Gabriel A. Radvansky
Other affiliations: Michigan State University
Bio: Gabriel A. Radvansky is an academic researcher from University of Notre Dame. The author has contributed to research in topics: Forgetting & Comprehension. The author has an hindex of 45, co-authored 112 publications receiving 6653 citations. Previous affiliations of Gabriel A. Radvansky include Michigan State University.
Papers published on a yearly basis
TL;DR: The authors argue that the time has now come for researchers to begin to take the multidimensionality of situation models seriously and offer a theoretical framework and some methodological observations that may help researchers to tackle this issue.
Abstract: This article reviews research on the use of situation models in language comprehension and memory retrieval over the past 15 years. Situation models are integrated mental representations of a described state of affairs. Significant progress has been made in the scientific understanding of how situation models are involved in language comprehension and memory retrieval. Much of this research focuses on establishing the existence of situation models, often by using tasks that assess one dimension of a situation model. However, the authors argue that the time has now come for researchers to begin to take the multidimensionality of situation models seriously. The authors offer a theoretical framework and some methodological observations that may help researchers to tackle this issue.
TL;DR: A variety of findings indicated that this age group is less able than younger adults to suppress the processing and retrieval of items designated as to be forgotten (TBF).
Abstract: Younger and older adults were compared in 4 directed forgetting experiments. These varied in the use of categorized versus unrelated word lists and in the use of item by item versus blocked remember-forget cueing procedures. Consistent with L. Hasher and R. T. Zacks's (1988) hypothesis of impaired inhibitory mechanisms in older adults, a variety of findings indicated that this age group is less able than yoimger adults to suppress the processing and retrieval of items designated as to be forgotten (TBF). Specifically, in comparison with younger adults, older adults produced more TBF word intrusions on an immediate recall test (Experiments 1A and 1B), took longer to reject TBF items (relative to a neutral baseline) on an immediate recognition test (Experiment 3), and recalled (Experiments 1A, 1B, and 2) and recognized (Experiments 1B and 2) relatively more TBF items on delayed retention tests in which all studied items were designated as targets. In this article, we present four experiments comparing the performance of younger and older adults on directed forgetting tasks. In this type of task (e.g., see Bjork, 1989), participants are presented items to study, some of which they are told to remember and others of which they are told to forget. Because the cueing as to which items are to be remembered (TBR items) and which are to be forgotten (TBF items) occurs after the items have been presented for study, participants must pay some attention to each item as it is presented. Thus, the directed forgetting paradigm investigates the ability to forget some inputs that one has recently attended to while at the same time remembering others presented in the same context and near the same time. To the degree that one is successful at this task, as younger adults generally are, the following trends are seen: The presence of TBF items on a list does not reduce recall or recognition of TBR items; there are few intrusions of TBF items when participants are asked to report only TBR items; and performance on TBF items is relatively poor when, on a later retention test, participants are asked to report TBF as well as TBR items.
TL;DR: This research investigated the ability of people to retrieve information about objects as they moved through rooms in a virtual space with object names that were either associated with the person or dissociated from the person.
Abstract: We investigated the ability of people to retrieve information about objects as they moved through rooms in a virtual space. People were probed with object names that were either associated with the person (i.e., carried) or dissociated from the person (i.e., just set down). Also, people either did or did not shift spatial regions (i.e., go to a new room). Information about objects was less accessible when the objects were dissociated from the person. Furthermore, information about an object was also less available when there was a spatial shift. However, the spatial shift had a larger effect on memory for the currently associated object. These data are interpreted as being more supportive of a situation model explanation, following on work using narratives and film. Simpler memory-based accounts that do not take into account the context in which a person is embedded cannot adequately account for the results. This research was supported in part by a grant from the Army Research Institute, ARMY-DASW01-02-K-0003 and by funding from J. Chris Forsythe of Sandia National Laboratories.
TL;DR: This article examined which dimensions of the situation model (time, space, causation, motivation, and protagonist) are monitored by readers during narrative comprehension and found that discontinuities on these dimensions led to reliable increases in reading times.
Abstract: We examined which dimensions of the situation model (time, space, causation, motivation, and protagonist) are monitored by readers during narrative comprehension. Clause or sentence reading times were collected in three experiments and analyzed using multiple-regression analyses. Experiment 1 showed that readers monitored temporal, causal, goal-related, and protagonist-related continuity because discontinuities on these dimensions led to reliable increases in reading times. This was not the case for spatial continuity. Prior to reading, participants in Experiment 2 memorized a map of the building in which the events described in the narratives took place. There was a reliable effect of the spatial dimension, as well as of the other dimensions. In Experiment 3, participants read the narratives of Experiment 2 but without having first memorized the map. There was no effect of the spatial dimension, but the effects were again reliable for the other dimensions. Reading times increased as a function of the num...
