Author
Fred Rothbaum
Bio: Fred Rothbaum is an academic researcher from Tufts University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Child rearing & Attachment theory. The author has an hindex of 24, co-authored 42 publications receiving 5857 citations.
Papers
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors claim that attributions to chance can reflect illusory control, since people often construe chance as a personal characteristic akin to an ability ("luck") and that attribution to powerful others permit vicarious control when the individual identifies with these others.
Abstract: There is extensive evidence that people strongly value and are reluctant to relinquish the perception of control. Yet, both helplessness and locus of control theorists interpret various "inward" behaviors (passivity, withdrawal, and submissiveness) as signs of relinquished perceived control. As evidence, they note that inward behavior frequently is accompanied by causal attributions to limited ability, chance, and powerful others—all attributions that suggest uncontrollability. In contrast, we claim,that these attributions and the behaviors to which they relate may often reflect a type of perceived control that is generally overlooked. People attempt to gain control not only by bringing the environment into line with their wishes (primary control) but also by bringing themselves into line with environmental forces (secondary control). Four manifestations of secondary control are considered: (a) Attributions to severely, limited ability can serve to enhance predictive control and to protect against disappointment. Passive and withdrawn behaviors reflect the attempt to inhibit unfulfillable expectations, (b) Attributions to chance can reflect illusory control, since people often construe chance as a personal characteristic akin to an ability ("luck"). Individuals who make attributions to chance may exhibit passivity and withdrawal in skill situations, reserving energy and emotional investment for situations that allow them to capitalize on their perceived strength—that is, being lucky, (c) Attributions to powerful others permit vicarious control when the individual identifies with these others. Submission to a powerful leader, a group, or a deity sometimes enables the individual to join in their power, (d) All of the preceding attributions may foster interpretive control, in which the individual seeks to understand and derive meaning from otherwise uncontrollable events in order to accept them. When perceived control is recognized in both its primary and secondary forms, a broad range of inward behaviors can be seen as efforts to sustain rather than relinquish the perception of control.
2,004 citations
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TL;DR: A meta-analysis of 47 studies found externalizing was more strongly linked to parental caregiving for boys than for girls, especially among preadolescents and their mothers, and for mothers than for fathers.
Abstract: A meta-analysis of 47 studies was used to shed light on inconsistencies in the concurrent association between parental caregiving and child externalizing behavior. Parent-child associations were strongest when the measure of caregiving relied on observations or interviews, as opposed to questionnaires, and when the measure tapped combinations of parent behaviors (patterns), as opposed to single behaviors. Stronger parent-child associations were also found for older than for younger children, and for mothers than for fathers. Finally, externalizing was more strongly linked to parental caregiving for boys than for girls, especially among preadolescents and their mothers. The meta-analysis helps account for inconsistencies in findings across previous studies and supports theories emphasizing reciprocity of parent and child behavior.
988 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare Japanese and American perspectives and practices in child rearing, socialization, religion and philosophy, work, and psychotherapy, and reveal the disadvantages of a one-sided pursuit of either form of control.
Abstract: There are at least two general paths to a feeling of control. In primary control, individuals enhance their rewards by influencing existing realities (e.g., other people, circumstances, symptoms, or behavior problems). In secondary control, individuals enhance their rewards by accommodating to existing realities and maximizing satisfaction or goodness of fit with things as they are. American psychologists have written extensively about control, but have generally defined it only in terms of its primary form. This, we argue, reflects a cultural context in which primary control is heavily emphasized and highly valued. In Japan, by contrast, primary control has traditionally been less highly valued and less often anticipated, and secondary control has assumed a more central role in everyday life than in our own culture. To illustrate this cross-cultural difference, we contrast Japanese and American perspectives and practices in child rearing, socialization, religion and philosophy, work, and psychotherapy. These Japanese-American comparisons reveal some key benefits, and some costs, of both primary and secondary approaches to control. In the process, the comparisons reveal the disadvantages of a one-sided pursuit of either form of control. They suggest that an important goal, both for individuals and for cultures, is an optimally adaptive blend of primary and secondary control, a goal best achieved with one's cultural blinders removed. In most American theory and research on the psychology of control, a common theme can be identified; the view that perceived control obtains when individuals shape existing physical, social, or behavioral realities to fit their perceptions, goals, or wishes. According to this view, individuals who do not act to influence such realities may be suffering from learned helplessness (see, e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978), defects in "self-efficacy" (Bandura, 1977), perceptions of self as a "pawn" (deCharms, 1979), or some form of relinquished control (see, e.g., Langer, 1979). Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder (1982) recently spelled out a somewhat broader view. They acknowledged that people do often attempt to gain control by influencing existing realities, often via acts involving personal agency, dominance, or even aggression. Rothbaum et al. labeled this process "primary control." But they argued that control is often sought via alternative paths, which they collectively labeled "secondary control." In secondary control, individuals attempt to align themselves with existing realities, leaving them unchanged but exerting control over their personal psychological impact. Table 1 gives an overview of these two forms of control. Rothbaum et al. reviewed evidence indicating that secondary control often involves behaviors that American investigators have typically classified as signs of relinquished control. For example: 1. Attributing outcomes to low ability combined with behaving in a passive and withdrawn manner, is often labeled helplessness; yet, this combination may often represent an attempt to inhibit unfulfillable expectations, thus preparing oneself for future events and thereby gaining predictive secondary control (e.g., Averill, 1973; Lazarus, 1966; Miller & Grant, 1980), Lefcourt (1973) has reviewed several studies suggesting that prediction allows people to prepare themselves for future events and thus to gain control over the psychological impact of those events. 2. When people attribute outcomes to powerful others and show submissive behavior, they are often thought to have abandoned the pursuit of perceived control; yet, this pattern may foster enhanced identification with the powerful others and thus promote vicarious secondary control (e.g., Hetherington & Frankie, 1967; Johnson & Downing, 1979). Fromm (1941) has written about the human inclination to align oneself with powerful entities (e.g., individuals, groups, or institutions) outside the self in order to enhance one's sense of strength or power. 3. The attribution of outcomes to chance, luck, or fate combined with passivity in or withdrawal from certain competitive skill situations is frequently taken as evidence of relinquished control. However, the combination may often reflect an attempt to be September 1984 • American Psychologist Copyright 1984 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. Vol. 39, No. 9, 955-969 955 Table 1 Primary and Secondary Control: An Overview Type of control General strategy Typical targets for causal influence Overall intent
827 citations
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TL;DR: Cultural differences in the meaning and dynamics, as opposed to the importance and strength, of relationships are highlighted, to investigate the processes underlying, and the adaptive consequences of, these two alternative paths.
Abstract: Findings from research on parent-child and adult mate relationships suggest that there are different paths of development in Japan and the United States. In Japan, the path is one of symbiotic harmony, as seen in the emphasis on union in infancy, others' expectations in childhood, the stability of relationships with parents and peers in adolescence, and assurance about the mate relationship in adulthood. In the United States, the path is one of generative tension, as seen in the tug between separation and reunion in infancy, the emphasis on personal preferences in childhood, the transfer of closeness from parents to peers in adolescence, and the emphasis on trust-a faith and hope in new relationships-in adulthood. The notion that there are different paths of development challenges Western investigators' presumption that certain processes-separation-individuation, use of the relational partner as a secure base for exploration, and conflict between partners-are central in all relationships. The notion of different paths also challenges the assumption of many cross-cultural investigators that relationships in the United States are less valued or weaker than those in Japan; this article highlights cultural differences in the meaning and dynamics, as opposed to the importance and strength, of relationships. The model suggests a need to investigate the processes underlying, and the adaptive consequences of, these two alternative paths.
490 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors highlight evidence of cultural variations and note ways in which attachment theory is laden with Western values and meaning, and call for an indigenous approach to the psychology of attachment.
Abstract: Attachment theorists maintain that cultural differences are relatively minor, and they focus on universals. Here the authors highlight evidence of cultural variations and note ways in which attachment theory is laden with Western values and meaning. Comparisons of the United States and Japan highlight the cultural relativity of 3 core hypotheses of attachment theory: that caregiver sensitivity leads to secure attachment, that secure attachment leads to later social competence, and that children who are securely attached use the primary caregiver as a secure base for exploring the external world. Attachment theorists use measures of sensitivity, competence, and secure base that are biased toward Western ways of thinking: The measures emphasize the child's autonomy, individuation, and exploration. In Japan, sensitivity, competence, and secure base are viewed very differently, calling into question the universality of fundamental tenets of attachment theory. The authors call for an indigenous approach to the psychology of attachment.
444 citations
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TL;DR: Theories of the self from both psychology and anthropology are integrated to define in detail the difference between a construal of self as independent and a construpal of the Self as interdependent as discussed by the authors, and these divergent construals should have specific consequences for cognition, emotion, and motivation.
