In recent year, the Internet of Things (IoT) has drawn significant research attention. IoT is considered as a part of the Internet of the future and will comprise billions of intelligent communicating `things'. The future of the Internet will consist of heterogeneously connected devices that will further extend the borders of the world with physical entities and virtual components. The Internet of Things (IoT) will empower the connected things with new capabilities. In this survey, the definitions, architecture, fundamental technologies, and applications of IoT are systematically reviewed. Firstly, various definitions of IoT are introduced; secondly, emerging techniques for the implementation of IoT are discussed; thirdly, some open issues related to the IoT applications are explored; finally, the major challenges which need addressing by the research community and corresponding potential solutions are investigated.

The internet of things: a survey

Internet of Things (IoT) has provided a promising opportunity to build powerful industrial systems and applications by leveraging the growing ubiquity of radio-frequency identification (RFID), and wireless, mobile, and sensor devices. A wide range of industrial IoT applications have been developed and deployed in recent years. In an effort to understand the development of IoT in industries, this paper reviews the current research of IoT, key enabling technologies, major IoT applications in industries, and identifies research trends and challenges. A main contribution of this review paper is that it summarizes the current state-of-the-art IoT in industries systematically.

Internet of Things in Industries: A Survey

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Complex networks arise in a wide range of biological and sociotechnical systems. Epidemic spreading is central to our understanding of dynamical processes in complex networks, and is of interest to physicists, mathematicians, epidemiologists, and computer and social scientists. This review presents the main results and paradigmatic models in infectious disease modeling and generalized social contagion processes.

Epidemic processes in complex networks

The term ‘‘Internet-of-Things’’ is used as an umbrella keyword for covering various aspects related to the extension of the Internet and the Web into the physical realm, by means of the widespread deployment of spatially distributed devices with embedded identification, sensing and/or actuation capabilities. Internet-of-Things envisions a future in which digital and physical entities can be linked, by means of appropriate information and communication technologies, to enable a whole new class of applications and services. In this article, we present a survey of technologies, applications and research challenges for Internetof-Things.

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Internet of things: Vision, applications and research challenges

Internet of Things (IoT) is characterized, at the system level, by high diversity with respect to enabling technologies and supported services. IoT also assumes to deal with a huge amount of heterogeneous data generated by devices, transmitted by the underpinning infrastructure and processed to support value-added services. In order to provide users with valuable output, the IoT architecture should guarantee the suitability and trustworthiness of the processed data. This is a major requirement of such systems in order to guarantee robustness and reliability at the service level. In this paper, we introduce a novel IoT architecture able to support security, privacy and data quality guarantees, thereby effectively boosting the diffusion of IoT services.

http://www.dicom.uninsubria.it/~sabrina.sicari/public/documents/journal/2015_NOS.pdf

A security-and quality-aware system architecture for Internet of Things

Optimal monotone forwarding policies in delay tolerant mobile ad-hoc networks

We study in this paper fluid approximations for a class of monotone relay policies in delay tolerant ad-hoc networks. This class includes the epidemic routing and the two-hops routing protocols. We enhance the relay policies with a probabilistic forwarding feature where a message is forwarded to a relay with some probability p. We formulate an optimal control problem where a tradeoff between delay and energy consumption is captured and optimized. We compute both the optimal static value of p as well as the optimal time dependent value of p. We show that the time dependent problem is optimized by threshold type policies and we compute explicitly the value of the optimal threshold for some special cases of relay policies.

Delay tolerant Ad-hoc Networks make use of mobility of relay nodes to compensate for lack of permanent connectivity and thus enable communication between nodes that are out of range of each other. To decrease delivery delay, the information that needs to be delivered is replicated in the network. Our objective in this paper is to study replication mechanisms that include coding in order to improve the probability of successful delivery within a given time limit. We propose an analytical approach that allows to quantify tradeoffs between resources and performance measures (energy and delay). We study the effect of coding on the performance of the network while optimizing parameters that govern routing. Our results, based on fluid approximations, are compared to simulations which validate the model

Francesco De Pellegrini

Papers

Internet of things: Vision, applications and research challenges

A security-and quality-aware system architecture for Internet of Things

Optimal monotone forwarding policies in delay tolerant mobile ad-hoc networks

Optimal monotone forwarding policies in delay tolerant mobile ad-hoc networks

Forward Correction and Fountain codes in Delay Tolerant Networks