scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Author

Frederic M. Bloom

Bio: Frederic M. Bloom is an academic researcher from University of Colorado Boulder. The author has contributed to research in topics: Supreme court & Subject-matter jurisdiction. The author has an hindex of 3, co-authored 8 publications receiving 17 citations.

Papers
More filters
Posted Content
TL;DR: This article makes sense of a lie as discussed by the authors and explains why legal jurisdiction depends on a lie and then explains why it would. And it helps to make sense of why jurisdiction's lie has so long endured.
Abstract: This Article makes sense of a lie. It shows how legal jurisdiction depends on a falsehood - and then explains why it would. To make this novel argument, this Article starts where jurisdiction does. It recounts jurisdiction’s foundations - its tests and motives, its histories and rules. It then seeks out jurisdictional reality, critically examining a side of jurisdiction we too often overlook. Legal jurisdiction may portray itself as fixed and unyielding, as natural as the force of gravity, and as stable as the firmest ground. But jurisdiction is in fact something different. It is a malleable legal invention that bears a false rigid front. This Article aims to prove as much. This Article then examines both the flexibility and the ruse. It supports the first with two uncommon jurisdictional theories - one that shows how pragmatics, remedial context, and rights-accommodation permit courts to reach smart equilibriums; another that details the cultural, “spatial,” and federalist value of jurisdictional malleability. It then explains the second through more conditional claims about the functional, deliberative, and structural benefits of jurisdiction’s long-running trick. This study does not mean to excuse the inexcusable. It hopes instead to offer new insight on an old problem. And it helps to make sense of why jurisdiction’s lie has so long endured.

5 citations

Journal Article
Abstract: This Article makes sense of a lie It shows how legal jurisdiction depends on a falsehood - and then explains why it would To make this novel argument, this Article starts where jurisdiction does It recounts jurisdiction’s foundations - its tests and motives, its histories and rules It then seeks out jurisdictional reality, critically examining a side of jurisdiction we too often overlook Legal jurisdiction may portray itself as fixed and unyielding, as natural as the force of gravity, and as stable as the firmest ground But jurisdiction is in fact something different It is a malleable legal invention that bears a false rigid front This Article aims to prove as much This Article then examines both the flexibility and the ruse It supports the first with two uncommon jurisdictional theories - one that shows how pragmatics, remedial context, and rights-accommodation permit courts to reach smart equilibriums; another that details the cultural, “spatial,” and federalist value of jurisdictional malleability It then explains the second through more conditional claims about the functional, deliberative, and structural benefits of jurisdiction’s long-running trick This study does not mean to excuse the inexcusable It hopes instead to offer new insight on an old problem And it helps to make sense of why jurisdiction’s lie has so long endured

3 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: Time is everywhere in law as mentioned in this paper, and it shapes doctrines as disparate as ripeness and retroactivity, and it impacts litigants of every status and type, the eager plaintiff who brings her case too early, the death-row inmate who seeks his stay too late.
Abstract: Time is everywhere in law. It shapes doctrines as disparate as ripeness and retroactivity, and it impacts litigants of every status and type — the eager plaintiff who brings her case too early, the death-row inmate who seeks his stay too late. Yet legal time is still scarcely studied, and it remains poorly understood. This Article makes new and better sense of that time. It begins with an original account of time as a tool of institutional power, tracking the relocation of that power from the first western cathedrals to the earliest Supreme Court. It then links time’s revealing past to our messy doctrinal present — first by compiling an initial doctrinal tally, then by sorting the doctrine into a novel time typology. This typology splits into three core categories — all time, some time, and broken time — and it brings analytical coherence to a concept too-long ignored. Even more, it sketches a blueprint for worthwhile reform. This Article proposes four such reforms — to Hicks v. Miranda, to mootness and desuetude, to retroactivity doctrine, and to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) — and it rethinks the courts’ most enduring time commitments. It also builds the foundation for what is to come, opening a discussion about time as a legal technology, arguing for a more critical investigation of the law’s clock.

3 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine five pieces of the civil information architecture (i.e., evidence tampering rules, automatic disclosure requirements, work product doctrine, peremptory challenge law, and bans on juror testimony) and fit these five doctrines into a creative rule typology, one built on the frame of (in)valid (mis)information.
Abstract: At the core of every lawsuit is a mix of information — revealing documents that chronicle a party’s malfeasance, guarded memos that outline a lawyer’s trial strategy, fading memories that recall a jury’s key mistakes. Yet the law’s system for managing that information is still poorly understood. This Article makes new and better sense of that system. It begins with an original examination of five pieces of our civil information architecture — evidence tampering rules, automatic disclosure requirements, work product doctrine, peremptory challenge law, and bans on juror testimony — and compiles a novel study of how those doctrines intersect and overlap. It then fits these five doctrines into a creative rule typology, one built on the frame of “(in)valid (mis)information.” This typology charts our system’s most basic commitments — to accuracy, to adversarialism, and to procedural equality. But it also raises a critical question about the space between what our rules now require and what legal actors actually do. To help answer that question, this Article reaches out to an untapped social-science discipline: the rich and instructive field of Information Behavior (IB). This Article uses IB to shed new light on how our information rules function and where they still may fail. It also offers fresh and focused insight on the nature of information in civil litigation — from before a lawsuit opens until well after it ends.

