Francisco Marcos

Bio: Francisco Marcos is an academic researcher from IE University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition law & Competition (economics). The author has an hindex of 9, co-authored 55 publications receiving 333 citations. Previous affiliations of Francisco Marcos include Autonomous University of Madrid.

Competencias autonómicas en los procesos de concentración de empresas

Abstract: Resumen /Abstract La descentralizacion de la aplicacion de la legislacion de competencia en Espana ha conducido a la creacion por las CCAA de autoridades administrativas encargadas de ese cometido. En la actualidad la mayoria de procedimientos sancionadores incoados s se ventilan ante ellas, que desempenan otras funciones consultivas y de promocion de la competencia. En materia de control concentraciones de empresas solo se contempla una limitada intervencion autonomica en aquellas operaciones que tengan una incidencia significativa en su territorio. El recurso de inconstitucionalidad de Canarias contra la LDC por la limitacion de las competencias autonomicas en esta materia (2008) y la STC 31/2010, de 28 de junio (sobre el estatuto de autonomia de Cataluna), permiten considerar la posibilidad de que en el futuro exista un control autonomico de las concentraciones empresariales. Este trabajo examina esa cuestion y las implicaciones que podrian tener las eventuales potestades autonomicas en materia de control de concentraciones.

The Single National Market as a Constitutional Principle in Spain: Market Fragmentation through Autonomous Regions' Rules and Decisions (in Spanish)

Abstract: When the 1978 Constitution opted for a market economy system as the principal mechanism for distributing goods and services it included other relevant declarations which seemed to imply that the Spanish market was to be a single one.The principle of a single market is a Constitutional Court doctrine against a possible decentralization of government policies as this could lead to the national economic order fragmenting into various markets. This study analyses the implications to be drawn from this principle, assessing its efficacy as a brake on autonomous laws which distort business activity in the national market.

european review of private law

Abstract: The past decade has shown a rapid development of the markets for digital content. The further development of these markets, however, may be hindered because of the lack of a functioning legal framework to deal with digital content contracts. In this article, it is argued that the future Optional Instrument should contain rules governing digital content contracts. Moreover, suggestions are made as to the content of such rules. Resume: La derniere decennie a connu un developpement rapide des marches des contenus numeriques. La poursuite du developpement de ces marches peut cependant etre entravee en raison de l’absence d’un cadre juridique qui fonctionne pour faire face a des contrats de contenu numerique. Dans ce papier, il est soutenu que le futur Instrument Optionnel devrait contenir des regles regissant les contrats de contenu numerique. Par ailleurs, des suggestions sont faites quant a la teneur de ces regles. Zusammenfassung: Das letzte Jahrzehnt sah eine sturmische Entwicklung der Markte fur digitale Inhalte. Das Fehlen eines angemessenen rechtlichen Rahmens fur Vertrage uber digitale Inhalte konnte allerdings den Fortschritt und die weitere Entwicklung dieser Markte erheblich beeintrachtigen. Dieser Artikel argumentiert, dass das zukunftige Optionale Instrument auch Regeln fur Vertrage uber digitale Inhalte beinhalten sollte, und machte konkrete Vorschlage, wie solche Regeln aussehen konnten.

Privatizing Higher Education in Spain

Abstract: The Spanish university system has witnessed many changes in the last thirty years. Initial conditions for competition were laid down in 1983, specially through the recognition of legal status to private universities. However, the shortage of students since 1998 and the drop on demand for higher education (aggravated by the extraordinary increase in offer, as the number of universities more than doubled since 1982) has prompted further reform in the last few years. A new regulation was enacted in 2001 in order to force market-like behavior and to privatize some operating conditions of state universities(free choice of university by students, hiring policies, quality assessment and accountability to the public, allocation of research funds and rankings). Although it might be too early to assess the effectiveness of these changes, public funding remains mostly unchanged and this is a key issue that would need to be modified in order to provide conditions of authentic competition in the higher education industry. Although the market has been introduced in the provision of higher education in Spain, endless (almost) public funding of state universities is a powerful distortion preventing the development of a truly competitive and fair market.

