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Fritz W. Scharpf

Bio: Fritz W. Scharpf is an academic researcher from Max Planck Society. The author has contributed to research in topics: Welfare state & European integration. The author has an hindex of 66, co-authored 318 publications receiving 24275 citations. Previous affiliations of Fritz W. Scharpf include International Institute of Minnesota & Yale University.


Papers
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Book
01 Jan 1999
TL;DR: In this article, the European Contribution Conclusion: Multi-level Problem-Solving in Europe References Index is presented, where the authors propose a solution without boundary control for solving multi-level problem solving in Europe.
Abstract: 1. Political Democracy in a Capitalist Economy 2. Negative and Positive Integration 3. Regulatory Competition and Re-Regulation 4. National Solutions without Boundary Control 5. The European Contribution Conclusion: Multi-level Problem-Solving in Europe References Index

2,726 citations

Book
18 Sep 1997
TL;DR: In the face of complexity, policy research in the Face of Complexity as mentioned in this paper has been studied in the context of actor-centered institutionalism and actor-constellations.
Abstract: * Introduction * Policy Research in the Face of Complexity * Actor-Centered Institutionalism * Actors * Actor Constellations * Unilateral Action in Anarchic Fields and Minimal Institutions * Negotiated Agreements * Decisions by Majority Vote * Hierarchical Direction * Varieties of the Negotiating State

2,187 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored the similarities between joint decision making in German federalism and decision-making in the European Community and argued that the fact that member governments are directly participating in central decisions, and that there is a de facto requirement of unanimous decisions, will systematically generate sub-optimal policy outcomes unless a "problem-solving" (as opposed to a "bargaining") style of decision making can be maintained.
Abstract: Compared to early expectations, the process of European integration has resulted in a paradox: frustration without disintegration and resilience without progress. The article attempts to develop an institutional explanation for this paradox by exploring the similarities between joint decision making (‘Politikverflechtung’) in German federalism and decision making in the European Community. In both cases, it is argued, the fact that member governments are directly participating in central decisions, and that there is a de facto requirement of unanimous decisions, will systematically generate sub-optimal policy outcomes unless a ‘problem-solving’ (as opposed to a ‘bargaining’) style of decision making can be maintained. In fact, the ‘bargaining’ style has prevailed in both cases. The resulting pathologies of public policy have, however, not resulted either in successful strategies for the further Europeanization of policy responsibilities or in the disintegration of unsatisfactory joint-decision systems. This ‘joint-decision trap’ is explained by reference to the utility functions of member governments for whom present institutional arrangements, in spite of their sub-optimal policy output, seem to represent ‘local optima’ when compared to either greater centralization or disintegration.

1,531 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss two options, closer co-operation and a combination of differentiated "framework directives" with the open method of co-ordination, to overcome the constitutional asymmetry between market efficiencies and policies promoting social protection and equality.
Abstract: European integration has created a constitutional asymmetry between policies promoting market efficiencies and policies promoting social protection and equality. National welfare states are legally and economically constrained by European rules of economic integration, liberalization and competition law, whereas efforts to adopt European social policies are politically impeded by the diversity of national welfare states, differing not only in levels of economic development and hence in their ability to pay for social transfers and services but, even more significantly, in their normative aspirations and institutional structures. In response, the ‘open method of coordination’ is now being applied in the social-policy field. It leaves effective policy choices at the national level, but tries to improve these through promoting common objectives and common indicators, and through comparative evaluations of national policy performance. These efforts are useful but cannot overcome the constitutional asymmetry. Hence there is reason to search for solutions which must have the character of European law in order to establish constitutional parity with the rules of European economic integration, but which also must be sufficiently differentiated to accommodate the existing diversity of national welfare regimes. The article discusses two such options, ‘closer co-operation’ and a combination of differentiated ‘framework directives’ with the open method of co-ordination.

819 citations

Book
01 Jan 1997

744 citations


Cited by
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a theory of ratification in the context of domestic political games and international political games, which is applicable to many other political phenomena, such as dependency, legislative committees, and multiparty coalitions.
Abstract: Domestic politics and international relations are often inextricably entangled, but existing theories (particularly “state-centric” theories) do not adequately account for these linkages. When national leaders must win ratification (formal or informal) from their constituents for an international agreement, their negotiating behavior reflects the simultaneous imperatives of both a domestic political game and an international game. Using illustrations from Western economic summitry, the Panama Canal and Versailles Treaty negotiations, IMF stabilization programs, the European Community, and many other diplomatic contexts, this article offers a theory of ratification. It addresses the role of domestic preferences and coalitions, domestic political institutions and practices, the strategies and tactics of negotiators, uncertainty, the domestic reverberation of international pressures, and the interests of the chief negotiator. This theory of “two-level games” may also be applicable to many other political phenomena, such as dependency, legislative committees, and multiparty coalitions.

