scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Author

Francisco Marcos

Other affiliations: Autonomous University of Madrid
Bio: Francisco Marcos is an academic researcher from IE University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition law & Competition (economics). The author has an hindex of 9, co-authored 55 publications receiving 333 citations. Previous affiliations of Francisco Marcos include Autonomous University of Madrid.


Papers
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the legal measures adopted to implement Directive 2014/104/EU into Spanish law and examine the process followed for the transposition and the issues discussed before the adoption of the Transposition Decree in May 2017.
Abstract: This paper analyses the legal measures adopted to implement Directive 2014/104/EU into Spanish law. After briefly looking at the context of private enforcement of competition law in Spain, it examines the process followed for the transposition and the issues discussed before the adoption of the Transposition Decree in May 2017. Overall, it can be affirmed that the new rules comply with the mandates of the Directive, only in a few matters there seems that there will be doubts concerning the interpretation of the new provisions. Some of the doubts may be rooted in the Directive itself (relative responsibility of co-infringers, umbrella claimants, harm to suppliers), and others in the lack of express rules in the Transposition Decree on some matters (causation, fault requirement, interests calculation), moreover it is uncertain how the new procedural tools will play out in practice as they imply a revolutionary change in our procedural rules.

50 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the interface and coordination of securities regulation of tender offers, merger review proceedings set up by competition law and any other bodies of sectoral regulation potentially applicable to a given transaction is a key issue in governing modern markets.
Abstract: The interface and coordination of securities regulation of tender offers, merger review proceedings set up by competition law and any other bodies of sectoral regulation potentially applicable to a given transaction is a key issue in governing modern markets. Indeed, Securities Regulation, Competition Law and Regulation impose mandatory conditions and bureaucratic procedures on mergers and acquisitions - which are inspired in different objectives and with disparate aims - that may delay the execution of these transactions and, in some cases, even lead to the introduction of substantial changes in their terms. In comparison with the pre-existing legal rules, as this paper analyzes in detail, the new regulation of merger review and tender offer proceedings - both of 2007 - make compatible the satisfaction of private business interests with the adequate protection of investors' interests and the public interest in maintaining effective competition in the market, as well as the diverse objectives sought by other regulations, sensibly reducing the delays in tender offers that may distort the working of securities markets. However, several doubts and some problematic issues remain in the overlap of these different regulatory bodies (securities/competition/regulation) that require further reflections, which constitute the focus of the present article.

30 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors assess the features of the Directive and the challenges it poses for its implementation by Member States, and assess the impact of this Directive on the enforcement of competition law.
Abstract: Directive EU/2014/104 is the latest legal instrument that crystalizes the evolution of EU competition law enforcement. This paper assesses critically the features of the Directive and the challenges it poses for its implementation by Member States. The Directive codifies the case law of the EUCJ and it encroaches upon the autonomy of Member States in setting the institutions, remedies and procedures available for victims’ of antitrust infringements. Although the Directive provides a fragmented and incomplete set of rules that only partially harmonizes antitrust damages claims in the EU, and it’s slanted towards follow-on cartel damages claims, it has publicised the availability of damages claims, creating momentum that will transform how competition law is enforced in the future.

21 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyse the need and adequacy of the proposed harmonization of Tort Law and Civil Procedure regulations and question whether the efforts of the European Commission for the harmonisation of antitrust damages actions constitutes a backdoor harmonisation with much broader implications and effects in fields of Law other than antitrust.
Abstract: Tort Law is not harmonised at a European level. Substantive and procedural regulations vary substantially across EU Member States in most of the facets and dimensions of damages actions. These differences derive, amongst other causes, from different legal traditions. However, significant efforts are being made in order to find common ground for the approximation or even harmonisation of these laws across the EU - building on the Principles of European Tort Law and other projects, such as the European Code of Civil Procedure. However, harmonisation of Tort Law and the corresponding Civil Procedure regulations is still open to debate and the process is envisaged to take a significant delay before any formal legal instruments are approved. Such regulatory diversity is inevitably reflected in the field of antitrust private enforcement-based on claims for harm inflicted as a result of the anticompetitive behaviour, which the European Commission is trying to encourage and promote as a key element of the modernisation process of the EC antitrust rules undertaken in 2003. In this regard, a Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules was published in December 2005 with the purpose of opening up a reform process that could facilitate private damages actions across the EU. Most remarkably, the Green Paper put forward most of the divergences in national Tort Law and Civil Procedure regulations that jeopardize the effectiveness of a privately enforced competition system. These differences in national regulations contrast with the nearly-full de facto harmonisation existing in antitrust law and its public enforcement. Consequently, the Commission proposed harmonisation alternatives that imply deep reforms in national Tort Law and Civil Procedure regulations. Those proposals are to be developed and further analysed in a forthcoming White Paper - foreseen to be adopted around the turn of the year 2007. At this stage, and before the Commission puts forward new harmonisation proposals, this paper analyses its need and adequacy and wonders whether the efforts of the Commission for the harmonisation of antitrust damages actions constitutes a backdoor harmonisation of fundamental aspects of Tort Law and Civil Procedure with much broader implications and effects in fields of Law other than antitrust.

