Fu Ying

Bio: Fu Ying is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: China & Ukrainian. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 13 citations.

How China sees Russia

Abstract: The article discusses the relations between Russia and China from the end of the Cold War in 1989 through the mid 2010s, including trade, cooperation, investment and national security relations between the two countries. The author comments on the possibility that Russian and China may form an alliance against the U.S. An overview of Chinese attitudes' towards Russian foreign policy, including in regard to the latter's involvement in the Ukrainian Conflict, is provided.

In search of the ‘Other’ in Asia: Russia–China relations revisited

Abstract: This paper argues that Russia and China are partners of consequence and that the neglect of the normative dimension of the Sino-Russian relationship has led its impact on global governance to be undervalued and misunderstood. Following a constructivist approach, the paper examines the shared norms underlying an ever closer Sino-Russian partnership, despite divergent interests in a number of areas. A first section examines how shared norms lead Russia and China to define their identity similarly, facilitate joint actions, and constrain their individual policy choices. For Russia, elaborating its own unique identity is crucial to its claim to global status, though complicated by interactions with multiple ‘Others.’ Russia's effort to engage Asian partners is often viewed as hedging against China, but as second section argues that Russian engagement in Asia is better understood in terms of Russia's effort to define an Asian identity. A third section highlights the securitization/desecuritization dyna...

PLA ground forces and the challenge of a rising China.

Abstract: : This monograph aims at sharpening the US Army's thinking about Chinese military threats and informing future research efforts that explore contingencies against the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the land domain. By looking at the interrelated factors of doctrine, personnel quality, force structure, and technological capability, it contributes to a deeper understanding of the PLA and how its ground forces have prepared to fight high-tech wars beyond China's periphery. The pace and extent of China's rise have been unsettling for the United States, which has viewed its relations with Beijing through the lenses of cooperation and competition. This monograph provides context on the latter. Driven by a renewed sense of destiny supported by growing power, China is no longer amenable to playing strictly by America's rules, especially close to home. While pursuing its own ambitions, China has contributed to escalating regional tensions and has challenged the US-led international order. The shape and scale of its military modernization suggest the means by which this challenge might come. China's quest through asymmetric weapons to undermine what it perceives as US hegemony has been paired by a parallel effort to imitate and match US military power, notably in deterrent and power-projection capabilities. After an overview of PLA ground forces and their course of reform since the 1950s, this monograph discusses the implications of the far-reaching set of reforms announced in late 2015. Under Mao Zedong's rule, the influential doctrine of people's war remained relatively unchanged, its persistence serving, along with the PLA's focus on maintaining domestic order, as a rationale for delaying modernization. During the 1980s and 1990s, the PLA gradually adapted people's war to modern conditions as its leaders shifted their attention to winning local, limited wars.

Rethinking the relations between identity and foreign policy: analysing Russia’s foreign policy discourse towards China

Abstract: This master’s thesis aims to reconstruct Russian identity discourse related to its foreign policy towards China. Taking the timeline surrounding the crisis in Ukraine and Crimea (2010-2016), this thesis was based on the background of the rising concept of “pivot to Asia/East”. Using China as the main actor in Russia’s Asian policy, this thesis tries to answer the questions regarding the construction of Russia’s identity discourse towards China and whether the changing Russian policy after Crimea initiate any changing identity. Based on the poststructuralist approach in foreign policy analysis and the methods of discourse analysis as offered by Campbell (1990), Waever (2002), and Hansen (2006), this thesis offers an alternative understanding of the (re)construction of the identity structure and the intricate relationship between identity and foreign policy. In using the Hansen’s methods of discourse analysis, this thesis analyses official speeches and interviews as part of the 1st model of poststructuralist discourse analysis, and both academic articles and opinions as part of the 2nd model. This thesis finds several patterns of discursive identity structure. Firstly, concurring with Waever’s argument, this thesis finds that existing discursive structure created limitations to the possibility of any changes in Russia’s identity/policy before Crimea. The crisis in Ukraine did provide some concrete policy changes, but these changes at the outmost layer of discursive structure were unable to drastically change the identity discourse in Russia related to China in the post-Crimean timeframe. The effect of this limitation was the stagnation of concrete policy switch towards China. From those findings, two important theoretical contributions could be noted. These findings show that there was the aspect of timeframe which poststructuralist theory of identity/foreign policy change should take into considerations when analyzing the probability of change or nonchange. However, this issue did not diminish the usefulness of poststructuralist approach in deepening the understanding of identity construction and its relations with foreign policy.

The Sino-Russian partnership and global order

Abstract: This essay about the Sino-Russian partnership and its relationship to global order makes four main arguments. The first is that the partnership is based on a sober appreciation of the two sides’ respective national interests. For all the rhetoric about shared values and common worldviews, this is a pragmatic, interests-based relationship. Second, it is a partnership between strategically autonomous actors, each with its own distinct agenda. Beijing and Moscow agree on much. But they do not operate as a coordinated force in international politics, let alone seek to build a new authoritarian world order. Third, although the rise of China and resurgence of Russia are trends of fundamental importance, the impact of their partnership on global order has been peripheral. Finally, the long-term outlook for the Sino-Russian partnership is uncertain. Against the backdrop of a fluid international environment, Beijing and Moscow face significant challenges in sustaining the momentum of their cooperation.

Brothers in arms, yet again? Twenty-first century Sino-Russian strategic collaboration in the realm of defence and security

Abstract: 2014-2015 were years of turmoil for strategic relations, with Sino-Russian relations emerging as a particularly interesting set of ties to observe. This article asks whether recurrent Sino-Russian ...