Abstract: People in different cultures have strikingly different construals of the self, of others, and of the interdependence of the 2. These construals can influence, and in many cases determine, the very nature of individual experience, including cognition, emotion, and motivation. Many Asian cultures have distinct conceptions of individuality that insist on the fundamental relatedness of individuals to each other. The emphasis is on attending to others, fitting in, and harmonious interdependence with them. American culture neither assumes nor values such an overt connectedness among individuals. In contrast, individuals seek to maintain their independence from others by attending to the self and by discovering and expressing their unique inner attributes. As proposed herein, these construals are even more powerful than previously imagined. Theories of the self from both psychology and anthropology are integrated to define in detail the difference between a construal of the self as independent and a construal of the self as interdependent. Each of these divergent construals should have a set of specific consequences for cognition, emotion, and motivation; these consequences are proposed and relevant empirical literature is reviewed. Focusing on differences in self-construals enables apparently inconsistent empirical findings to be reconciled, and raises questions about what have been thought to be culture-free aspects of cognition, emotion, and motivation.
18,178 citations
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TL;DR: Research suggesting that certain illusions may be adaptive for mental health and well-being is reviewed, examining evidence that a set of interrelated positive illusions—namely, unrealistically positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism—can serve a wide variety of cognitive, affective, and social functions.
Abstract: Many prominent theorists have argued that accurate perceptions of the self, the world, and the future are essential for mental health. Yet considerable research evidence suggests that overly positive selfevaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism are characteristic of normal human thought. Moreover, these illusions appear to promote other criteria of mental health, including the ability to care about others, the ability to be happy or contented, and the ability to engage in productive and creative work. These strategies may succeed, in large part, because both the social world and cognitive-processing mechanisms impose niters on incoming information that distort it in a positive direction; negative information may be isolated and represented in as unthreatening a manner as possible. These positive illusions may be especially useful when an individual receives negative feedback or is otherwise threatened and may be especially adaptive under these circumstances. Decades of psychological wisdom have established contact with reality as a hallmark of mental health. In this view, the well-adjusted person is thought to engage in accurate reality testing, whereas the individual whose vision is clouded by illusion is regarded as vulnerable to, if not already a victim of, mental illness. Despite its plausibility, this viewpoint is increasingly difficult to maintain (cf. Lazarus, 1983). A substantial amount of research testifies to the prevalence of illusion in normal human cognition (see Fiske& Taylor, 1984;Greenwald, 1980; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Sackeim, 1983; Taylor, 1983). Moreover, these illusions often involve central aspects of the self and the environment and, therefore, cannot be dismissed as inconsequential. In this article, we review research suggesting that certain illusions may be adaptive for mental health and well-being. In particular, we examine evidence that a set of interrelated positive illusions—namely, unrealistically positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism—can serve a wide variety of cognitive, affective, and social functions. We also attempt to resolve the following para
7,519 citations
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TL;DR: A critical appraisal of resilience, a construct connoting the maintenance of positive adaptation by individuals despite experiences of significant adversity, concludes that work on resilience possesses substantial potential for augmenting the understanding of processes affecting at-risk individuals.
Abstract: This paper presents a critical appraisal of resilience, a construct connoting the maintenance of positive adaptation by individuals despite experiences of significant adversity. As empirical research on resilience has burgeoned in recent years, criticisms have been levied at work in this area. These critiques have generally focused on ambiguities in definitions and central terminology; heterogeneity in risks experienced and competence achieved by individuals viewed as resilient; instability of the phenomenon of resilience; and concerns regarding the usefulness of resilience as a theoretical construct. We address each identified criticism in turn, proposing solutions for those we view as legitimate and clarifying misunderstandings surrounding those we believe to be less valid. We conclude that work on resilience possesses substantial potential for augmenting the understanding of processes affecting at-risk individuals. Realization of the potential embodied by this construct, however, will remain constrained without continued scientific attention to some of the serious conceptual and methodological pitfalls that have been noted by skeptics and proponents alike.
7,392 citations
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TL;DR: The emerging field of emotion regulation studies how individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express them as mentioned in this paper, and characterizes emotion in terms of response tendencies.
Abstract: The emerging field of emotion regulation studies how individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express them. This review takes an evolutionary perspective and characterizes emotion in terms of response tendencies. Emotion regulation is denned and distinguished from coping, mood regulation, defense, and affect regulation. In the increasingly specialized discipline of psychology, the field of emotion regulation cuts across traditional boundaries and provides common ground. According to a process model of emotion regulation, emotion may be regulated at five points in the emotion generative process: (a) selection of the situation, (b) modification of the situation, (c) deployment of attention, (d) change of cognitions, and (e) modulation of responses. The field of emotion regulation promises new insights into age-old questions about how people manage their emotions.
6,835 citations