Evelin Pärn-Lee

Bio: Evelin Pärn-Lee is an academic researcher from Tallinn University of Technology. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition (economics) & Oligopoly. The author has an hindex of 2, co-authored 4 publications receiving 13 citations.

Legal dilemmas of Estonian artificial intelligence strategy: in between of e-society and global race

Abstract: Estonia has successfully created a digital society within the past 2 decades. It is best known for its eGovernment achievements, but it is also home for four unicorn star-ups. While the state is aiming to attract tech investments with e-Residency program and has recently started to invest into protecting national IP and safeguarding data from cybercrime by applying blockchain technology and creating its “digital embassy” in Luxembourg, emerging technologies such as and applications of artificial intelligence but also internet of things have posed the question on legal regulation and standardization. The dilemma, however, seems to be that since the new technologies, such artificial intelligence is much more overwhelming phenomenon than e-governance and presumably, before deciding the legal standards, the political and economic strategies that go beyond the e-governance should be set.

Effect of National Decisions on Actions for Competition Damages in the CEE Countries

Abstract: One of the main objectives of the so-called Damages Directive (2014/104/EU) was to make antitrust enforcement more effective. Although in most EU countries private antitrust enforcement has been possible subject to general rules of civil law; the number of private antitrust litigations has remained relatively low. It is presumed that the complementary roles of public and private enforcement, as well as the synergy between them, will take effect if formal decisions taken during public enforcement will have binding effect with regard to follow-on private litigations. According to the Damages Directive, final national decisions on competition infringements shall have binding effect in follow-on litigations. What is to be understood under ‘binding effect’, and the potential effects thereof, has been subject to a lively debate among academics and practitioners. It has been questioned if decisions of an executive body can bind the judiciary, and if so, to what extent. What is the evidentiary value of a formal decision of a NCA regarding national courts, but also on the court of another Member State. The article deals with the main issues and arguments presented in the general debate on the binding effect of national competition law decisions, and provides a closer look on this topic with regard to specific CEE countries.

The Origins of Supranational State Aid Legislations: What Policymakers Must Know and Adhere to. The Case of Estonia

Abstract: As an independent country, Estonia can decide on how to promote its economy through state intervention, at least in theory. At the same time, Estonia has been a WTO member since 1999 and an EU Member State since 2004 and must adhere to these rules. Both regimes limit a Member State’s ability to interfere in the economy, setting forth rules on when a state can interfere with consequences if the rules are not met. But these rules differ, and the same situation can have a different result depending on the rules applied. Also, both sets of rules limit the competence of a member country to interfere in economy differently, for example, the WTO applies a rather lenient ex post control while in the EU a strict ex ante control by the Commission is used. Also the consequences for failing to adhere are different. Although one of the smallest EU Member States and represented by the Commission in WTO roundtables, it is still relevant for Estonia to have a position on globally applied state interference measures, and present and protect its views, if needed. To successfully promote its economy nationally and in the EU, Estonian policymakers, like those of any other country in the same position, must know not only the applicable state interference rules but also the underlying principles thereof. The article will provide a historical overview of the framework of the supranational state aid regimes of the WTO and the EU, as well as the domestic rules of Estonia. It is aimed at reflecting the principles behind the state aid rules that the domestic policymakers must consider when designing national state interference measures. The author applies classical research methods, namely, reading and interpretation of texts, but also comparing the WTO, EU and Estonian laws on state subsidies.

Efficiency and bid rigging in simultaneous procurement auctions under oligopoly

Abstract: Splitting of large procurements into several smaller ones has been propagated, for example in the European Union and OECD members, as a way for enhancing competition and improving institutional framework for market efficiency. This paper presents a conceptual argumentation on the causes and consequences of potential bid rigging when simultaneous bids for similar goods are asked from oligopolists. It appears that calling for similar bids simultaneously may incentivise collusion among bidders, while arranging several consecutive procurement auctions could lessen that problem. Moreover, simultaneous procurement auctions may result in a relatively high cost of supply due to the larger risks involved for bidders. Furthermore, bid rigging remains difficult to detect under simultaneous procurement auctions due to a large degree of uncertainty for bidders, which supports relatively high bid prices that may, in fact, be collusive.

Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game

Abstract: This paper proposes an estimation method for a repeated auction game under the presence of capacity contraints The estimation strategy is computationally simple as it does not require solving for the equilibrium of the game It uses a two stage approach In the first stage the distribution of bids conditional on state variables is estimated using data on bids, bidder characteristics and contract characteristics In the second stage, an expression of the expected sum of future profits based on the distribution of bids is obtained, and costs are inferred based on the first order condition of optimal bids We apply the estimation method to repeated highway construction procurement auctions in the state of California between May 1996 and May 1999 In this market, previously won uncompleted contracts reduce the probability of winning further contracts We quantify the effect of intertemporal constraints on bidders' costs and on bids Due to the intertemporal effect and also to bidder asymmetry, the auction can be inefficient Based on the estimates of costs, we quantify efficiency losses

Promotion and Harmonization of Antitrust Damages Claims by Directive EU/2014/104?

Abstract: Directive EU/2014/104 is the latest legal instrument that crystalizes the evolution of EU competition law enforcement. This paper assesses critically the features of the Directive and the challenges it poses for its implementation by Member States. The Directive codifies the case law of the EUCJ and it encroaches upon the autonomy of Member States in setting the institutions, remedies and procedures available for victims’ of antitrust infringements. Although the Directive provides a fragmented and incomplete set of rules that only partially harmonizes antitrust damages claims in the EU, and it’s slanted towards follow-on cartel damages claims, it has publicised the availability of damages claims, creating momentum that will transform how competition law is enforced in the future.

The GDPR Enforcement Fines at Glance

Abstract: The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into force in 2018. After this enforcement, many fines have already been imposed by national data protection authorities in Europe. This paper examines the individual GDPR articles referenced in the enforcement decisions, as well as predicts the amount of enforcement fines with available meta-data and text mining features extracted from the enforcement decision documents. According to the results, three articles related to the general principles, lawfulness, and information security have been the most frequently referenced ones. Although the amount of fines imposed vary across the articles referenced, these three particular articles do not stand out. Furthermore, a better statistical evidence is available with other meta-data features, including information about the particular European countries in which the enforcements were made. Accurate predictions are attainable even with simple machine learning techniques for regression analysis. Basic text mining features outperform the meta-data features in this regard. In addition to these results, the paper reflects the GDPR's enforcement against public administration obstacles in the European Union (EU), as well as discusses the use of automatic decision-making systems in judiciary.

Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private Antitrust Enforcement

Abstract: The conventional wisdom is that private antitrust enforcement lacks any value. Indeed, skepticism of private enforcement has been so great that its critics make contradictory claims. The first major line of criticism is that private enforcement achieves too little — it does not even minimally compensate the actual victims of antitrust violations and does not significantly deter those violations. A second line of criticism contends that private enforcement achieves too much — providing excessive compensation, often to the wrong parties, and producing overdeterrence. This article undertakes the first ever systematic evaluation of these claims. Building upon original empirical work and theoretical inquiry by the authors, and an assessment of the specific factual bases of the criticisms, the article demonstrates that private enforcement provides important and beneficial compensation and deterrence, although the level of both is likely suboptimal. Moreover, the article shows it is highly unlikely that private enforcement produces excessive compensation or deterrence. The article concludes that private enforcement should be strengthened and explores some implications of this conclusion.