Regulation, Innovation and Productivity

Abstract: This paper estimates the average effect of regulatory intensity and administrative redtape on productivity and innovation. For this purpose we exploit the exogenous variation of the decentralization process that has taken place in Spain during the last three decades. Using objective proxies for legislative and regulatory activity such as the number of pages and number of new norms published in the regional legislative reporters we find a strong negative impact of regulatory intensity on regional innovation and productivity. This negative effect of regional regulation is not only statistically significant but also of large economic importance and can explain the absence of productivity growth of Spain in the last decades. Finally, we provide evidence that regulatory intensity has affected the size distribution of establishment reducing its skewness and therefore affecting asymmetrically more those establishments that are more likely to innovate.

I. Antitrust Law

Abstract: Antitrust law consists primarily of three federal laws: The Sherman Act (1890) prohibits conspiracies to create monopolies and anticompetitive conduct. The Clayton Act (1914) regulates mergers (Hylton). The Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) created the Federal Trade Commission and regulates advertising and other interstate competition (DOJ). Cases related to these laws are either decided using the “reasonable rule” which requires the plaintiff prove that defendants’ actions created an “unreasonable” restriction of competition in the market; or by the per se rule which infers the conduct and intent of the defendant based on their actions’ result (Hovenkamp).

Report and Recommendations

Abstract: On August 26, 2014, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a final rule on continued at-reactor storage of spent nuclear fuel and terminated a two-year suspension of final licensing actions for new nuclear power plants and license renewals of existing plants. The 2014 “Continued Storage” rule is good news for opponents of Yucca Mountain. First, the NRC determination that spent nuclear fuel can be safely managed in dry casks for up to 160 years eliminates the argument that the successful licensing of Yucca Mountain is required to assure the continued licensing of nuclear reactors. The future of Yucca Mountain and the future of nuclear power are now separate. Second, the NRC environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared in support of the Continued Storage Rule defines the “no action” alternative required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in a manner that negates the key “no action” alternative in the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) 2008 Supplemental EIS for Yucca Mountain, which was submitted to NRC as part of the license application. DOE’s conclusion that constructing and operating a repository at Yucca Mountain is the preferred alternative under NEPA is no longer supported by DOE’s and NRC’s own NEPA analyses. This paper reviews the developments that led up to the NRC’s new “Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel” Rule, beginning with the adoption in 1980 of the former “Waste Confidence Rule”.

The Market System: What It Is, How It Works, and What to Make of It

Abstract: Charles Lindblom has long been one of the country’s most interesting political theorists writing about the economy. In The Market System, he offers the general reader an excellent guide to thinking about the advantages and disadvantages of a market economy. Half of the book is devoted to an analysis of the market as a social institution. Lindblom’s account of the nuts and bolts of the system is fi rst-rate. He insists that we should think of the market as a mechanism for coordinating human behavior, much like a system of authority or a voting process. What is distinctive about the market is that it coordinates our activities through a process of “mutual adjustment.” There is no central authority here: each individual decides for himself how to respond to what other people are doing given the moves available to him under the rules. The image makes vivid to the reader one of the most attractive features of the market, namely the way that it simplifi es the enormously complex task of social coordination by decentralizing the decision-making process. The other half of the book is devoted to assessing the market in terms of values such as effi ciency, freedom, culture and democracy. Lindblom is at his best on democracy. He argues that the market does poorly in terms of both popular control over economic elites (e.g. bankers, fi nanciers and corporate executives) and popular control over political elites. One of the main problems lies in the fact that corporations participate in the political process as though they were ordinary citizens. His discussion of allocative effi ciency, on the other hand, could have been better. It never quite makes clear to the reader that the market generates outcomes that are “effi cient” in a sense that is much weaker than we normally associate with the idea of effi ciency. Overall, though, this book provides an excellent survey of the issues as well as some penetrating insights from Lindblom’s unique perspective. It would serve well as a companion piece to any general course on the normative dimensions of market society.

The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain

Abstract: (1994). The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain. History: Reviews of New Books: Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 72-73.