Francisco Marcos

Bio: Francisco Marcos is an academic researcher from IE University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition law & Competition (economics). The author has an hindex of 9, co-authored 55 publications receiving 333 citations. Previous affiliations of Francisco Marcos include Autonomous University of Madrid.

Is the U.S. Supreme Court Giving a New Shape to Antitrust Law? (in Spanish)

Abstract: This brief note reviews the judgments on antitrust law delivered by the U.S. Supreme Court in the last two years and provides a concise reference to the issues examined in each of them. It also gives a general overview of the effects that they may have in the stare decisis doctrine and in antitrust law practice.

Innovation by dominant firms in the market: damned if you don’t … but damned if you do?

Abstract: Innovation is key for dynamic efficiency and one of the best recipes to increase long-term businesses’ profits and, at the same time, enhance consumer welfare. Modern high-technology markets offer a perfect account of the importance of innovation for business success: either firms keep apace innovating, or rivals will overcome them and they will be left aside by consumers. History shows many examples of firms that have failed to sustain the innovation game and have faded away. At the same time it also demonstrates how many successful businesses have gained a powerful position in the market in a very short period of time by offering good innovative products or services to consumers at competitive prices. Nevertheless, by being successful, firms sometimes have attained a dominant position in the market and that may have meaningful implications from the perspective of antitrust or competition law. In that situation, the experience in many countries shows that innovation decisions by dominant market players can be second-guessed by competition authorities in search for anticompetitive behavior. This paper will assess the limits and dangers competition law enforcers face in their investigations and sanctioning antitrust proceedings in the assessment of anticompetitive unilateral conduct by innovating firms.

Los Contratos De Adquisición De Empresas En España 2013-2014 (An Empirical Study of M&A Contracts in Spain (2013-2014))

Abstract: Spanish Abstract:A partir de una encuesta realizada entre marzo y julio de 2015 a mas de cien companias espanolas participes en las operaciones de compraventa de empresas este trabajo examina la realidad de diversas clausulas utilizadas por los operadores en esos contratos en cuestiones varias (relativas al precio, la responsabilidad del vendedor, la proteccion del comprador y la resolucion de conflictos). El estudio busca proporcionar sustento empirico a las reflexiones juridicas de caracter teorico que existen sobre el particular en nuestro pais, emulando analisis empiricos similares realizados en otras jurisdicciones.La encuesta se realizo a los directivos encargados de la negociacion de los contratos de 113 companias espanolas, obteniendose 43 respuestas validas. Las contestaciones comprenden 278 operaciones de compraventa de empresas celebradas entre 2013 y 2014. Los resultados y el analisis posterior permiten constatar la influencia angloamericana en la redaccion de los contratos sobre estas transacciones, de manera que la praxis no se aleja de la seguida en otros paises europeos y en los Estados Unidos. Aun asi, existen algunas divergencias notables sobre el grado o el nivel de utilizacion de determinadas clausulas, asi como diferencias significativas en las pautas de contratacion seguidas por las empresas de capital privado en ciertas materias.English Abstract: Based on a survey conducted between March and July 2015 to more than a hundred Spanish companies active in the Spanish MA therefore, Spanish practice does not differ much from that followed in other European countries and in the United States. Still, there are some relevant differences concerning the frequency of use frequency of some clauses, as well as meaningful divergences in the contractual patterns followed by private equity firms on certain issues.

A Vueltas con la ‘Unidad Demercado Nacional’ (Dancing with the National Market Unity Principle in Spain)

Abstract: The market unity principle is an amphibological creation of the Constitutional Court to strengthen the prohibition of certain exorbitant interventions by the regions. This paper criticizes the existence and use of such an euphemistic reinforcement, which contradicts the latent preference for autonomy and decentralization. The reference to "domestic unit" is meaningless it is not part of the concept (and reality) of markets considered as the economic crossroad of supply and demand for goods and services. The characteristics of demand and offer and the exchanged goods and services will determine the configuration and structure of each market, so that, strictly speaking, is impossible to refer to in generic terms, a single national market.

