Emilia Ferone

Bio: Emilia Ferone is an academic researcher from University of Chieti-Pescara. The author has contributed to research in topics: Sociological theory & Sociology of law. The author has an hindex of 3, co-authored 7 publications receiving 23 citations.

Innovation in citizenship policies

Abstract: A viable citizenship program is pivotal for state development, and to let official policy determine politics as taught by T. J. Lowi. National states based on national-state citizenship are weaker and weaker before the key challenges of our times. That is why citizenship programs are more and more focused on innovation policies to integrate ius sanguinis, ius soli, citizenship on investment and citizenship on performance. This paper provides a strategic innovation policy by linking development and global citizenship. Innovative law-making, citizenship policy innovation, and development are dramatically interconnected to evolve a scenario in which citizenship represents a key intangible asset to generate tangible wealth in open horizons where free circulation of tangibles or intangibles is strategic and linked to downsizing the bureaucratic burdens, the local power centers by evolving a much leaner and higher organizational standard of citizenship: legally, isotropically, and socially. This results...

Organizational innovation: a systemic approach*

Abstract: Since, Vilfredo Pareto formulated what later became Pareto’s principle (also referred to as the 80/20 or 90/10 principle, see Koch [2008. The 80/20 Principle: The Secret to Achieving More with Less...

Epilogue: systemic sociology and innovation

Abstract: This short note provides a few conclusive considerations on theoretical approaches to innovation studies, from the scope of the works that appeared in the monographic issue of International Review ...

Academic Capitalism as a Key Challenge and the Emergence of the New Economy Scenario

Abstract: What are the evolutionary scenarios of academic capitalism, able to deliver an ever more strategic knowledge, with a high added value within the global society? Under the current system of knowledge economy, characterized, at the beginning of this third millennium, by strong hyper-complexity, the challenge for the society evolution toward a sustainable world, full of varieties and opportunities, is the development of a form of capitalism able to guide and facilitate the reshaping of society through self-organizing systems (Lazslo 2011) the academic capitalism as a form of functional capitalism, the difference that makes the knowledge considered at a systemic level.

Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality

Abstract: Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Aihwa Ong. Durham, NIC: Duke University Press, 1999. ix. 322 pp., notes, bibliography, index.

The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined

Abstract: THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED. Steven Pinker, Penguin, New York, NY 2011. ISBN 978-0-670-02295-3.There's been a shooting in a Sikh Temple this morning. A lone gunman entered a Colorado theater and opened fire. Syrians are now engaged in civil war. Faced with daily news stories of death and destruction, it is easy to believe that things are getting worse. Not so, explains Harvard psychologist, Steven Pinker in his new work, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence has Declined.Pinker combines in-depth historical research with rigorous psychological research to argue the case for a decline in global violence. As Pinker aptly points out, many people look at our age as one of unprecedented violence and terror to be viewed with pessimism. Drawing on historical analysis, psychological research and findings from related sciences such as anthropology, sociology, and economics Pinker argues that the data paint a very different picture. In the first chapter, Pinker takes the reader on a quick journey through the history of the world pointing out that the ancient and medieval worlds were very different than the world we live in today. Numerous prehistoric skeletons bear evidence of very violent deaths. Ancient people destroyed entire tribes. Romans carried out violent executions. Medieval Knights led lies of violence and other Europeans meted out horrendous punishments for acts which might not even be judged worthy of condemnation in today's democracies. Finally, the early 20th century saw two World Wars before the long peace ensued. In light of that history, Pinker argues that perhaps we should reconsider our assumptions about our own world.In the first section of the book, Pinker identifies six historical trends which could have led to declines in violence. The first trend he calls the Pacification Process by which people gave up nomadic hunting and gathering lives for lives of agriculture in cities. Competition and anarchy in the prehistoric world made violence necessary for survival. The development of agriculture called for greater cooperation between individuals and the formation of governments to impose order created a world where violence was not always in one's best interest. Statistical analysis supports the idea that the emergence of states lead to a decline in violence. The second trend, the Civilizing Process, is an idea he developed from the work of Norbert Elias. In the late medieval and early modern periods, etiquette and social norms began to be important in social interactions, economics and technology began to advance, and governments began to become more centralized. This trend was also accompanied by a decline in violence. The third trend is the Humanitarian Revolution during which people began to increasingly find practices, such as torture, capital punishment, war and slavery, morally questionable. Empathy, compassion, and peace became important characteristics. The fourth trend is the Long Peace, which stems from the realization that since World War II no two major world powers have gone to war and, in spite of predictions to the contrary, nuclear weapons have never been used. …

Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers

Abstract: Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. By Kwame Anthony Appiah. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006. Pp. xxii + 196, preface, introduction, acknowledgments, notes, index. $24.95 cloth, $15.95 paper) Kwame Anthony Appiah's Cosmopolitanism is meant as a guide for identifying and confronting complex ethical issues in a multi-perspectival world. Its author, an Oxford-educated philosopher of Ghanaian-British parentage, bridges worlds. The term cosmopolitanism - the author prefers it over globalizations narrow association with economics and multiculturalismi observed tendency to prescribe - encompasses two core values: "the idea that we have obligations to others, obligations that stretch beyond those to whom we are related by the ties of kith and kin, or even formal ties of a shared citizenship," and the idea "that we take seriously the value not just of human life but of particular human lives, which means taking an interest in the practices and beliefs that lend them significance" (xv). Terms such as tolerance, kindness, and pluralism are central to cosmopolitan thinking. Appiah presents a wide range of issues that can serve as frames through which to examine how we as individuals and professionals make ethical decisions - essential for the humanities scholar, student, and public-sector folklorist: How real are values? What do we talk about when we talk about differences? Is any form of relativism right? When do morals and manners clash? Can culture be owned? What do we owe strangers by virtue of our shared humanity? And all this is good... and yet, and yet. Too often, the resolutions Appiah proposes for these key issues are so one-sided and misleading, so bolstered by irrelevant, erroneous, and outdated sources, that they are of little help in sorting through the paradoxical interfaces of pluralism and autonomy, diversity and democracy, and globalization and protection of what is valuable in the local. In his central chapter, "Cosmopolitan Contamination," Appiah proposes a change of priorities - away from purity, peoples, authenticity, tribalism, and cultural protection, and toward individuals, mixture, modernity, rights, and what he calls contamination (his term for healthy hybridization) . His philosophical underpinning ("The right approach, I think, starts by taking individuals - not nations, tribes or 'peoples' - as die proper object of moral concern" [Appiah 2006] ) is a hallmark of rightist thought and practice. The left emphasizes social, political, and environmental factors that can constrain the ability of individuals to choose freely. Both perspectives are needed, but only one is developed in this book. Many folklorists are familiar with issues of cultural change and preservation as discussed at UNESCO and WIPO. Appiah reveals no understanding of the complexities of diese dynamics. He wrongly assumes many anthropologists to be cultural relativists who tolerate such practices as female genital mutilation (15) and that UNESCO's Declaration of Cultural Diversity celebrates a pluralism that could embrace the likes of the KKK conveniently ignoring Article IV: "No one may invoke cultural diversity to infringe upon human right. …

