Gary Charness

Bio: Gary Charness is an academic researcher from University of California, Santa Barbara. The author has contributed to research in topics: Wage & Equilibrium selection. The author has an hindex of 67, co-authored 278 publications receiving 21404 citations. Previous affiliations of Gary Charness include Pompeu Fabra University & University of California.

Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests

Abstract: Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of “social preferences” We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than existing experiments Our experiments show that subjects are more concerned with increasing social welfare—sacrificing to increase the payoffs for all recipients, especially low-payoff recipients—than with reducing differences in payoffs (as supposed in recent models) Subjects are also motivated by reciprocity: They withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice, and sometimes punish unfair behavior

Understanding Social Preference with Simple Tests

Abstract: Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of ?social preferences?. We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than existing experiments. Our experiments show that subjects are more concerned with increasing social welfare?sacrificing to increase the payoffs for all recipients, especially low-payoff recipients?than with reducing differences in payoffs (as supposed in recent models). Subjects are also motivated by reciprocity: They withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice, and sometimes punish unfair behavior.

Strong Evidence for Gender Differences in Risk Taking

Abstract: Are men more willing to take financial risks than women? The answer to this question has immediate relevance for many economic issues. We assemble the data from 15 sets of experiments with one simple underlying investment game. Most of these experiments were not designed to investigate gender differences and were conducted by different researchers in different countries, with different instructions, durations, payments, subject pools, etc. The fact that all data come from the same basic investment game allows us to test the robustness of the findings. We find a very consistent result that women invest less, and thus appear to be more financially risk averse than men.

Promises and partnership

Abstract: We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations so as to avoid guilt, as can be modeled using psychological game theory. When players exhibit such guilt aversion, communication may influence motivation and behavior by influencing beliefs about beliefs. Promises may enhance trustworthy behavior, which is what we observe. We argue that guilt aversion may be relevant for understanding strategic interaction in a variety of settings, and that it may shed light on the role of language, discussions, agreements, and social norms in these contexts.

Experimental methods: Between-subject and within-subject design

Abstract: a b s t r a c t In this article we explore the issues that surround within-subject and between-subject designs. We describe experiments in economics and in psychology that make comparisons using either of these designs (or both) that sometimes yield the same results and some- times do not. The overall goal is to establish a framework for understanding which critical questions need to be asked about such experimental studies, what authors of such studies can do to ameliorate fears of confoundedness, and which scenarios are particularly suscep- tible to divergent results from the two approaches. Overall, we find that both designs have their merits, and the choice of designs should be carefully considered in the context of the question being studied and in terms of the practical implementation of the research study. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition

Abstract: We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner's dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets (JEL C78, C90, D63, D64, H41)

Gender Differences in Preferences

Abstract: This paper reviews the literature on gender differences in economic experiments. In the three main sections, we identify robust differences in risk preferences, social (other-regarding) preferences, and competitive preferences. We also speculate on the source of these differences, as well as on their implications. Our hope is that this article will serve as a resource for those seeking to understand gender differences and to use as a starting point to illuminate the debate on gender-specific outcomes in the labor and goods markets.

Running experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk

Abstract: textAlthough Mechanical Turk has recently become popular among social scientists as a source of experimental data, doubts may linger about the quality of data provided by subjects recruited from online labor markets. We address these potential concerns by presenting new demographic data about the Mechanical Turk subject population, reviewing the strengths of Mechanical Turk relative to other online and offline methods of recruiting subjects, and comparing the magnitude of effects obtained using Mechanical Turk and traditional subject pools. We further discuss some additional benefits such as the possibility of longitudinal, cross cultural and prescreening designs, and offer some advice on how to best manage a common subject pool.