TL;DR: Wyer and Srull as discussed by the authors proposed a theory of social cognition to account for the comprehension and verification of information, which views comprehension as a process of constructing situation models of new information on the basis of previously formed models about its referents.
Abstract: The information one acquires in daily life concerns specific people and events about which one has prior knowledge. A theory of social cognition is proposed to account for the comprehension and verification of such information. The theory views comprehension as a process of constructing situation models of new information on the basis of previously formed models about its referents. The theory specifies the conditions in which statements about familiar people and events (e.g., "Jane Fonda does aerobics") are spontaneously recognized as true or false in the process of comprehending them. It further specifies the conditions in which these spontaneous validity judgments of a statement will influence perceptions of its implications when the statement is made in a social context. The comprehension of both single statements and multiple pieces of information in combination is considered. The way in which new information is interpreted can have considerable influence on how well it is remembered (Bransford, Barclay, & Franks, 1972; Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980). Moreover, when a piece of information (e.g., "John gave someone an answer during an exam") can be understood in terms of more than one concept (e.g., dishonest or helpful), the particular concept that is applied not only influences judgments and behavior toward its referents, but the magnitude of this influence increases over time (Carlston, 1980; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1980, 1983). Numerous theories of social cognition attempt to account for these effects and when they will occur (Bargh, 1997; Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; Martin, 1986; E. R. Smith, 1990; Wyer & Srull, 1986, 1989). Wyer and Srull's theory (1986, 1989) goes on to specify how the comprehension of information at early stages affects processing at later, goal-directed stages. These latter stages include the organization of different pieces of information into a single representation of their referent, the computation of a subjective judgment, and the transformation of this judgment into a response. The theory explicates the memory storage and retrieval processes that occur at each stage of cognitive activity. The Wyer and Srull model is the most well-articulated theory of social cognition to date, and it generates unique predictions for a number of phenomena that have been identified in social cognition
01 Jan 1964
TL;DR: In this paper, the notion of a collective unconscious was introduced as a theory of remembering in social psychology, and a study of remembering as a study in Social Psychology was carried out.
Abstract: Part I. Experimental Studies: 2. Experiment in psychology 3. Experiments on perceiving III Experiments on imaging 4-8. Experiments on remembering: (a) The method of description (b) The method of repeated reproduction (c) The method of picture writing (d) The method of serial reproduction (e) The method of serial reproduction picture material 9. Perceiving, recognizing, remembering 10. A theory of remembering 11. Images and their functions 12. Meaning Part II. Remembering as a Study in Social Psychology: 13. Social psychology 14. Social psychology and the matter of recall 15. Social psychology and the manner of recall 16. Conventionalism 17. The notion of a collective unconscious 18. The basis of social recall 19. A summary and some conclusions.
TL;DR: A perceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal symbol systems and implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.
Abstract: Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statis- tics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement record- ing systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The stor- age and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components - not at the level of holistic perceptual expe- riences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a com- mon frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspec- tion (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and ab- stract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinato- rially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a per- ceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal sym- bol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.
TL;DR: To account for the large demands on working memory during text comprehension and expert performance, the traditional models of working memory involving temporary storage must be extended to include working memory based on storage in long-term memory.
Abstract: To account for the large demands on working memory during text comprehension and expert performance, the traditional models of working memory involving temporary storage must be extended to include working memory based on storage in long-term memory. In the proposed theoretical framework cognitive processes are viewed as a sequence of stable states representing end products of processing. In skilled activities, acquired memory skills allow these end products to be stored in long-term memory and kept directly accessible by means of retrieval cues in short-term memory, as proposed by skilled memory theory. These theoretical claims are supported by a review of evidence on memory in text comprehension and expert performance in such domains as mental calculation, medical diagnosis, and chess.
TL;DR: It is argued that individual differences in EFs, as measured with simple laboratory tasks, show both unity and diversity and are related to various clinically and societally important phenomena, and show some developmental stability.
Abstract: Executive functions (EFs)—a set of general-purpose control processes that regulate one’s thoughts and behaviors—have become a popular research topic lately and have been studied in many subdisciplines of psychological science. This article summarizes the EF research that our group has conducted to understand the nature of individual differences in EFs and their cognitive and biological underpinnings. In the context of a new theoretical framework that we have been developing (the unity/diversity framework), we describe four general conclusions that have emerged. Specifically, we argue that individual differences in EFs, as measured with simple laboratory tasks, (a) show both unity and diversity (different EFs are correlated yet separable), (b) reflect substantial genetic contributions, (c) are related to various clinically and societally important phenomena, and (d) show some developmental stability.