18 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the activities of promotion and advocacy of the Spanish competition authorities in the face of unjustified public barriers and restrains to competition, distinguishing between preventive and reactive tools, arguing that preventive measures are articulated through reports that seek to inspire regulation and administrative action, persuading the public authorities to adopt those solutions that are more respectful of free competition in the markets.
Abstract: Spanish Abstract: Este articulo examina las actividades de promocion de la competencia de las autoridades de competencia espanolas frente a las barreras y restricciones publicas injustificadas a la libre competencia, distinguiendo entre actuaciones preventivas y reactivas. La actuacion preventiva se articula a traves de informes que buscan inspirar la regulacion y actuacion administrativa, persuadiendo a los poderes publicos para la adopcion de aquellas soluciones mas respetuosas con la libre competencia en los mercados. La actuacion reactiva se verifica una vez la regulacion o actuacion administrativa se ha materializado y es de caracter impugnatorio. Este mecanismo de intervencion ex post se ha visto reforzado en diciembre de 2013 con el reconocimiento a la Comision Nacional de los Mercados y de la Competencia de potestades adicionales de impugnacion de actuaciones y normas en la Ley de Garantia de la Unidad de Mercado. English Abstract: This article examines the activities of promotion and advocacy of the Spanish competition authorities in the face of unjustified public barriers and restrains to competition, distinguishing between preventive and reactive tools. The preventive measures are articulated through reports that seek to inspire regulation and administrative action, persuading the public authorities to adopt those solutions that are more respectful of free competition in the markets. The reactive action is verified once the regulation or administrative action has occurred through their challenge in court. This mechanism of intervention ex post has been reinforced in December 2013 with the recognition to the National Markets and Competition Commission of additional powers to challenge restrictive public measures in accordance to the Market Unit Guarantee Law (MUGL).

16 citations


Cited by
More filters
Journal Article
TL;DR: The Sherman Act (1890) prohibits conspiracies to create monopolies and anticompetitive conduct, and the Clayton Act (1914) regulates mergers (Hylton) as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Antitrust law consists primarily of three federal laws: The Sherman Act (1890) prohibits conspiracies to create monopolies and anticompetitive conduct. The Clayton Act (1914) regulates mergers (Hylton). The Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) created the Federal Trade Commission and regulates advertising and other interstate competition (DOJ). Cases related to these laws are either decided using the “reasonable rule” which requires the plaintiff prove that defendants’ actions created an “unreasonable” restriction of competition in the market; or by the per se rule which infers the conduct and intent of the defendant based on their actions’ result (Hovenkamp).

130 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1981
TL;DR: In 2014, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a final rule on continued at-reactor storage of spent nuclear fuel and terminated a two-year suspension of final licensing actions for new nuclear power plants and license renewals of existing plants as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: On August 26, 2014, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a final rule on continued at-reactor storage of spent nuclear fuel and terminated a two-year suspension of final licensing actions for new nuclear power plants and license renewals of existing plants. The 2014 “Continued Storage” rule is good news for opponents of Yucca Mountain. First, the NRC determination that spent nuclear fuel can be safely managed in dry casks for up to 160 years eliminates the argument that the successful licensing of Yucca Mountain is required to assure the continued licensing of nuclear reactors. The future of Yucca Mountain and the future of nuclear power are now separate. Second, the NRC environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared in support of the Continued Storage Rule defines the “no action” alternative required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in a manner that negates the key “no action” alternative in the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) 2008 Supplemental EIS for Yucca Mountain, which was submitted to NRC as part of the license application. DOE’s conclusion that constructing and operating a repository at Yucca Mountain is the preferred alternative under NEPA is no longer supported by DOE’s and NRC’s own NEPA analyses. This paper reviews the developments that led up to the NRC’s new “Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel” Rule, beginning with the adoption in 1980 of the former “Waste Confidence Rule”.

115 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Market System as mentioned in this paper is an excellent guide to thinking about the advantages and disadvantages of a market economy, and it is a good place to start a course on the normative dimensions of market society.
Abstract: Charles Lindblom has long been one of the country’s most interesting political theorists writing about the economy. In The Market System, he offers the general reader an excellent guide to thinking about the advantages and disadvantages of a market economy. Half of the book is devoted to an analysis of the market as a social institution. Lindblom’s account of the nuts and bolts of the system is fi rst-rate. He insists that we should think of the market as a mechanism for coordinating human behavior, much like a system of authority or a voting process. What is distinctive about the market is that it coordinates our activities through a process of “mutual adjustment.” There is no central authority here: each individual decides for himself how to respond to what other people are doing given the moves available to him under the rules. The image makes vivid to the reader one of the most attractive features of the market, namely the way that it simplifi es the enormously complex task of social coordination by decentralizing the decision-making process. The other half of the book is devoted to assessing the market in terms of values such as effi ciency, freedom, culture and democracy. Lindblom is at his best on democracy. He argues that the market does poorly in terms of both popular control over economic elites (e.g. bankers, fi nanciers and corporate executives) and popular control over political elites. One of the main problems lies in the fact that corporations participate in the political process as though they were ordinary citizens. His discussion of allocative effi ciency, on the other hand, could have been better. It never quite makes clear to the reader that the market generates outcomes that are “effi cient” in a sense that is much weaker than we normally associate with the idea of effi ciency. Overall, though, this book provides an excellent survey of the issues as well as some penetrating insights from Lindblom’s unique perspective. It would serve well as a companion piece to any general course on the normative dimensions of market society.

70 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain this article is a history book about the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath, which is based on the idea of the return of civil society.
Abstract: (1994). The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain. History: Reviews of New Books: Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 72-73.

70 citations