Frank H. Durgin

Bio: Frank H. Durgin is an academic researcher from Swarthmore College. The author has contributed to research in topics: Perception & Poison control. The author has an hindex of 32, co-authored 116 publications receiving 3440 citations. Previous affiliations of Frank H. Durgin include University of Virginia.

Who is being deceived? The experimental demands of wearing a backpack

Abstract: A growing literature argues that wearing a heavy backpack makes slopes look steeper and distances seem longer (e.g., Proffitt, 2006). To test for effects of experimental demand characteristics in a backpack experiment, we manipulated the experimental demand of the backpack and then used a postexperiment questionnaire to assess participants’ beliefs about the purpose of the backpack. For participants in the low-demand condition, an elaborate deception was used to provide an alternative explanation of the requirement to wear a heavy backpack (i.e., that it held EMG equipment). The highest slope judgments were found for those undeceived participants who guessed that the backpack was intended to affect their slope perception and also reported that they thought they were affected by it. When persuaded that the backpack served another purpose, participants’ slope estimates were no different from those of participants not wearing a backpack. These findings suggest that backpack effects, and other reported effects of effort on perception, are judgmental biases that result from the social, not physical, demands of the experimental context.

Distance Perception and the Visual Horizon in Head-Mounted Displays

Abstract: Can distance perception be studied using virtual reality (VR) if distances are systematically underestimated in VR head-mounted displays (HMDs)? In an experiment in which a real environment was observed through an HMD, via live video, distances, as measured by visually directed walking, were underestimated even when the perceived environment was known to be real and present. However, the underestimation was linear, which means that higher-order space perception effects might be preserved in VR. This is illustrated in a second experiment, in which the visual horizon was artificially manipulated in a simulated outdoor field presented in immersive VR. As predicted by the claim that angle of declination from the horizon may serve as a strong cue to distance, lowering the horizon line produced “expansiv ” judgments of distance (power function exponents greater than one) both in verbal and in motor estimates.

The perception of walking speed in a virtual environment

Abstract: Studies of locomotion in virtual environments assume that correct geometric principles define the relationship between walking speed and environmental flow. However, we have observed that geometrically correct optic flow appears to be too slow during simulated locomotion on a treadmill, Experiment 1 documents the effect in a head-mounted display. Experiment 2 shows that the effect is eliminated when the gaze is directed downward or to the side, or when the walking speed is slow. Experiment 3 shows that the effect is unchanged by stride length, Experiment 4 verifies that the effect is not attributable to image jitter, The change in perceived speed from straight ahead to side or down gaze coincides with a shift from expanding optic flow to lamellar flow. Therefore, we hypothesize that lamellar flow is necessary for accurate speed perception, and that a limited field of view eliminates this cue during straight-ahead gaze.

Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart

Abstract: Fast and frugal heuristics - simple rules for making decisions with realistic mental resources - are presented here. These heuristics can enable both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices, classifications, and predictions by employing bounded rationality. But when and how can such fast and frugal heuristics work? What heuristics are in the mind's adaptive toolbox, and what building blocks compose them? Can judgments based simply on a single reason be as accurate as those based on many reasons? Could less knowledge even lead to systematically better predictions than more knowledge? This book explores these questions by developing computational models of heuristics and testing them through experiments and analysis. It shows how fast and frugal heuristics can yield adaptive decisions in situations as varied as choosing a mate, dividing resources among offspring, predicting high school drop-out rates, and playing the stock market.

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting out our sensory experience

Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness

Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

The Perception of the Visual World. By James J. Gibson. U.S.A.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950 (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London). Price 35s.

Abstract: Let's read! We will often find out this sentence everywhere. When still being a kid, mom used to order us to always read, so did the teacher. Some books are fully read in a week and we need the obligation to support reading. What about now? Do you still love reading? Is reading only for you who have obligation? Absolutely not! We here offer you a new book enPDFd the perception of the visual world to read.

"Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state": Erratum

Abstract: The problem of which cues, internal or external, permit a person to label and identify his own emotional state has been with us since the days that James (1890) first tendered his doctrine that \"the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion\" (p. 449). Since we are aware of a variety of feeling and emotion states, it should follow from James' proposition that the various emotions will be accompanied by a variety of differentiable bodily states. Following James' pronouncement, a formidable number of studies were undertaken in search of the physiological differentiators of the emotions. The results, in these early days, were almost uniformly negative. All of the emotional states experi-