Francisco Marcos Fernández

Bio: Francisco Marcos Fernández is an academic researcher. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 12 citations.

Puede sancionarse a las Administraciones Públicas cuando no actúan como operador económico si restringen la competencia o promueven conductas anticompetitivas

Abstract: En ocasiones las conductas anticompetitivas de los operadores en el mercado vienen precedidas o acompanadas de intervenciones de los poderes publicos que las incitan, promueven o patrocinan. En otros casos las restricciones de la competencia se derivan directamente de una actuacion administrativa sin amparo legal que distorsiona el funcionamiento de los mercados. La praxis de las autoridades de defensa de la competencia en Espana en los ultimos anos ofrece varios ejemplos de algunos supuestos de este tipo, que tampoco son insolitos en otras jurisdicciones. Este trabajo pasa revista a la reciente casuistica espanola y analiza criticamente el tratamiento otorgado a estas intervenciones de las Administraciones Publicas por las autoridades de competencia espanolas.

Prevención y reacción frente a restricciones públicas injustificadas de la competencia por las autoridades antitrust españolas (Prevention and Reaction Against Unjustified Restraints to Competition by Spanish Antitrust Authorities)

Abstract: Spanish Abstract: Este articulo examina las actividades de promocion de la competencia de las autoridades de competencia espanolas frente a las barreras y restricciones publicas injustificadas a la libre competencia, distinguiendo entre actuaciones preventivas y reactivas. La actuacion preventiva se articula a traves de informes que buscan inspirar la regulacion y actuacion administrativa, persuadiendo a los poderes publicos para la adopcion de aquellas soluciones mas respetuosas con la libre competencia en los mercados. La actuacion reactiva se verifica una vez la regulacion o actuacion administrativa se ha materializado y es de caracter impugnatorio. Este mecanismo de intervencion ex post se ha visto reforzado en diciembre de 2013 con el reconocimiento a la Comision Nacional de los Mercados y de la Competencia de potestades adicionales de impugnacion de actuaciones y normas en la Ley de Garantia de la Unidad de Mercado. English Abstract: This article examines the activities of promotion and advocacy of the Spanish competition authorities in the face of unjustified public barriers and restrains to competition, distinguishing between preventive and reactive tools. The preventive measures are articulated through reports that seek to inspire regulation and administrative action, persuading the public authorities to adopt those solutions that are more respectful of free competition in the markets. The reactive action is verified once the regulation or administrative action has occurred through their challenge in court. This mechanism of intervention ex post has been reinforced in December 2013 with the recognition to the National Markets and Competition Commission of additional powers to challenge restrictive public measures in accordance to the Market Unit Guarantee Law (MUGL).

Revisiting the concept of undertaking from a public procurement law perspective: a discussion on EasyPay and finance engineering

Abstract: In EasyPay and Finance Engineering (C-185/14), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has revisited the concept of undertaking for the purposes of the application of EU competition law. It has clarified the test applicable to economic agents engaging in ‘mixed’ economic and non-economic activities. The EasyPay test determines that, in order not to be qualified as “economic” because of its links with another activity that fulfils an exclusively social function based on the principle of solidarity and entirely non-profit making, an activity must, by its nature, its aims and the rules to which it is subject, be inseparably connected to it. In the paper, we discuss how the CJEU has arguably given a stricter interpretation and adopted a less lenient approach to the severability or separation of activities than in previous cases like FENIN, Selex or Compass-Datenbank. In our view, this interpretation is anchored on a functional analysis of the concept of undertaking, and it is a welcome development that will have far reaching implications. Beyond that general discussion, the paper focuses on the potential implications of the EasyPay test in the area of public procurement and, in particular, for the activities of central purchasing bodies. We submit that EasyPay facilitates a revision of the current position regarding the direct applicability of EU competition law to entities carrying out public procurement activities and, in particular, central purchasing bodies. We also submit that this is highly desirable because it grants legal certainty to economic operators when dealing with a central purchasing body, to the effect that the purchasing activities will be under competition law and the derived constrains on the market behaviour of large public buyers that may abuse of their buyer power.

The chameleon state : EU law and the blurring of the private/public distinction in the market

Abstract: The rethinking of the traditional role of the State in the market has brought with it a variety of new forms of exercise of public power and an increased blurring of the private/public distinction in the market. It is now common, for example, for the State to intervene in the market not through the traditional mechanisms of regulation or public ownership but in a private legal form, as another market participant. In some instances it is the State that grants private operators the shield of a public legal form. There are also instances where the state imposes on private entities the pursuit of actions that it itself may not be legally authorised to undertake. In all these cases, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between private and public participation in the market and between the pursuit of traditional public goals and the pursuit of private interests whose protection the State deems in the public interest. This difficulty does not simply represent a conceptual challenge for the law. It also blurs the traditional distinction between the market and the State as alternative modes of decision-making subject to different mechanisms of accountability.

Ejercicio de la abogacía, pacto de "cuota litis" y defensa de la competencia: consideraciones en torno a la RTDC -Pleno- de 26 de septiembre de 2002

Abstract: espanolComentario a la resolucion del Pleno del TDC, de fecha 26 de septiembre de 2002, por la que se declara que la prohibicion del pacto de cuota litis en sentido estricto contenida el articulo 16 del Codigo Deontologico constituye una decision colectiva colusoria contraria al articulo 1 de la Ley 16/1989, de 17 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia, encaminada a fijar honorarios minimos a los abogados, e impide que los precios en este sector se pacten libremente entre abogado y cliente. Se concluye que esta practica, justificada plenamente desde un punto de vista historico y deontologico, y a la luz del peculiar estatuto al que estan sometidos los abogados, carece de la virtualidad restrictiva de la competencia que se le imputa, al tiempo que representa un instrumento util para reprimir determinadas conductas concurrenciales desleales y contrarias a la libre competencia en el sector. EnglishCommentary to resolution of the Plenary session of the Court of Defense of the Competition, date 26 of September of 2002 (expte.528/01) by that declares that prohibition of the pact of quota litis in strict sense contained article 16 of the Code of Conduct decision constitutes one collective colusoria opposite to article 1 of Law 16/1989, of 17 of July, Defense of the Competition, directed to fix minimum honoraria to the lawyers, and prevents that the prices in this sector freely agree to between lawyer and client. It concludes that this practice, justified totally from a historical and deontology point of view, and light of the statute and the peculiarities of profession of lawyer, lacks the restrictive potentiality of the competition that is imputed to him, to the time that represents an useful instrument to repress certain disloyal and opposite concurrenciales conducts to the free competition in the sector.