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Showing papers by "Francisco Marcos published in 2007"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The enforcement of antitrust laws in Spain has mainly been a task for public authorities as discussed by the authors, as sanctions for antitrust infringements can only be pecuniary, as prison or other criminal penalties are not used as a punishment device.
Abstract: The enforcement of antitrust laws in Spain has mainly been a task for public authorities. Sanctions for antitrust infringements can only be pecuniary, as prison or other criminal penalties are not used as a punishment device. Public enforcement of antitrust laws has, therefore, taken the form of fines imposed by the State administrative authorities in charge with the enforcement of Antitrust Laws. However, the competition authorities' policy in setting the amount of fines has been rather erratic, which has led to the annulment of some of its opinions by the judicial courts. On the other hand, private enforcement of antitrust laws through civil actions is neither frequent nor encouraged by Spanish regulation, being anecdotic those cases in which antitrust offences have led private persons to claim for damages through a civil action in court. The discussion in 2005 of a major reform of the Defence Competition Act of 1989 provides an excellent opportunity to reflect critically on the enforcement of antitrust laws in Spain, specifically dealing with two of the main problems which will need to be addressed in the reform: (a) how to "make the penalty fit the crime" setting a fine that optimally punishes each infringement; (b) whether and how private enforcement has to be encouraged.

3 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the determinants of public tomb prices in a sample of Spanish towns were studied empirically and strong evidence in favor that cemeteries act as local monopolies that use second degree price discrimination to maximize profits.
Abstract: We study empirically the determinants of public tomb prices in a sample of Spanish towns. We document strong evidence in favor that cemeteries act as local monopolies that use second degree price discrimination to maximize profits. Additionally we report that local cemetery prices react to competition from private cremation companies. This competition is associated with lower price dispersion caused by an increase in the minimum niche prices with no effect on other higher niche prices. We conclude that cemeteries have accommodated and facilitated entry of private cremation companies through an increase in those niche prices more likely to affect cremation demand.

2 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the transfer of Andean competition rules to the national system requires considerable effort to adapt them to national institutional background, and even afterwards some conflicts and interferences may arise.
Abstract: Ecuador and Bolivia have proved resilient to the establishment and the adoption of Competition Laws. Despite several drafts have been discussed in the last few years, to date no competition rules have been enacted. Notwithstanding, both are members of the Andean Community which have recently adopted new rules aimed at fighting anticompetitive practices at supranational level (2005). The competition rules of the Andean Community foresee the possibility that Ecuador and Bolivia apply them in their domestic settings until national competition laws are adopted. Although this provision is well-intended and it may help in overcoming the impasse in the processes leading to the adoption of national competition laws in both countries, this paper will argue it may have undesirable effects. Not only it may undermine the goals of RTA competition rules, but also may worsen the prospective of domestic competition rules being adopted. Besides, the transfer of Andean rules to the national system requires considerable effort to adapt them to national institutional background, and even afterwards some conflicts and interferences may arise.

1 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a set of principles for benchmarking potentially alternative systems of private copy compensation is proposed, and a brief analysis of the main modifications and alternatives to the current system in light of the above-mentioned principles.
Abstract: Private copying is one of the few exceptions to the exclusiveness on their works granted to creators by Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Such an exception diminishes the value of IPR-protected works, so IPR regulations need to establish devices by virtue of which creators get compensated for the private copying of their works. The most common device – at least in the EU - consists of charges imposed upon the sale of devices and carriers that are used by consumers in their private copying activities (i.e. the so-called copyright levies). Such system has been strongly criticised, and some alternatives have been proposed and are strongly supported by some constituencies. Legislators seem to be open to amending or substituting the current system, but they face a lack of the analytical tools required to compare the potentially alternative systems.Current theory provides no clear framework for the analysis of the current system and its potential modifications and/or alternatives. Building upon more general incentive economics theory and on general legal considerations, this paper attempts to build such analytical framework by proposing a set of principles for benchmarking potentially alternative systems of private copy compensation. The paper also offers a brief analysis of the main modifications and alternatives to the current system in light of the above-mentioned principles. The main finding is that, according to the proposed principles, the current system “as is” gets the best appraisal.