Business cycles: A methodological approach

Abstract: Business cycles are both less volatile and more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones. We develop two alternative explanations based on the idea that comparative advantage causes rich countries to specialize in industries that use new technologies operated by skilled workers, while poor countries specialize in industries that use traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers. Since new technologies are difficult to imitate, the industries of rich countries enjoy more market power and face more inelastic product demands than those of poor countries. Since skilled workers are less likely to exit employment as a result of changes in economic conditions, industries in rich countries face more inelastic labour supplies than those of poor countries. We show that either asymmetry in industry characteristics can generate cross-country differences in business cycles that resemble those we observe in the data. We are grateful to Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Perri for useful comments. The views expressed here are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of The World Bank. Business cycles are not the same in rich and poor countries. A first difference is that fluctuations in per capita income growth are smaller in rich countries than in poor ones, in the top panel of Figure 1 , we plot the standard deviation of per capita income growth against the level of (log) per capita income for a large sample of countries. We refer to this relationship as the volatility graph and note that it slopes downwards. A second difference is that fluctuations in per capita income growth are more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones. In the bottom panel of Figure 1 , we plot the correlation of per capita income growth rates with world average per capita income growth, excluding the country in question, against the level of (log) per capita income for the same set of countries. We refer to this relationship as the comovement graph and note that it slopes upwards. Table 1 , which is self-explanatory, shows that these facts apply within different sub-samples of countries and years. 1 Why are business cycles less volatile and more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones? Part of the answer must be that poor countries exhibit more political and policy instability, they are less open or more distant from the geographical center, and they also have a higher share of their economy devoted to the production of agricultural products and the extraction of minerals. Table 1 shows that, in a statistical sense, these factors explain a substantial fraction of the variation in the volatility of income growth, although they do not explain much of the variation in the comovement of income growth. More important for our purposes, the strong relationship between income and the properties of business cycles reported in Table 1 is still present after we control for these variables. In short, there must be other factors behind the strong patterns depicted in Figure 1 beyond differences in political instability, remoteness and the importance of natural resources. With the exception that the comovement graph seems to be driven by differences between rich and poor countries and not within each group. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) also present the volatility graph. They provide an explanation for it based on the observation that rich countries have more diversified production structures. We are unaware of any previous reference to the comovement graph. In this paper, we develop two alternative but non-competing explanations for why business cycles are less volatile and more synchronized with the world in rich countries than in poor ones. Both explanations rely on the idea that comparative advantage causes rich countries to specialize in industries that require new technologies operated by skilled workers, while poor countries specialize in industries that require traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers. This pattern of specialization opens up the possibility that cross-country differences in business cycles are the result of asymmetries between these types of industries. In particular, both of the explanations advanced here predict that industries that use traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers will be more sensitive to country-specific shocks. Ceteris paribus, these industries will not only be more volatile but also less synchronized with the world cycle since the relative importance of global shocks is lower. To the extent that the business cycles of countries reflect those of their industries, differences in industrial structure could potentially explain the patterns in Figure 1 . One explanation of why industries react differently to shocks is based on the idea that firms using new technologies face more inelastic product demands than those using traditional technologies. New technologies are difficult to imitate quickly for technical reasons and also because of legal patents. This difficulty confers a cost advantage on technological leaders that shelters them from potential entrants and gives them monopoly power in world markets. Traditional technologies are easier to imitate because enough time has passed since their adoption and also because patents have expired or have been circumvented. This implies that incumbent firms face tough competition from potential entrants and enjoy little or no monopoly power in world markets. The price-elasticity of product demand affects how industries react to shocks. Consider, for instance, the effects of country-specific shocks that encourage production in all industries. In industries that use new technologies, firms have monopoly power and face inelastic demands for their products. As a result, fluctuations in supply lead to opposing changes in prices that tend to stabilize industry income. In industries that use traditional technologies, firms face stiff competition from abroad and therefore face elastic demands for their products. As a result, fluctuations in supply have little or no effect on their prices and industry income is more volatile. To the extent that this asymmetry in the degree of product-market competition is important, incomes of industries that use new technologies are likely to be less sensitive to country-specific shocks than those of industries that use traditional technologies. Another explanation for why industries react differently to shocks is based on the idea that the supply of unskilled workers is more elastic than the supply of skilled workers. A first reason for this asymmetry is that non-market activities are relatively more attractive to unskilled workers whose market wage is lower than that of skilled ones. Changes in labour demand might induce some unskilled workers to enter or abandon the labour force, but are not likely to affect the participation of skilled workers. A second reason for the asymmetry in labour supply across skill categories is the imposition of a minimum wage. Changes in labour demand might force some unskilled workers in and out of unemployment, but are not likely to affect the employment of skilled workers. The wage-elasticity of the labour supply also has implications for how industries react to shocks. Consider again the effects of country-specific shocks that encourage production in all industries and therefore raise the labour demand. Since the supply of unskilled workers is elastic, these shocks lead to large fluctuations in employment of unskilled workers. In industries that use them, fluctuations in supply are therefore magnified by increases in employment that make industry income more volatile. Since the supply of skilled workers is inelastic, the same shocks have little or no effects on the employment of skilled workers. In industries that use them, fluctuations in supply are not magnified and industry income is less volatile. To the extent that this asymmetry in the elasticity of labour supply is important, incomes of industries that use unskilled workers are likely to be more sensitive to country-specific shocks than those of industries that use skilled workers To study these hypotheses we construct a stylized world equilibrium model of the cross-section of business cycles. Inspired by the work of Davis (1995), we consider in section one a world in which differences in both factor endowments a la Heckscher-Ohlin and industry technologies a la Ricardo combine to determine a country's comparative advantage and, therefore, the patterns of specialization and trade. To generate business cycles, we subject this world economy to the sort of productivity fluctuations that have been emphasized by Kydland and Prescott (1982). 2 In section two, we characterize the cross-section of business cycles and show how asymmetries in the elasticity of product demand and/or labour supply can be used to explain the evidence in Figure 1 . Using available microeconomic estimates of the key parameters, we calibrate the model and find that: (i) The model exhibits slightly less than two-thirds and one-third of the observed cross-country variation in volatility and comovement, respectively; and (ii) The asymmetry in the elasticity of product demand seems to have a quantitatively stronger effect on the slopes of the volatility and comovement graphs, than the elasticity in the labour supply. We explore these results further in sections three and four. In section three, we extend the model to allow for monetary shocks that have real effects since firms face cash-in-advance constraints. We use the model to study how cross-country variation in monetary policy and financial development affect the cross-section of business cycles. Once these factors are considered, the calibrated version of the model exhibits roughly the same cross-country variation in volatility and about 40 percent of the variation in comovement as the data. In section four, we show th

The cosmopolitan vision

Abstract: Sociology was born as an attempt to delimit an object of investigation offered by society as a social reality. The ambition was that of “treating the social facts as things” (Durkheim) or of understanding and explaining the social relations by respecting an “axiological neutrality” (Max Weber). Today, however, we are in the presence of a new kind of sociologists, and they are by no means the less popular ones, who are not trying to avoid assessments in their analysis of the present social world. I have in mind especially two sociologists, Ulrich Beck (Munich) and David Held (London). I will discuss in particular the view of sociology presented in a recent book of Ulrich Beck (Macht und Gegenmacht im globalen Zeitalter, 2002, translated into French under the title Pouvoir et contre-pouvoir a l’ere de la mondialisation, 2003), and I will show some analogies between Beck and Held. Finally, I will try to identify the points hat make the present sociological epistemology different from that of the great founders of this science.