Author
Ernesto Schargrodsky
Bio: Ernesto Schargrodsky is an academic researcher from Torcuato di Tella University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Land titling & Property rights. The author has an hindex of 29, co-authored 75 publications receiving 4982 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors used the variation in ownership of water provision across time and space generated by the privatization process to find that child mortality fell 8 percent in the areas that privatized their water services and that the effect was largest in the poorest areas.
Abstract: While most countries are committed to increasing access to safe water and thereby reducing child mortality, there is little consensus on how to actually improve water services. One important proposal under discussion is whether to privatize water provision. In the 1990s Argentina embarked on one of the largest privatization campaigns in the world, including the privatization of local water companies covering approximately 30 percent of the country’s municipalities. Using the variation in ownership of water provision across time and space generated by the privatization process, we find that child mortality fell 8 percent in the areas that privatized their water services and that the effect was largest (26 percent) in the poorest areas. We check the robustness of these estimates using cause‐specific mortality. While privatization is associated with significant reductions in deaths from infectious and parasitic diseases, it is uncorrelated with deaths from causes unrelated to water conditions.
873 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors used data on the location of car thefts before and after a terrorist attack on the main Jewish center in the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina, in July 1994, and found a large deterrent effect of observable police presence on crime, with little or no appreciable impact outside the narrow area in which the police are deployed.
Abstract: An important challenge in the crime literature is to isolate causal effects of police on crime. Following a terrorist attack on the main Jewish center in the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina, in July 1994, all Jewish institutions (including schools, synagogues, and clubs) were given 24-hour police protection. Thus, this hideous event induced a geographical allocation of police forces that can be presumed to be exogenous in a crime regression. Using data on the location of car thefts before and after the terrorist attack, we find a large deterrent effect of observable police presence on crime. The effect is local, with little or no appreciable impact outside the narrow area in which the police are deployed.
614 citations
01 Jan 2015
447 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors studied the impact of a crackdown on corruption in the public hospitals of the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina, during 1996-97 and found that the wage elasticity of input prices exceeds.20.
Abstract: We study the prices paid for basic inputs during a crackdown on corruption in the public hospitals of the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina, during 1996–97. We find a well‐defined, negative effect on the measures used to capture corruption. Prices paid by hospitals for basic, homogeneous inputs decrease by 15 percent during the first 9 months of the crackdown. After this period prices increase, but they are still 10 percent lower than those prevailing before the crackdown. Relative to the precrackdown period, higher wages play no role in inducing lower input prices when audit intensity can be expected to be maximal (during the first phase of the crackdown) but have a negative and well‐defined effect when audit intensity takes intermediate levels (the last phase of the crackdown). Controlling for fixed effects, we find that the wage elasticity of input prices exceeds .20. These results are consistent with the standard model of bribes of Gary Becker and George Stigler.
380 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors exploit a natural experiment in the allocation of land titles, and find that entitled families substantially increased housing investment, reduced household size, and enhanced the education of their children relative to the control group.
379 citations
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TL;DR: The Commission on Social Determinants of Health (CSDH) as mentioned in this paper was created to marshal the evidence on what can be done to promote health equity and to foster a global movement to achieve it.
7,335 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce the concept of ''search'' where a buyer wanting to get a better price, is forced to question sellers, and deal with various aspects of finding the necessary information.
Abstract: The author systematically examines one of the important issues of information — establishing the market price. He introduces the concept of «search» — where a buyer wanting to get a better price, is forced to question sellers. The article deals with various aspects of finding the necessary information.
3,790 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the extent, nature, and economic costs of political rent provision in government banks and found that political firms borrow twice as much and have 50% higher default rates.
Abstract: Corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills, particularly in less developed economies. Using a loan-level data set of more than 90,000 firms that represents the universe of corporate lending in Pakistan between 1996 and 2002, we investigate rents to politically connected firms in banking. Classifying a firm as political if its director participates in an election, we examine the extent, nature, and economic costs of political rent provision. We find that political firms borrow twice as much and have 50% higher default rates. Such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks - private banks provide no political favors. Using firm fixed effects and exploiting variation across time or lenders, we show that the observed political preference is driven by the political status of the firm and not by any unobserved firm characteristic. The political rents thus identified increase with the strength of the firm's politician and whether he or his party is in power, and fall with the degree of electoral participation in his constituency. We provide direct evidence that rules out alternative explanations such as socially motivated lending by government banks to politicians. The economy wide costs of the rents identified are estimated to be 0.3% to 1.9% of GDP every year.
1,791 citations
TL;DR: The authors discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption: What is corruption, which countries are the most corrupt, what are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption, what is the magnitude of corruption, do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption, can competition reduce corruption and why have there been so few successful attempts to fight corruption?
Abstract: This paper will discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption: (1) What is corruption? (2) Which countries are the most corrupt? (3) What are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption? (4) What is the magnitude of corruption? (5) Do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption? (6) Can competition reduce corruption? (7) Why have there been so few (recent) successful attempts to fight corruption? (8) Does corruption adversely affect growth?
1,631 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the extent, nature, and economic costs of political rent provision in government banks and found that political firms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates than private banks.
Abstract: Corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills, particularly in less developed economies. Using a loan-level data set of more than 90,000 …rms that represents the universe of corporate lending in Pakistan between 1996 and 2002, we investigate rents to politically connected …rms in banking. Classifying a …rm as “political”if its director participates in an election, we examine the extent, nature, and economic costs of political rent provision. We …nd that political …rms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates. Such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks - private banks provide no
1,556 citations