/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

Antitrust law consists primarily of three federal laws: The Sherman Act (1890) prohibits conspiracies to create monopolies and anticompetitive conduct. The Clayton Act (1914) regulates mergers (Hylton). The Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) created the Federal Trade Commission and regulates advertising and other interstate competition (DOJ). Cases related to these laws are either decided using the “reasonable rule” which requires the plaintiff prove that defendants’ actions created an “unreasonable” restriction of competition in the market; or by the per se rule which infers the conduct and intent of the defendant based on their actions’ result (Hovenkamp).

I. Antitrust Law

On August 26, 2014, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a final rule on continued at-reactor storage of spent nuclear fuel and terminated a two-year suspension of final licensing actions for new nuclear power plants and license renewals of existing plants. The 2014 “Continued Storage” rule is good news for opponents of Yucca Mountain. First, the NRC determination that spent nuclear fuel can be safely managed in dry casks for up to 160 years eliminates the argument that the successful licensing of Yucca Mountain is required to assure the continued licensing of nuclear reactors. The future of Yucca Mountain and the future of nuclear power are now separate. Second, the NRC environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared in support of the Continued Storage Rule defines the “no action” alternative required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in a manner that negates the key “no action” alternative in the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) 2008 Supplemental EIS for Yucca Mountain, which was submitted to NRC as part of the license application. DOE’s conclusion that constructing and operating a repository at Yucca Mountain is the preferred alternative under NEPA is no longer supported by DOE’s and NRC’s own NEPA analyses. This paper reviews the developments that led up to the NRC’s new “Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel” Rule, beginning with the adoption in 1980 of the former “Waste Confidence Rule”.

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Report and Recommendations

Charles Lindblom has long been one of the country’s most interesting political theorists writing about the economy. In The Market System, he offers the general reader an excellent guide to thinking about the advantages and disadvantages of a market economy. Half of the book is devoted to an analysis of the market as a social institution. Lindblom’s account of the nuts and bolts of the system is fi rst-rate. He insists that we should think of the market as a mechanism for coordinating human behavior, much like a system of authority or a voting process. What is distinctive about the market is that it coordinates our activities through a process of “mutual adjustment.” There is no central authority here: each individual decides for himself how to respond to what other people are doing given the moves available to him under the rules. The image makes vivid to the reader one of the most attractive features of the market, namely the way that it simplifi es the enormously complex task of social coordination by decentralizing the decision-making process. The other half of the book is devoted to assessing the market in terms of values such as effi ciency, freedom, culture and democracy. Lindblom is at his best on democracy. He argues that the market does poorly in terms of both popular control over economic elites (e.g. bankers, fi nanciers and corporate executives) and popular control over political elites. One of the main problems lies in the fact that corporations participate in the political process as though they were ordinary citizens. His discussion of allocative effi ciency, on the other hand, could have been better. It never quite makes clear to the reader that the market generates outcomes that are “effi cient” in a sense that is much weaker than we normally associate with the idea of effi ciency. Overall, though, this book provides an excellent survey of the issues as well as some penetrating insights from Lindblom’s unique perspective. It would serve well as a companion piece to any general course on the normative dimensions of market society.

The Market System: What It Is, How It Works, and What to Make of It

(1994). The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain. History: Reviews of New Books: Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 72-73.

The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain

English Abstractt The publication on June 30, 2020 of the Decision sanctioning Scania concerning its participation in the trucks’ manufacturers collusion -that was adopted by the European Commission three years ago (9/27/2017)- is the axis around which this article is built. Firstly, it analyzes the main features of the Decision that differentiate it from the Transactional Decision on the truck cartel published on 6/4/2017, comparing it with other “hybrid” decisions. Secondly, given that it is three times longer than Transactional Decision adopted on the same case, the novelties in its content on the analysis of the market and the truck manufacturers’ collusion and their possible impact on the market are examined.


Spanish Abstract La publicacion el pasado 30 de junio de 2020 de la Decision sancionadora de Scania sobre su participacion en la colusion de los fabricantes de camiones -adoptada por la Comision europea hace ya tres anos (el 27/9/2017)- es el eje en torno al cual se construye este articulo. En primer lugar, se analizan las caracteristicas de la Decision que la diferencian de la Decision transaccional sobre el cartel de los camiones publicada el 6/4/2017 y tambien en comparacion con otras decisiones “hibridas”. En segundo lugar, dado que es tres veces mas extensa que la Decision transaccional adoptada sobre el mismo asunto, se examinan las novedades en su contenido sobre el analisis del mercado y de la colusion de los fabricantes de camiones y su posible impacto en el mercado)

The Scania Decision on the Truck Manufacturers’ Cartel LA DECISIÓN SCANIA SOBRE EL CÁRTEL DE LOS FABRICANTES DE CAMIONES)

Private copying is one of the few exceptions to the exclusiveness on their works granted to creators by Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Such an exception diminishes the value of IPR-protected works, so IPR regulations need to establish devices by virtue of which creators get compensated for the private copying of their works. The most common device – at least in the EU - consists of charges imposed upon the sale of devices and carriers that are used by consumers in their private copying activities (i.e. the so-called copyright levies). Such system has been strongly criticised, and some alternatives have been proposed and are strongly supported by some constituencies. Legislators seem to be open to amending or substituting the current system, but they face a lack of the analytical tools required to compare the potentially alternative systems.Current theory provides no clear framework for the analysis of the current system and its potential modifications and/or alternatives. Building upon more general incentive economics theory and on general legal considerations, this paper attempts to build such analytical framework by proposing a set of principles for benchmarking potentially alternative systems of private copy compensation. The paper also offers a brief analysis of the main modifications and alternatives to the current system in light of the above-mentioned principles. The main finding is that, according to the proposed principles, the current system “as is” gets the best appraisal.