Measuring Regulatory Intensity by the Spanish Regions (1978-2009)

Abstract: This paper constructs several objective indicators of regulatory intensity in the context of the Spanish decentralization since 1978. Our aim is to develop a quantitative measure of the levels of regulatory intensity set by different regions in Spain. The dynamic nature of the decentralization process requires that we take into account the initial institutional framework for decentralization and the successive transfers of powers to the regions. As a result, we obtain a series of variables that measure regulatory intensity across Spanish regions in the period 1978-2009.

I. Antitrust Law

Abstract: Antitrust law consists primarily of three federal laws: The Sherman Act (1890) prohibits conspiracies to create monopolies and anticompetitive conduct. The Clayton Act (1914) regulates mergers (Hylton). The Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) created the Federal Trade Commission and regulates advertising and other interstate competition (DOJ). Cases related to these laws are either decided using the “reasonable rule” which requires the plaintiff prove that defendants’ actions created an “unreasonable” restriction of competition in the market; or by the per se rule which infers the conduct and intent of the defendant based on their actions’ result (Hovenkamp).

Report and Recommendations

Abstract: On August 26, 2014, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a final rule on continued at-reactor storage of spent nuclear fuel and terminated a two-year suspension of final licensing actions for new nuclear power plants and license renewals of existing plants. The 2014 “Continued Storage” rule is good news for opponents of Yucca Mountain. First, the NRC determination that spent nuclear fuel can be safely managed in dry casks for up to 160 years eliminates the argument that the successful licensing of Yucca Mountain is required to assure the continued licensing of nuclear reactors. The future of Yucca Mountain and the future of nuclear power are now separate. Second, the NRC environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared in support of the Continued Storage Rule defines the “no action” alternative required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in a manner that negates the key “no action” alternative in the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) 2008 Supplemental EIS for Yucca Mountain, which was submitted to NRC as part of the license application. DOE’s conclusion that constructing and operating a repository at Yucca Mountain is the preferred alternative under NEPA is no longer supported by DOE’s and NRC’s own NEPA analyses. This paper reviews the developments that led up to the NRC’s new “Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel” Rule, beginning with the adoption in 1980 of the former “Waste Confidence Rule”.

The Market System: What It Is, How It Works, and What to Make of It

Abstract: Charles Lindblom has long been one of the country’s most interesting political theorists writing about the economy. In The Market System, he offers the general reader an excellent guide to thinking about the advantages and disadvantages of a market economy. Half of the book is devoted to an analysis of the market as a social institution. Lindblom’s account of the nuts and bolts of the system is fi rst-rate. He insists that we should think of the market as a mechanism for coordinating human behavior, much like a system of authority or a voting process. What is distinctive about the market is that it coordinates our activities through a process of “mutual adjustment.” There is no central authority here: each individual decides for himself how to respond to what other people are doing given the moves available to him under the rules. The image makes vivid to the reader one of the most attractive features of the market, namely the way that it simplifi es the enormously complex task of social coordination by decentralizing the decision-making process. The other half of the book is devoted to assessing the market in terms of values such as effi ciency, freedom, culture and democracy. Lindblom is at his best on democracy. He argues that the market does poorly in terms of both popular control over economic elites (e.g. bankers, fi nanciers and corporate executives) and popular control over political elites. One of the main problems lies in the fact that corporations participate in the political process as though they were ordinary citizens. His discussion of allocative effi ciency, on the other hand, could have been better. It never quite makes clear to the reader that the market generates outcomes that are “effi cient” in a sense that is much weaker than we normally associate with the idea of effi ciency. Overall, though, this book provides an excellent survey of the issues as well as some penetrating insights from Lindblom’s unique perspective. It would serve well as a companion piece to any general course on the normative dimensions of market society.

The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain

Abstract: (1994). The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain. History: Reviews of New Books: Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 72-73.