Elisabetta Ottoz

Bio: Elisabetta Ottoz is an academic researcher from University of Turin. The author has contributed to research in topics: Intellectual property & Scope (project management). The author has an hindex of 9, co-authored 31 publications receiving 246 citations.

The impact of ownership on the cost of bus service provision: an example from Italy

Abstract: This article examines the potential impact of ownership on the cost of bus service provision for a sample of 65 private and 12 public companies providing local public transit (LPT) in Piedmont (Italy) from 1998 to 2002. A translog cost frontier is estimated using the model in Battese and Coelli (1995) where inefficiency scores are allowed to vary across firms and over time. A public ownership dummy is included in the inefficiency model and it is always positive and significant. Density and scale economies and cost inefficiencies are then computed. Private companies seem to experience higher density and scale economies than public ones. Cost inefficiencies appear higher in the public sample.

Patent–Secret Mix in Complex Product Firms

Abstract: Different protection mechanisms may be employed at the same time when an innovation is comprised of separately protectable components. If patents and trade secrets can be mixed in protecting single innovations, a strengthening in patent breadth may induce a lower level of patenting, as innovators are more prone to rely on secrecy.

Trade Secret vs. Broad Patent: The Role of Licensing

Abstract: We present a simple model wherein a patents regime is inferior to a trade secrets system, meaning that when private returns from innovation under the two regimes are the same, society will be better off if the innovator chooses not to patent. In our model, trade secret licensing is envisaged and the inferiority of patents depends on the lack of an independent invention defense in patent law, while such a defense currently exists in secrecy and copyright law. Thus, although secrecy is superior to patents, it is not superior to other types of formal intellectual property rights where independent invention is allowed (such as copyrighted software).

The Relevance of Scale and Scope Economies in the Provision of Urban and Intercity Bus Transport

Abstract: This report examines the relevance of scale and scope economies in the provision of urban and intercity bus transport. The authors use a sample of bus companies operating local public transport in Piedmont, in the northwest region of Italy. The authors examine 67 firms between 1998 and 2004. They find that large cost advantages can be obtained from fixed cost savings. They also detected density economies and scale economies. They suggest however that local authorities should be aware that specialized competitive tendering for urban and intercity transport may imply higher costs. There is a trade-off because unbundling removes entry barrier for single mode operators, but does not guarantee the use of scale and scope economies.

Introduction to Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk

Abstract: In the last several years, business leaders, policymakers, and inventors have complained to the media and to Congress that today’s patent system stifles innovation instead of fostering it. But like the infamous patent on the peanut butter and jelly sandwich, much of the cited evidence about the patent system is pure anecdote--making realistic policy formation difficult. Is the patent system fundamentally broken, or can it be fixed with a few modest reforms? Moving beyond rhetoric, Patent Failure provides the first authoritative and comprehensive look at the economic performance of patents in forty years. James Bessen and Michael Meurer ask whether patents work well as property rights, and, if not, what institutional and legal reforms are necessary to make the patent system more effective. Patent Failure presents a wide range of empirical evidence from history, law, and economics. The book’s findings are stark and conclusive. While patents do provide incentives to invest in research, development, and commercialization, for most businesses today, patents fail to provide predictable property rights. Instead, they produce costly disputes and excessive litigation that outweigh positive incentives. Only in some sectors, such as the pharmaceutical industry, do patents act as advertised, with their benefits outweighing the related costs. By showing how the patent system has fallen short in providing predictable legal boundaries, Patent Failure serves as a call for change in institutions and laws. There are no simple solutions, but Bessen and Meurer’s reform proposals need to be heard. The health and competitiveness of the nation’s economy depend on it.

The Choice between Formal and Informal Intellectual Property: A Review

Abstract: We survey the economic literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the choice of intellectual property protection by firms. Our focus is on the trade-offs between using patents and disclosing versus the use of secrecy, although we also look briefly at the use of other means of formal intellectual property protection.

A theory of military dictatorships

Abstract: We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships Nondemocratic regimes need the use of force in order to remain in power, but this creates a political moral hazard problem; a strong military may not simply work as an agent of the elite but may turn against them in order to create a regime more in line with their own objectives The political moral hazard problem increases the cost of using repression in nondemocratic regimes and in particular, necessitates high wages and policy concessions to the military When these concessions are not sufficient, the military can take action against a nondemocratic regime in order to create its own dictatorship A more important consequence of the presence of a strong military is that once transition to democracy takes place, the military poses a coup threat against the nascent democratic regime until it is reformed The anticipation that the military will be reformed in the future acts as an additional motivation for the military to undertake coups against democratic governments We show that greater inequality makes the use of the military in nondemocratic regimes more likely and also makes it more difficult for democracies to prevent military coups In addition, greater inequality also makes it more likely that nondemocratic regimes are unable to solve the political moral hazard problem and thus creates another channel for the emergence of military dictatorships We also show that greater natural resource rents make military coups against democracies more likely, but have ambiguous effects on the political equilibrium in nondemocracies (because with abundant natural resources, repression becomes more valuable to the elite, but also more expensive to maintain because of the more severe political moral hazard problem that natural resources induce) Finally, we discuss how the national defense role of the military interacts with its involvement in domestic politics

A Theory of Military Dictatorships

Abstract: We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships. The elite may build a strong military and make the concessions neces - sary for the military to behave as their perfect agent, or they may risk the military turning against them. Once the transition to democ - racy takes place, a strong military poses a threat against the nascent democratic regime until it is reformed. We study the role of income inequality and natural resources in the emergence of military dicta - torships and show how the national defense role of the military may facilitate democratic consolidation. (JEL D72, H56)