2 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: The idea of state-court defiance may surprise us as mentioned in this paper, but it is not in every case, after all, that state courts affirmatively disobey binding Supreme Court precedent, but occasionally state courts do.
Abstract: We don't think that state courts disobey binding Supreme Court precedent, but occasionally state courts do. In a number of important cases, state courts have actively defied apposite Supreme Court doctrine. And often it is the Court itself that has invited them to. This article shows state courts doing the unthinkable: flouting Supreme Court precedent, sometimes at the Court's own behest. The idea of state-court defiance may surprise us. It is not in every case, after all, that state courts affirmatively disobey. But rare events still have their lessons, and we should ask how and why they emerge. By unsettling constitutional substance and excusing state court errors, the Supreme Court has permitted - even encouraged - state courts to rethink critical portions of existing Court doctrine. It has written the story, that is, of "state courts unbound." To bring this story into focus, this article examines how the unbinding process works, where we can see it, and why it warrants serious inspection. In the process, this article carefully recounts three illustrative chapters in the "state courts unbound" tale. One chapter grows out of Williams v. North Carolina, a long-ignored discussion of migratory divorce. A second chapter emerges in Lockyer v. Andrade, a more memorable study of California's "three strikes" law. And a third chapter appears in Roper v. Simmons, a controversial decision on the juvenile death penalty. All three of these chapters show how state courts can, and sometimes do, defy still-valid Supreme Court precedent - even in cases pending before the Court now. All three of these cases raise important questions about judicial motives, constitutional theory, and the balance of doctrinal power in our adjudicative system. And all three encourage us to rethink what may seem most familiar - and to read carefully the story of state courts unbound.

1 citations


Cited by
More filters
Book
29 Aug 2016
TL;DR: The Black Box Society argues that we all need to be able to do so and to set limits on how big data affects our lives as mentioned in this paper. But who connects the dots about what firms are doing with this information?
Abstract: Every day, corporations are connecting the dots about our personal behaviorsilently scrutinizing clues left behind by our work habits and Internet use. The data compiled and portraits created are incredibly detailed, to the point of being invasive. But who connects the dots about what firms are doing with this information? The Black Box Society argues that we all need to be able to do soand to set limits on how big data affects our lives. Hidden algorithms can make (or ruin) reputations, decide the destiny of entrepreneurs, or even devastate an entire economy. Shrouded in secrecy and complexity, decisions at major Silicon Valley and Wall Street firms were long assumed to be neutral and technical. But leaks, whistleblowers, and legal disputes have shed new light on automated judgment. Self-serving and reckless behavior is surprisingly common, and easy to hide in code protected by legal and real secrecy. Even after billions of dollars of fines have been levied, underfunded regulators may have only scratched the surface of this troubling behavior. Frank Pasquale exposes how powerful interests abuse secrecy for profit and explains ways to rein them in. Demanding transparency is only the first step. An intelligible society would assure that key decisions of its most important firms are fair, nondiscriminatory, and open to criticism. Silicon Valley and Wall Street need to accept as much accountability as they impose on others.

1,342 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Human rights were a defining discourse of the 20th century and the opening decades of the twenty-first, however, have witnessed increasing claims that the time of this discourse as an emancipatory too...
Abstract: Human rights were a defining discourse of the 20th century. The opening decades of the twenty-first, however, have witnessed increasing claims that the time of this discourse as an emancipatory too...

29 citations

Book
30 Nov 2018
TL;DR: Leigh Anenson as discussed by the authors analyzes the scope of judicial authority and discretion to recognize the equitable doctrine of unclean hands as a bar to actions seeking damages in the United States.
Abstract: T. Leigh Anenson analyzes the scope of judicial authority and discretion to recognize the equitable doctrine of unclean hands as a bar to actions seeking damages in the United States. Bringing an American perspective to contentious conversation about law-equity fusion in other countries of the common law, Anenson provides a historical, doctrinal, and theoretical account of the integration, analyzes cases in the federal courts and across the fifty states, and places the issue of integration within a broader debate over the fusion of law and equity. Her analysis also includes descriptive and normative accounts of the equitable maxim of unclean hands. This groundbreaking work, which clarifies conflicting case law and advances the idea of a principled fusion of law and equity, should be read by anyone interested in the need for equity - its cultivation, preservation, and celebration.

22 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: For decades, we have debated whether political safeguards preserve healthy relations between the states and the federal government and thus reduce or eliminate the need for judges to referee state-federal tussles.
Abstract: For decades, we have debated whether “political safeguards” preserve healthy relations between the states and the federal government and thus reduce or eliminate the need for judges to referee state-federal tussles. No one has made such an argument about relations among the states, and the few scholars to have considered the question insist that such safeguards don’t exist. This Article takes the opposite view and lays down the intellectual foundations for the political safeguards of horizontal federalism.If you want to know what unites the burgeoning work on horizontal federalism and illuminates the hidden logic of its doctrine, you need only know one fact: Lawyers hate spillovers. Whether it is a state’s decision to license same-sex marriage or set high emissions standards or maintain lax gun-ownership rules, we worry when one state’s regulations affect residents in another state. And just as most scholars aspire to prevent spillovers, most look to the courts to fix the problem.The current state of the law and literature makes clear why no one has thought to develop a safeguards account of horizontal federalism to match the one that dominates debates over vertical federalism. Why bother with political safeguards if politics are the problem and the judiciary is the solution?In this Article, we don’t just question the consensus against spillovers but offer an affirmative account as to why much interstate conflict can or should be left to the free play of politics. Our argument emphasizes the democratic possibilities associated with spillovers and looks to vertical federalism as a model for thinking about how the states ought to interact with each other. Spillovers, after all, occur just as routinely between the state and federal government as they do between states. State-federal friction, however, is understood to be both a problem and a valuable part of a well-functioning democracy. The same should be true of horizontal federalism. Our goal should not be to suppress friction, but to harness it — to shut down damaging spillovers while allowing productive ones to run their course.

20 citations