Franco Blanchini

Bio: Franco Blanchini is an academic researcher from University of Udine. The author has contributed to research in topics: Linear system & Lyapunov function. The author has an hindex of 41, co-authored 268 publications receiving 10437 citations. Previous affiliations of Franco Blanchini include CentraleSupélec & Mathematica Policy Research.

Modelling the COVID-19 epidemic and implementation of population-wide interventions in Italy.

Abstract: In Italy, 128,948 confirmed cases and 15,887 deaths of people who tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 were registered as of 5 April 2020. Ending the global SARS-CoV-2 pandemic requires implementation of multiple population-wide strategies, including social distancing, testing and contact tracing. We propose a new model that predicts the course of the epidemic to help plan an effective control strategy. The model considers eight stages of infection: susceptible (S), infected (I), diagnosed (D), ailing (A), recognized (R), threatened (T), healed (H) and extinct (E), collectively termed SIDARTHE. Our SIDARTHE model discriminates between infected individuals depending on whether they have been diagnosed and on the severity of their symptoms. The distinction between diagnosed and non-diagnosed individuals is important because the former are typically isolated and hence less likely to spread the infection. This delineation also helps to explain misperceptions of the case fatality rate and of the epidemic spread. We compare simulation results with real data on the COVID-19 epidemic in Italy, and we model possible scenarios of implementation of countermeasures. Our results demonstrate that restrictive social-distancing measures will need to be combined with widespread testing and contact tracing to end the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

Set-theoretic methods in control

Abstract: This self-contained monograph describes basic set-theoretic methods for control and provides a discussion of their links to fundamental problems in Lyapunov stability analysis and stabilization, optimal control, control under constraints, persistent disturbance rejection, and uncertain systems analysis and synthesis. New computer technology has catalyzed a resurgence of research in this area, particularly in the development of set-theoretic techniques, many of which are computationally demanding. The work presents several established and potentially new applications, along with numerical examples and case studies. A key theme of the presentation is the trade-off between exact (but computationally intensive) and approximate (but conservative) solutions to problems. Mathematical language is kept to the minimum necessary for the adequate formulation and statement of main concepts. Numerical algorithms for the solution of the proposed problems are described in detail. Set-Theoretic Methods in Control is accessible to readers familiar with the basics of systems and control theory; prerequisites such as convexity theory are included. The text provides a solid foundation of mathematical techniques and applications and also features avenues for further theoretical study. Aimed primarily at graduate students and researchers in applied mathematics and engineering, the book will also appeal to practitioners since it contains extensive references to the literature and supplies many recipes for solvingsignificant control problems.

A SIDARTHE Model of COVID-19 Epidemic in Italy

Abstract: In late December 2019, a novel strand of Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) causing a severe, potentially fatal respiratory syndrome (COVID-19) was identified in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China and is causing outbreaks in multiple world countries, soon becoming a pandemic. Italy has now become the most hit country outside of Asia: on March 16, 2020, the Italian Civil Protection documented a total of 27980 confirmed cases and 2158 deaths of people tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. In the context of an emerging infectious disease outbreak, it is of paramount importance to predict the trend of the epidemic in order to plan an effective control strategy and to determine its impact. This paper proposes a new epidemic model that discriminates between infected individuals depending on whether they have been diagnosed and on the severity of their symptoms. The distinction between diagnosed and non-diagnosed is important because non-diagnosed individuals are more likely to spread the infection than diagnosed ones, since the latter are typically isolated, and can explain misperceptions of the case fatality rate and of the seriousness of the epidemic phenomenon. Being able to predict the amount of patients that will develop life-threatening symptoms is important since the disease frequently requires hospitalisation (and even Intensive Care Unit admission) and challenges the healthcare system capacity. We show how the basic reproduction number can be redefined in the new framework, thus capturing the potential for epidemic containment. Simulation results are compared with real data on the COVID-19 epidemic in Italy, to show the validity of the model and compare different possible predicted scenarios depending on the adopted countermeasures.

Ultimate boundedness control for uncertain discrete-time systems via set-induced Lyapunov functions

Abstract: In this note, linear discrete-time systems affected by both parameter and input uncertainties are considered. The problem of the synthesis of a feedback control, assuring that the system state is ultimately bounded within a given compact set containing the origin with an assigned rate of convergence, is investigated. It is shown that the problem has a solution if and only if there exists a certain Lyapunov function which does not belong to a preassigned class of functions (e.g., the quadratic ones), but it is determined by the target set in which ultimate boundedness is desired. One of the advantages of this approach is that we may handle systems with control constraints. No matching assumptions are made. For systems with linearly constrained uncertainties, it is shown that such a function may be derived by numerically efficient algorithms involving polyhedral sets. The resulting compensator may be implemented as a linear variable-structure control. >

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

The geometry of biological time , by A. T. Winfree. Pp 544. DM68. Corrected Second Printing 1990. ISBN 3-540-52528-9 (Springer)

Abstract: 1980 Preface * 1999 Preface * 1999 Acknowledgements * Introduction * 1 Circular Logic * 2 Phase Singularities (Screwy Results of Circular Logic) * 3 The Rules of the Ring * 4 Ring Populations * 5 Getting Off the Ring * 6 Attracting Cycles and Isochrons * 7 Measuring the Trajectories of a Circadian Clock * 8 Populations of Attractor Cycle Oscillators * 9 Excitable Kinetics and Excitable Media * 10 The Varieties of Phaseless Experience: In Which the Geometrical Orderliness of Rhythmic Organization Breaks Down in Diverse Ways * 11 The Firefly Machine 12 Energy Metabolism in Cells * 13 The Malonic Acid Reagent ('Sodium Geometrate') * 14 Electrical Rhythmicity and Excitability in Cell Membranes * 15 The Aggregation of Slime Mold Amoebae * 16 Numerical Organizing Centers * 17 Electrical Singular Filaments in the Heart Wall * 18 Pattern Formation in the Fungi * 19 Circadian Rhythms in General * 20 The Circadian Clocks of Insect Eclosion * 21 The Flower of Kalanchoe * 22 The Cell Mitotic Cycle * 23 The Female Cycle * References * Index of Names * Index of Subjects