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Emilios Christodoulidis

Other affiliations: University of Edinburgh
Bio: Emilios Christodoulidis is an academic researcher from University of Glasgow. The author has contributed to research in topics: Politics & Philosophy of law. The author has an hindex of 13, co-authored 80 publications receiving 770 citations. Previous affiliations of Emilios Christodoulidis include University of Edinburgh.


Papers
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Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1998
TL;DR: In this article, the authors locate their discussion of conflict and law in two prevalent contexts: the first is the broad context of the sociological discussion of the relationship between conflict and society, and the second is the narrower one of the 'juridification' of conflict.
Abstract: I will locate my discussion of conflict and law in two prevalent contexts. The first is the broad context of the sociological discussion of the relationship of conflict and society. The second is the narrower one of the ‘juridification’ of conflict. I will engage in both debates, take cues from both, but also distance my position from both by re-working central assumptions from the point of view of systems-theory, or at least of my view of how systems theory makes best sense of both debates. Such a fundamental re-tracing of the inter-relationship between conflict, law and society aims to confront the deep and multi-faceted mis-understandings that underlie the republican suggestion for the legal containment of politics in the crucial area of political conflict.
Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1998
TL;DR: In Luhmann's discussion of the political system, democracy, as foil for the guiding distinction, allowed for the system's self-observation and the scope of political variability was thereby delimited as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In Luhmann’s discussion of the political system, democracy, as foil for the guiding distinction, allowed for the system’s self-observation. The scope of political variability was thereby delimited, the scope of what could change arrested in that depiction. This means more than that the system sanctions a certain order of affairs. What is at stake here is meaning, the possibility that something registers as politically meaningful. For Luhmann, the ‘government/opposition’ distinction opens up the contingency space in politics in the sense of delimiting what can be done politically in terms of operations. In terms of observation it allows not simply an understanding of how things are but also a glimpse of how things could be different (the opposition could come to power). It is in that limiting way that the conceptual space of political possibility is semanticised.
Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1998
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors treat Dworkin as both an interpretivist and a republican, arguing that the nature of law can only be understood in the practice of a community, and how the community substantiates itself through arguing legal questions in the interpretative way.
Abstract: To classify Dworkin as a republican flies in the face of much conventional labelling, notably the division that wants interpretivists opposing republicans.1 I will say nothing about the division because I believe it misleading, but will treat Dworkin as both interpretivist and republican because, it is my claim, his major work Lawn Empire relies on law’s interpretative nature to provide a powerful statement of the containment thesis. This work not only sets community at the heart of a theory of law, but also uses law as a lever for politics and the self-determination of community. I will take Dworkin up on his suggestions; the interpretative one, that the nature of law can only be understood in the practice of a community; and the republican one, about how the community substantiates itself through arguing legal questions in the interpretative way, and how this thorough involvement in legal argument allows communal self-government through law.
Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the average cost of confining an inmate as $70,000 when it is closer to half that figure (p. 234); claims that the executions took place at ‘an average of 200 per year’ during the Depression, when in fact there was never a single year in the twentieth century when 200 executions were carried out.
Abstract: He confuses civil procedure with criminal procedure (pp. 208–9); presents the average cost of confining an inmate as $70,000 when it is closer to half that figure (p. 234); claims that the executions took place at ‘an average of 200 per year’ during the Depression (p. 52), when in fact there was never a single year in the twentieth century when 200 executions were carried out. (The peak was 199 in 1935.) He states the current number of inmates on death row as being 2,700 (p. 222) when he must have meant 3,700 (at the end of 2003, the total was actually 3,504) and refers to the increased number of lynchings that occurred between 1889 and 1993, when he must mean 1893 (p. 101). One can only shudder that so many errors have found their way onto the printed page and hope that other authors will be better served by their colleagues and their publishers.
Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1998
TL;DR: The legal-institutional connection is the significant one: what characterises the republican thesis is the centrality of law both to politics and to the moulding of community.
Abstract: Republican theory claims nothing less than that the constitution provides the possibility of politics and the substantiation of community. The legal-institutional connection is the significant one: what characterises the republican thesis is the centrality of law both to politics and to the moulding of community.

Cited by
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Journal ArticleDOI

459 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the development of the open method of co-ordination, addressing whether it is a new form of governance from two related perspectives: to what extent can the method be effectively applied outside the scope of economic policy, and will it lead to policy transfer to the EU and hence act only as a transitional mode of governance?
Abstract: Taking economic co-ordination in EMU as a starting point, this article explores the development of the open method of co-ordination, addressing whether it is a new form of governance from two related perspectives. First, to what extent can the method be effectively applied outside the scope of economic policy? Second, will it lead to policy transfer to the EU and hence act only as a transitional mode of governance? Identified at the Lisbon European Council, the method codified practices such as benchmarking, target-setting and peer review developed in the Luxembourg, Cardiff and Cologne processes. The method offers a new approach to governance of the EU as a heterarchical, decentred and dynamic process. It supports and radicalizes the principle of subsidiarity; offers an alternative to the treaty rules on enhanced co-operation; and addresses some of the legitimacy issues inherent in the EU. In EMU, the method arose out of a specific policy framework with a common monetary policy complemented by the coordination of national economic policies. The recent recommendation issued against Ireland is the first example of the operation of the method in EMU and shows how debate can be stimulated and how different and arguably equally valid perspectives defended. The particular experience of EMU with a sound money, sound finance paradigm, a long history of project-building by key elites and the central role of the European Council suggest similar conditions are required for the effective application of the method in other policy spheres. The context within which the method has operated to date is contingent and could change either over time or between policy fields. If so, the very openness of the method may serve to reconfigure the boundaries of competence between the Member States and the Union, after all.

445 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors claim that restorative justice is the opposite of retributive justice, and use indigenous justice practices and was the first step towards restoring justice in the United States.
Abstract: Advocates’ claims about restorative justice contain four myths: (1) restorative justice is the opposite of retributive justice; (2) restorative justice uses indigenous justice practices and was the...

377 citations