated by content distribution and retrieval yet current networking protocols are designed for conversations between hosts. Accessing content and services requires mapping from the what that users care about to the network's where. We present Content-Centric Networking (CCN) which uses content chunks as a primitive---decoupling location from identity, security and access, and retrieving chunks of content by name. Using new approaches to routing named content, derived from IP, CCN simultaneously achieves scalability, security, and performance. We describe our implementation of the architecture's basic features and demonstrate its performance and resilience with secure file downloads and VoIP calls.

Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)

Abstract: The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) is a transport protocol that provides bidirectional unicast connections of congestion-controlled unreliable datagrams. DCCP is suitable for applications that transfer fairly large amounts of data and that can benefit from control over the tradeoff between timeliness and reliability. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)

Abstract: This document describes the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP), a profile of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), which can provide confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection to the RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP, the Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP).

Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT) Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols

Abstract: This document describes a protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT) traversal for multimedia session signaling protocols based on the offer/answer model, such as the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). This protocol is called Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE). ICE makes use of existing protocols, such as Simple Traversal of UDP Through NAT (STUN) and Traversal Using Relay NAT (TURN). ICE makes use of STUN in peer-to-peer cooperative fashion, allowing participants to discover, create and verify mutual connectivity.

The security and performance of the galois/counter mode (GCM) of operation

Abstract: The recently introduced Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation for block ciphers provides both encryption and message authentication, using universal hashing based on multiplication in a binary finite field. We analyze its security and performance, and show that it is the most efficient mode of operation for high speed packet networks, by using a realistic model of a network crypto module and empirical data from studies of Internet traffic in conjunction with software experiments and hardware designs. GCM has several useful features: it can accept IVs of arbitrary length, can act as a stand-alone message authentication code (MAC), and can be used as an incremental MAC. We show that GCM is secure in the standard model of concrete security, even when these features are used. We also consider several of its important system-security aspects.