6,155 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that norms evolve in a three-stage "life cycle" of emergence, cascades, and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics.
Abstract: Norms have never been absent from the study of international politics, but the sweeping “ideational turn” in the 1980s and 1990s brought them back as a central theoretical concern in the field. Much theorizing about norms has focused on how they create social structure, standards of appropriateness, and stability in international politics. Recent empirical research on norms, in contrast, has examined their role in creating political change, but change processes have been less well-theorized. We induce from this research a variety of theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the role of norms in political change. We argue that norms evolve in a three-stage “life cycle” of emergence, “norm cascades,” and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics. We also highlight the rational and strategic nature of many social construction processes and argue that theoretical progress will only be made by placing attention on the connections between norms and rationality rather than by opposing the two.

5,761 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The term "New Institutionalism" is a term that now appears with growing frequency in political science as mentioned in this paper, and there is considerable confusion about just what the new institutionalism is, how it differs from other approaches, and what sort of promise or problems it displays.
Abstract: The ‘new institutionalism’ is a term that now appears with growing frequency in political science. However, there is considerable confusion about just what the ‘new institutionalism’ is, how it differs from other approaches, and what sort of promise or problems it displays. The object of this essay is to provide some preliminary answers to these questions by reviewing recent work in a burgeoning literature. Some of the ambiguities surrounding the new institutionalism can be dispelled if we recognize that it does not constitute a unified body of thought. Instead, at least three different analytical approaches, each of which calls itself a ‘new institutionalism’, have appeared over the past fifteen years. We label these three schools of thought: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism.’ All of these approaches developed in reaction to the behavioural perspectives that were influential during the 1960s and 1970s and all seek to elucidate the role that institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes. However, they paint quite different pictures of the political world. In the sections that follow, we provide a brief account of the genesis of each school and characterize what is distinctive about its approach to social and political problems. We then compare their analytical strengths and weaknesses, * An earlier version of this paper WLS presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association and at a Conference on ‘What is Institutionalism Now? at the

5,455 citations

Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: The authors provides an overview of recent developments in historical institutionalism and assesses the progress in understanding institutional formation and change, drawing on insights from recent historical institutional work on icritical juncturesi and on ipolicy feedbacks.
Abstract: This article provides an overview of recent developments in historical institutionalism. First, it reviews some distinctions that are commonly drawn between the ihistoricali and the irational choicei variants of institutionalism and shows that there are more points of tangency than typically assumed. However, differences remain in how scholars in the two traditions approach empirical problems. The contrast of rational choiceis emphasis on institutions as coordination mechanisms that generate or sustain equilibria versus historical institutionalismis emphasis on how institutions emerge from and are embedded in concrete temporal processes serves as the foundation for the second half of the essay, which assesses our progress in understanding institutional formation and change. Drawing on insights from recent historical institutional work on icritical juncturesi and on ipolicy feedbacks,i the article proposes a way of thinking about institutional evolution and path dependency that provides an alternative to equilibrium and other approaches that separate the analysis of institutional stability from that of institutional change.

4,425 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors discusses the rise of New Public Management (NPM) as an alternative to the tradition of public accountability embodied in progressive-era public administration ideas and argues that there was considerable variation in the extent to which different OECD countries adopted NPM over the 1980s.
Abstract: Changes in public sector accounting in a number of OECD countries over the 1980s were central to the rise of the “New Public Management” (NPM) and its associated doctrines of public accountability and organizational best practice. This paper discusses the rise of NPM as an alternative to the tradition of public accountability embodied in progressive-era public administration ideas. It argues that, in spite of allegations of internationalization and the adoption of a new global paradigm in public management, there was considerable variation in the extent to which different OECD countries adopted NPM over the 1980s. It further argues that conventional explanations of the rise of NPM (“Englishness”, party political incumbency, economic performance record and government size) seem hard to sustain even from a relatively brief inspection of such cross-national data as are available, and that an explanation based on initial endowment may give us a different perspective on those changes.

3,281 citations