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Principles for Benchmarking Potentially Alternative Systems of Private Copy Compensation

Antitrust Damages in Portugal and Spain

This article makes an original contribution to the literature on the developing area of private enforcement of EU competition law. It delivers a significant, rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the transposition across a broad selection of Member States (MS) of a major EU Directive introduced with the aim of harmonizing and facilitating competition law damages actions across the EU. It looks at the implementation of the Directive 2014/104/EU in sixteen MS. It analyses the solutions followed by each of those MS in addressing the various issues raised by the Directive (liability and compensation, joint liability, statute of limitations, quantification of harm, passing-on defence and indirect purchasers claims, access to evidence and collective redress).

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A panacea for competition law damages actions in the EU? A comparative view of the implementation of the EU Antitrust Damages Directive in sixteen Member States:

Spanish abstract:Las acciones consecutivas para la compensacion del dano causado por carteles representan el transito de la infraccion de la prohibicion de carteles (declarada por las autoridades de competencia) a la indemnizacion de los perjuicios provocados por la conducta de los infractores. Corresponde al perjudicado que interpone la accion indemnizatoria la prueba del dano y su conexion causal con la conducta antijuridica declarada por la autoridad de competencia. Frecuentemente, la constatacion e identificacion del dano sufrido se subsumira en la cuantificacion del mismo que figure en las pruebas aportadas por el demandante. Aun asi, puede ocurrir que esa prueba no resulte convincente al tribunal, con lo que cualquier decision debera ir precedida de la identificacion del posible dano provocado por el cartel. 
La decision previa de la autoridad de competencia no suele declarar ni acreditar los efectos del cartel en el mercado, aunque en la misma pueden contenerse pruebas o indicios de la produccion de danos. En todo caso, la eventual presuncion (judicial o legal) del dano es una presuncion que el demandado puede rebatir. Aunque los carteles que no provocan dano sean excepcionales, son una posibilidad, y debe reconocerse a las empresas participes en los carteles el derecho a probar el sobrecoste cero. De modo que, cuando la existencia del dano no se extraiga de la decision de la autoridad de competencia (como ocurria, por ejemplo, en el cartel del azucar o en el cartel de los sobres de papel), la salvaguarda del derecho de defensa exige permitir al demandado la prueba de la ausencia de sobrecoste, basandose en datos objetivos y de mercado (que no esten afectados por la infraccion). 


English abstract: Follow-on actions for cartel damages compensation represent the transition from the infringement of the cartel prohibition (declared by the competition authorities) to the compensation of damages caused by the infringers' conduct. It is up to the injured party bringing the damages claim to prove the harm and its causal connection with the unlawful conduct declared by the competition authority. Frequently, the ascertainment and identification of the harm suffered will be subsumed in the quantification of the damage that appears in the evidence provided by the plaintiff. Even so, as such evidence may not be convincing to the court, its decision will have to be preceded by the identification of the possible harm caused by the cartel. The competition authority's prior decision does not usually state or prove the cartel effects on the market, although it may contain evidence or indicia of harm. In any case, the (judicial or legal) presumption of harm can be rebutted by the defendant. Although cartels that do not cause harm are exceptional, they exist, and cartelized firms have the right to prove zero overcharge. So, where the existence of harm is not drawn from the competition authority's decision (as it was the case, for example, in the sugar cartel or the paper envelopes cartel), safeguarding the defense rights of cartelized firms requires that they are allowed to prove the absence of overcharge, based on objective and market data (not affected by the infringement).

IDENTIFICACIÓN DEL PERJUICIO INDEMNIZABLE EN ACCIONES CONSECUTIVAS (FOLLOW-ON) EN CASO DE CÁRTELES: DE LA INFRACCIÓN (Y SANCIÓN) A LA COMPENSACIÓN DEL DAÑO (Identifying the Compensable Harm in Cartel Follow-On Actions: From Infringement (and Penalty) to Damages Compensation)

Francisco Marcos

Papers

The Scania Decision on the Truck Manufacturers’ Cartel LA DECISIÓN SCANIA SOBRE EL CÁRTEL DE LOS FABRICANTES DE CAMIONES)

Principles for Benchmarking Potentially Alternative Systems of Private Copy Compensation

Antitrust Damages in Portugal and Spain

A panacea for competition law damages actions in the EU? A comparative view of the implementation of the EU Antitrust Damages Directive in sixteen Member States:

IDENTIFICACIÓN DEL PERJUICIO INDEMNIZABLE EN ACCIONES CONSECUTIVAS (FOLLOW-ON) EN CASO DE CÁRTELES: DE LA INFRACCIÓN (Y SANCIÓN) A LA COMPENSACIÓN DEL DAÑO (Identifying the Compensable Harm in Cartel Follow-On Actions: From Infringement (and Penalty) to Damages Compensation)