Gabriel Lele

Bio: Gabriel Lele is an academic researcher from Gadjah Mada University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Decentralization & Central government. The author has an hindex of 4, co-authored 10 publications receiving 69 citations.

Asymmetric decentralization, accommodation and separatist conflict: lessons from Aceh and Papua, Indonesia

Abstract: The employment of asymmetric decentralization to deal with separatist conflicts has become increasingly popular in recent years. However, contentions remain as to whether it is an effective tool to...

The Paradox of Distance in Decentralized Indonesia

Abstract: One of the most important promises of decentralization is to bring government closer to the people through improved public services and decision making. In contrast to this promise, the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia seems to create farther distance between government and the people resulting in the paradox of distance. This article argues that the paradox of distance in decentralized Indonesia is institutionally engineered. It is due mainly to unclear mechanisms for the people to hold government accountable and this stems from two main factors. The first one refers to the politics of functional assignment between central and local governments which benefits central government more than local government. The second factor is the macro institutional arrangements on the relationships between local government and the people where there is almost no way for local people to hold their government accountable or punish the underperformed local government. This article recommends significant transformation in the way the central government manages functional assignment to enable local governments to be more responsive to local people as well as reform of key political arrangements to make them more responsive and accountable to local people.

Concurrency as crisis decision-making governance: Lessons from Indonesia's response to the COVID-19 pandemic

Abstract: This research extends the centralization–decentralization dichotomy in the crisis decision-making literature by offering an alternative lens of concurrency. It argues that centralization and decent...

Compliance under fragmented governance: the case of ASEAN economic community implementation in four Indonesian city governments

Abstract: This article assesses the degree of compliance with international commitments by looking at the dynamics of policy implementation in four Indonesian city governments in implementing the conditions of ASEAN Economic Community reform. The article identifies an implementation gap between formal international commitments and their achievement in practice. The nature of Indonesian governance explains the gap and brings into focus central-local government relationships under highly formally decentralized systems. While forging international commitments is an exclusive responsibility of central government, the implementation of those commitments unavoidably brings in local governments. Local governments under a decentralized system may lack the knowledge or capacity to implement decisions. They may have political and economic interests that encourage non-compliance. Both sets of factors feature in this study.

Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World

Abstract: Politics of Policy ImplementationInstitutions and Democracy in AfricaThe Role of the Public Bureaucracy in Policy Implementation in Five ASEAN CountriesPublic PolicyThe Politics of EvaluationEducational Reform At The State Level: The Politics And Problems Of implementationPolicy Implementation and BureaucracyStudying Public PolicyBureaucracy and Policy ImplementationUnhealthy PoliticsPolitics and Policy Implementation in the Third WorldThe Politics of Policy ImplementationEnvironmental PolicyPolitics and Policy ImplementationImplementing Public PolicyPublic Policy and Program EvaluationPublic Policy AnalysisDisability, Civil Rights, and Public PolicyImplementation and the Policy ProcessUneven Social PoliciesPolicy Styles and Policy-MakingCreating and Implementing Public PolicyDecentralization Policy Implementation in ZambiaHealth Policy and the BureaucracyInternational E-Government DevelopmentMao's CrusadeMaking Politics Work for DevelopmentDemocracy and Economic Change in IndiaSocial WelfarePolicy Implementation in the Federal SystemThe Politics of EnergyThe Art of PolicymakingMao's CrusadeImplementation and Public PolicyMaking Health PolicyThe Politics of the EnvironmentInternational Perspectives on Educational Reform and Policy ImplementationPolitics and Policy Implementation in the Third WorldAn Analysis of Policy Implementation in the Third WorldPublic Policy and the CJEU’s Power

Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late? (vol 109, pg 354, 2015)

Abstract: This article evaluates the effect of territorial autonomy on the outbreak of internal conflict by analyzing ethnic groups around the world since WWII. Shedding new light on an ongoing debate, we argue that the critics have overstated the case against autonomy policies. Our evidence indicates that decentralization has a significant conflict-preventing effect where there is no prior conflict history. In postconflict settings, however, granting autonomy can still be helpful in combination with central power sharing arrangements. Yet, on its own, postconflict autonomy concessions may be too little, too late. Accounting for endogeneity, we also instrument for autonomy in postcolonial states by exploiting that French, as opposed to British, colonial rule rarely relied on decentralized governance. This identification strategy suggests that naïve analysis tends to underestimate the pacifying influence of decentralization.